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Chapter-1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Performance of Mergers & Acquisitions 
Merers are important corporate strategic action' that. among other things. help the 
firm in external gro%%th and pro\ ide it competitive advantage. This area has spawned a 
vast amount of literature o\er the past halt' a center\. especiall\ in the developed 
economics of the \%orld. India too has been seeing a growth in the number of mergers 
over the past one-and-a-half decade. Studies on the post-merger long-term 
performance of firms in both the developed and the developing markets have not been 
able to come to a definite and convincing conclusion about hether mergers have 
helped or hindered firm pertornlancc. Ranlakrishnan (2008), 
This stud\ is an attempt to%~ards anal./ing the long terns performance of domestic 
mergers and acquisitions in India b\ using accounting parameters. cash flows and 
EV.A as a measure of' performance. I \\o main research approaches explain Mergers 
and .Acquisition protitabilit\. I he C\ cut <tudics examine the abnormal returns to 
shareholders in the period surrounding the announcement of a merger or acquisition. 
The accounting studies examine the reported financial results of acquirers before and 
after the acquisitions to see how the financial performance changes. Kumar and 
Prabina Rajib (2007). 
Mergers and Acquisition research results signif\ that target shareholders benefit from 
mergers. Researchers have attributed increases in equit\ value to some unmeasured 
source of real economic gains such as s\ ncrg\ . The kc\ question in the context of 
corporate control issues is whether takeo\ers are value-creating activities It can be 
stated that a given merger is successl'ul it' other things equal. it increases the total 
current calth of the o\\ners of the acquiring firm. the efficient market hypothesis 
assumes that investor's anticipation 0l' future benefits \\ ill be reflected in the merging 
firm's stock prices at the time of acquisition announcement. The post takeover 
accounting performance pleasures represent actual economic benefits generated by 
takeovers, whereas the takeover announcement returns represent the investor's 
expectation of takeover benefits, Kumar and Prahina Rajib (2007). 
There is near unanimous aereentent that target stockholders benefit from mergers, as 
evidenced by the premium they receive for selling their shares. The stock price studies 
of takeovers also indicate that bidders acnera Ift break-even, and that the combined 
equity, value of the bidding and target firms increase as a result of takeovers. These 
increases in equil% values are typicallc attributed to some unmeasured source of real 
economic gains, such as s'nergy. But the equhv value gains could also be due to 
capital market inefficiencies. For example. the equity value gains may simply arise 
from the creation of an over-valued sceurith Healy et al. (1992). 
An increasing number of studies are now attempting to understand the long-term 
performance of the firm over a few years post-merger, as such studies with longer 
horizons may provide us with butter insights on whether mergers are serving the 
intended purpose. the rationale behind stud} ing u longer time horizon post-merger. 
and not just the immediate period surrounding merger announcement, is that stock 
price movements around the latter period are only indicative of the capital market's 
expectations of the merger's performance. They are speculative in character and by no 
means stand for the actual performance of the merger. This real' or actual 
performance is reflected in. among other things, the financial reports of the 
combination for a few years after the merger. A careful analysis of these financial 
statements is indicative of the true level of post-merger performance. The term'post-
nterger' here means subsequent to the eunsuniniation of the merger that has been 
previously announced, Ramakrislinan (2008). 
Operating performance studies using accounting measures also do not reveal a 
consensual view on the effect of acquisitions. While some studies report gains (e.g. 
Healy at al., 1992: Cornett and heh rail ian, 199?: Manson. Stark and 'Thomas. 1994: 
and Ramaswamy and Salatka. 1996). some report losses (e.g. Hogarly, 1978: 
Philippatos. Choi and Dowling 1985: and Ravenscral't and Seherer. 1987), and others 
show mixed results (e.g. Necly and Rochester, 1987: and Herman and Lowenstein, 
1988). Generally, studies showing losses employ earnings based measures while 
studies showing gains use cash flow based performance measures. Very few studies 
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like Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Sharma& Ho (2002) have employed cash 
and earnings based performance measures together. It is possible that the results 
observed in the past studies are an artifact of the ntcasurcmunt of operating 
performance. This may be so because the accounting method adopted for merger 
related transactions could inlluenee earnings. Major accounting choices relate to 
immediate write-off versos capitalization for goodwill and restructuring costs, and 
revisions io the value of assets acquired (asset revaluations). Sharma and I to (2002). 
1.2 Conceptual Understanding & Findings of Key Reports on M&A 
Organizations can grow b} using the snateg) of internal growth or external growth or 
a combination of these two strategies. Firstly they can adopt the strategy of organic 
growth that is they establish their plant & machinery or expand their capacities etc. 
The benefit of such an approach is that the owner has complete control on the 
operations and expansion process. There are no problems of cultural fit, post merger 
integration. over pavment etc. which arc commonly Found when organizations adopt 
the route of external growth through mergers & acquaitlons- However, the 
disadvantage of such an approach is that. it 'ill he a time consuming process and in 
the meantime competitor may enpture the morket or the last growth period of the 
industrvs'economv mac he lost in capacity building. 
Another approach to groo or expand at a faster pace is through inorganic growth that 
is to merge with or acquire another firm. M&A benefits the organizations in several 
ways. Few of the benefits of mergers and acquisitions are Expansion of capacity at a 
faster pace, Fast and easy entry in the new industry, Fast and easy entry in the new 
geographical market, To reduce the competition and increase market power. To 
achieve the consolidation in the industry. To acquire the key source of raw material/ 
components. For taxation purpose etc. 
Synergies are by far the most common reason to motivate acquisitions and premium 
paid. Synergies fall into two categories Cost reductions and Revenue enhancement. 
Synergies arise as a result of increase of size or scale of operations; this gives rise to 
economies of scaleis;ope: vertical integration leads to complementary benclits; 
monopoly gains are resulted out of the increase in market share in a horizontal 
3 
merger: efficiency gains are realized out of superior managerial performance and 
effectiveness. 
Source: http://www.economyw•atch.coin'mergers-acquisitions. browsed on 15.l 1.09 
1.2.1 Corporate Reports on M&A: There are reports of three companies which give 
us an understanding, of mergers & acquisitions in present Indian scenario. They are 
detailed below: 
Accenture Report 2008: 
High Performance through Mergers & Acquisitions - India's New Dynamics: 
Mergers and Acquisitions have been one of the primary strategies of corporate sector 
for faster growth or entry to a new market or industry. Indian companies have 
significantly increased their M&A activity over recent years. particularly in terms of 
cross-border acquisitions. The value of deals conducted by Indian companies grew at 
a compound annual growth rate of' 28.3 percent over 2000- 2007 to reach US$ 30.4 
4 
billion in 2007, of which IJS$ 22.8 billion represented cross-border transactions. 
Many Indian companies are conducting multiple M&A deals, building a series of 
stakes in different businesses and often a variety of industries. This "string of- pearls" 
approach allows them to rapidly expand their growth opportunities and extend their 
geographical footprint. 
According to Accenture's analysis of data from Thomson Financial, as many as 643 
M&A deals were completed by Indian companies both at home and abroad in 2007. 
with a total value of US$ 30.4 billion. This represents a compound annual growth rate 
(('AGR) of 28.3 percent in deal value over the period 2000- 2007. Figure I illustrates 
the increase in both the number and size of deals over this period (Accenture-CII 
Report. 2007- High Performance through Mergers & Acquisitions: India's New 
Dynamics, India). 
Figure 1: M&A transactions by Indian companies 2000-2007 
35"00 1- 600 
30000 - 	• s- 	- Sl)U 
^► 
i 25000 
i G 
E 2000() 3 
~ 15000 I 300 I I 
w 10000 • • 200 
> 
5000 . 
I _ __ 
- 100 
A 
..r 
0 -- 	- 	
0 
r ---~- 
2000 	2001 2002 	2003 2004 	2005 2006 	2007 
■ Value (USS trillion) 
♦ Volume 
Source: Accenture analysis of.Thomson Financial data 
KPMG 2010 Report:The Determinants of M&A Success 
Key Findings of this report are as follows: 
I. Cash-only deals had higher returns than stock-and-cash deals, and stock-only 
deals Acquirers with lower P/F ratios completed more successful deals 
2. The number of prior deals pursued by an acquirer was relevant; those who 
closed three to five deals were the most successful 
3. transactions that %Here moti%ated h\ increasing_ "financial strength" %%ere 
most successful 
4. Deals that \%ere mot i'ated b\ a desire to purchase IP or technology and those 
motivated h\ a desire to increase re\enues \sere least successful 
5. the size of the acquirer (based on market capitalization) as not statistically 
'i niticant. 
Accenture Report 2012: Who Says 1&A Doesn't Create Value 
Whether or not an industr\ is poised for gro'\th turns out to he er\ germane to its 
abilits to create value from \1&A. 
this research slio\\ s a \\ ide range of 'clue-creation potential across industries, from a 
median total return to shareholders of' 25 percent fur deals in banking and capital 
markets to a discouraging negati\e 21 percent in retail and services (as given in 
chart). 
While the competiti\c d\namics in the t o sectors may seem superficially similar - 
both have bricks-and-mortar branches. both are moving to Web-based interactions 
with their customers--the pertinent factor that may explain wh\ banks succeeded in 
creating value while retailers didn't could be their outlook toward growth. Bankers 
relentlessly acquired and consolidated from 2002 to 2009, generating more M&A 
volume than any other industry as consumers across the globe valued established 
banking brands (the financial crisis that broke out in 2008 does not appear to have 
sibgnifieantP accelerated consolidation in the industry ). 
Retailers. on the other hand, thought small and looked in ard. Leading players have 
suffered well-documented challen~oes in trying to move into ne\\ markets to capture 
growth. As a result. from 2002 to 2009. there \\ere no acquisitions in the emerging 
markets retail sector by developed economy acquirers among the 500 largest deals. 
Industry is also important in the sense that less concentrated industries tend to create 
more value from M&A than more heavily concentrated industries, as measured by' the 
Ilerfindahl—I-lirschman Index. 
Their findings sho this relationship is fairly loose—after all, banking and retail are 
both relatively fragmented. Report states that "f3ut it's possible that we would have 
found more evidence of this trend IF 	hadn't confined our research to the 50O 
largest deals." 
As earlier researchers have reported, less concentrated industries offer prospective 
acquirers a target-rich environment where they can find and acquire smaller best-fit 
companies that meet their exact screening criteria—an advantage that's somewhat 
blunted lithe acquirer is determined to do a very large deal. 
I•urther, earlier researchers have reported that less-concentrated industries tend to be 
less mature and less regulated than more concentrated industries, making change 
easier to enact during a deal's critical merger integration phase. 
Is there an industry advantage? 
While deals in some industries create more value than those in other sectors, top-
quartile pert rmers in every industry create value from M&A. 
Acquirer total return to shareholders versus industry index. h industry Top 500 deals 
from June 2002 to September 2009 
(TRS measured 24 months after deal announced) 
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1.3 Theories of M&A 
There are several theories explaining the possible sources of gains following 
corporate acquisitions. Three of the common theories are the s\nerg\ or efficiency 
theor\. the market for corporate control theor\ and the free cash tlo%\ theorn. All three 
theories predict enhanced operating performance through some sort ofefticienc\. 
1.3.1 The Ss nergy Theory 
A popular explanation for acquisition is unproved etticienc\ that someho\\ a 
combination of firms \\ill re.ult in inmpro ed operations and a better financial and 
operational profile. 
.According to Chatterjee (1992) proponents of free markets have Tong maintained that 
acquisitions are value-increasing events. This improved performance is most often 
referred to as 's nertg\'. Synergy occurs hen t'\ o firms can be run more etiicientl\ 
(i.e.. 	ith lo%~er cost) and,'or more etlectikel\ (i.e.. 	ith a more appropriate allocation 
of scarce resources. gi~en environmental constraints} together than apart (Luhatkin. 
1983). The common element k impro\ed resource allocation. '\hereb\ an 
improvement in ailocative etticienc\ is expected to promote o\erall economic gains. 
As brief) explained bolo. s\nergics can he created through economics of scale. 
economies otfscope and market po er (Seth. 1990). 
(a) Economies of Scale 
The economy of scale argument posits that corporate combinations generate 
efficiencies through size. There are several potential sources of this efl'tcienc\. The 
new combined firm ma \ ha\e a much higher debt capacity and thus be able to borrow 
at a lo\\er cost (Le ellen. 1971) through better access to capital markets (Lev) and 
Sarnat. 1970). These economies ma\ he exploited h\ both conglomerate and non-
conglomerate acquisitions. A combined firm ma also be able to achieve greater 
eilicienc\ in transportation, production or management (Se'eriens. 1991). For 
instance, production linked economics nla\ he achieved in the areas of purchasing or 
in\entor\ management in the case of acquisitions in oh ink, firms using common ra%\ 
materials or components. (onsequentl\. these economics of scale should manifest in 
lo%%er operating and financing expenses thcreh\ impro ink( operating, performance. 
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(b) Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope exist \\hen managers are able to produce multiple products 
,jointl\ at lower cost than if production were spread across multiple firms (Severiens. 
1991 ). Most commonl\. both partners in an acquisition bring some complementary 
skills to the combination such that 'alue is created as a result of the acquisition (Seth. 
1990). For instance, managers \\ho acquire skills of firm A ma) find those skills ver\ 
useful in lo\\eririg costs and increasing profits in firm B. I'conomies of scope ma\ 
also arise from reuse of an input. such as sharing of production kno\%ho\% or other 
intangible assets h,, more than one product ('feecc. 1980). Efficiencies from 
economies of scope are t\ peal of non-conglomerate acquisitions and tend to improve 
operating performance through lo\\er costs. 
(c) Market Power 
Market power or pecrrniar\ economics represent another source of synergies 
(Lubatkin, 1983). These economics are achieved by the firm's ability to dictate prices 
h) exerting marker po\%cr achieved primaril\ through size. Twwo types of pecuniary 
economies are monopol.\ and monopson\ ( Porter. 1980). 'the first refers to the ability 
of a firm to fierce htners to accept higher prices. The second retcrs to the firm's ability 
to force suppliers to accept lo\\er prices. tto\\e\er. the existence of these economies 
has never been proven because of measurement problems (Shepherd. 1970). 
Regardless. market po\\er supposedl\ enhances profit margins and therefore 
protitabilit\ ofthe ne\\ economic entit\. 
1.3.2 The Market for Corporate Control Theory 
There is an established recognition that corporate acquisitions provide a mechanism 
for more effective management of the acquiree's assets (Marne. 1965). The corporate 
control market is one in "hick se\cral teams of management compete to acquire the 
right to manage the firm. Competition among these mianagemeilt teams ensures, at 
least theoreticall\. that the most efficient team manages the firm. The market 
therefore expects the ne\\ management to he more eflecti'.e than the incumbent 
management. 'Ihis increased ef'l cti~eness and efficiency should subsequently 
manifest in impro\ed operating performance. 
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Share price studies sho%%ing improved firm pertiormance consistent %pith this vie%% 
include Martin and McConnell (1991 ). Studies revie\\ed h\ Jensen and Ruback 
(1983), Jarrell et al. (1988) and Dodd (1989). Bugeja and Walter (1995) provide 
Australian evidence consistent \N ith this school of thought. 
1.3.3 Free Cash Floss Theory 
Jensen's ( I986 thcor' (, t I ree ('ash I'Io\\ posits that managers have a tendency to 
in\est •free cash floss' in negati e net present \alue projects. \\hick is contrar\ to 
shareholders' calth maximisation polio. According to Jensen ( 1986) this agenc) 
problem is particularf' se\cre for firms \%ith substantial free cash flow and limited 
,,ro\\th potential. and \\here consideration for the acquisition is eyuit\ rather than debt 
or cash. Servaes 11991) found that more value is created \\hen the consideration for 
the acquisition is cash or debt rather than equit>. This is so because the acquisition 
e\ent and the debt-load created in the process. limits management's freedom to use 
future cash flows, thereby reducing the possibility of misuse of free cash flows. The 
increased fixed interest charges of debt also compel management to he more efficient. 
Thus. according to Jensen's (1986) free cash flo\\ theory. post-acquisition 
performance should also impro~c relative to the pre-acquisition period particularly for 
rton-e quit\ purchased acquisitions. 
The three theories described ahore hate a common underpinning that corporate 
acquisition ought to generate gains in operating performance. 
1.3.4 Some other theories on 1ergers & Acquisitions 
Ilo\\ever there are se\eral other theories related to \1&A \\hick attempts to explain 
the motives 'causes behind the M&A. 
Value increasing theories 
(a) Size and returns to scale 
Benefits of site are usual source of "sv nergies". I lie bigger scale of operations leads 
to economies of scale. the average costs decline s ith larger size and large firms more 
able to implement specialization. I conomles of scope enable a firm to produce related 
additional products due to experience \\ ith existing products. 
(h) Transaction costs and information efficienc\ 
.~ccordin-, tu' (oasc t f9 7 al I1rll1 must decide bet\\cen internal or external 
production. Transaction costs ithin and outside firm determines the decision on firm 
size and merger. Williamson (1985) goes a step further by detining the transaction 
cost as a function of' "transaction frequency" and "asset specificity". Vertical 
integration is only optimal \%hen "asset specificity" and "transaction frequency" are 
high. Market structure is the best alternati\e when "asset specilicit\" is low. 
(c) lunopol% gains 
Bu in a ri\al Firm might reduce competition and increase industr\ protits. Only the 
merging firm pas the associated cost (i.e.. the cost of managing a larger corporation). 
lonopol\ po\\er from horimntal mergers is limited due to the existence of' 
competition la\\. Limited e\ idence is a\ailahle in the literature on monopol\ gains as 
a reason to acquire 
(d) Disciplinary motives (efficiency gains) 
Manne ( 1965) introduces the concept of "market for corporate control" i.e., a market 
in \\hich different management teams are competing \\ith each other. The M&A 
market is vie\\ed as an alternati\e control Mechanism to internal control. Poorl\ 
managed companies are taken o\er b\ \\ell performing companies. The `1&A market 
exerts external control on Incumbent managements According to \larane (1965. p. 
113). "greater capital losses are prevented b\ the existence of' a competitive market 
for corporate control 
Value reducing theories 
(a) AgencN costs of free cash flow (Jensen. 1986) 
As per this theory. free cash tlo\\ is a source of value reducing mergers. Firms with 
FCF are those where internal funds exceed investment required for positive NPV 
projects. 
(b) Managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and \ ishm, 1989) 
Manager,, are reluctant to C1rtribute cash to sharcholders. Investments may be in form 
of acquisitions \\here managers over pa\ but reduce likelihood of their own 
replacement. "l)isciplinar\ mergers' are solutions to these "aggenc\-problem driven 
mereers 
Jensen. 1986. p. 328 "Free cash t10 theor\ predicts \rhich mergers and takeo%ers are 
more likel\ to destro\. rather than to create, \aloe: it shows ho\\ takeover are both 
evidence of the conflicts of interest bet~\een shareholders and managers, and a 
solution to the problem" 
Mitchell & Lehn (1990) provide empirical evidence that had bidders become good 
tareet' 
Value neutral theor\ 
(a) The hubris hypothesis of "corporate taketmers" 
Merger bids result, from nianageriat hubris - managers are prone to e\ccssi\e self- 
or o\er- confidence. Competitive bidding has a distribution of value estimates. As per 
\Vinner's curse theor\. manager \\ ith most optimistic forecast %%ins bidding process, 
cursed b\ fact that the \\inning hid more likely o\ervalues target. Mergers can occur 
even when no value effects are there. Target sells \\hen hid is higher than target \alue. 
No value effects takes place under the hubris hypothesis \\ealth is transferred from the 
biddinu firm's o\\ ners to tartet shareholders. 
Roll (1986. p. 21 _2) "the hubris hypothesis can serve as the null hypothesis of 
corporate takeovers 
As stated in these divergent theories on \1&A it can he contemplated that mergers and 
acquisitions as a strateg\ to gro\\th ma\ result in the significant improvement in 
perti~rmance or the' ma \ also result in the destruction of value of the merged entit\ 
Therefore it is important to empiricall\ examine the performance of the merged 
company to examine the success/failure of M&A as a strategy for growth. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
It has aI\a\s been a matter to investigate hether \1&A are fruitful exercises or they 
are the 'ante of capital and human effort and do not lead to value enhancement. 
Therefore this stud' aims to examine long-term financial performance of domestic 
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acquisitions. This stud) examines the comhined post-merger performance of 
acquiring and target firms vis a vis combined pre-merger performance. This research 
is motivated by the inyuisitivene=s to kno 	hether takeovers create real economic 
gains and can be considered as the rewarding strategy for corporate growth. 
Here the approach is to use post-merger accounting data to directly lest for changes in 
operating performance that result from mergers. The tests use accounting data 
collected from CMIE-Prowess data base. It is recognized that accounting data are 
imperfect measures of economic performance and that these data can he affected by 
managerial decisions. 'I herefore this study also uses cash flow measures of economic 
performance to mitigate the impact of the financing of the acquisition and the method 
of accounting for the transaction. If is also recognized that these cash flow variables 
measure period-by-period performance which is affected by firm-specific and 
industry factors. Therefore industry performance is used as a benchmark to evaluate 
post-merger performance following Healy et al.. (1992). 
1.5 Methodology 
The evaluation will be done by comparing post-merger performance vis-$-vis pre-
merger performance after adjusting for industry related factors. The performance 
measures which are applied for this purpose includes profitability ratios, operating 
cash flows and economic value added. For this purpose annual financial results of 
sample companies are used and paired t-test is applied to see whether there is 
significant difference in pre and post-merger performance of sample companies. The 
application of many measures will help to check the robustness of the results. 
Further, past studies related to performance evaluation have depicted the mixed 
results. Therefore it is important to analyse, wvhc some mergers are successful while 
others not. Therefore this study also aims to probe several merger characteristics 
which may have a bearing on the performance of tit&A. The characteristics which 
will he studied include size, mode of payment, relatedness, capital structure. 
promoter's stake etc. 
For this purpose multiple regression technique is applied to assess the impact of these 
characteristics on post merger performance. In addition to it. entire sample is divided 
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into to sub-samples for each of these factors. After that post-merger performance of 
such sub-samples is evaluated separatel\. 
his work has also attempted to analyse the impact of M&A on firm performance for 
select industries. For this purpose entire sample is divided into nine sabsamples each 
representing a specific industr\. The pre and post-merger performance for these select 
industries is then compared. 
Thus %%ith the help of this study we have made an attempt to find out the performance 
of M&A and underl in- factors which may influence their performance. 
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Chapter-2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter provides the review of existing research work done in the area of 
performance evaluation of mergers and acquisition. Drooled survey of literature is 
done with more emphasis laid on M&A performance measurement related studies. It 
is an attempt to assimilate studies, observations and recommendations by earlier 
researchers. 
This review will help to identify the research gap which will play a guiding role in 
setting up objectives and scope of study. 
2.1 Categories of Studies on performance of Mergers &Acquisition 
For the evaluation of performance of Mergers and Acquisitions existing research 
work can he categorized into several avpecis of perlimnanee evaluation which are as 
follows: 
L Studies measuring performance 01 mercers & acquisition 
2. Impact of mode of paymenton the performance ofnter_ers & acquisition 
3. Impact of'size of the target firm on the perfurmanec of mergers & acquisition 
4. Comparison in the performance of related and unrelated mergers & acquisition 
5. Impact of capital structure of acquirer on mergers & acquisition performance 
6. Impact of promoter's stake and group/non-group M&A on the post merger 
performance 
7. Performance of multiple mergers & acquisitions. 
2.2 Studies measuring performance of M&A 
This Section of survey of literature has been sub-divided in the studies using the 
accounting. cash-Flows & EVA Measures for the pre & post M&A period Ibr the 
evaluation of performance of mergers & acquisition and studies using the event study 
methodology around the announcement of mergers & acquisition. 
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2.2.1 Studies using the accounting, cash-flows & EV'A measures: 
Hogart\ ( 197()) attempted to pinpoint some of' the sources of the conflicting findings 
in the anal\sis of M&A performance. This is done h\ comparing the investment 
performance and earnings per share gro\\th of acti\e acquirer to that of their 
respective industries. The first finding of' this investigation 	as that the investment 
performance of hea\il\ merging firms 	as generall\ \\arse than the average 
investment pertiirmance of' firm, in their respecti\e industries. Second. all the 
measures Used resulted in ''success distribution" this exhibited high relative 
variahilit\. I'he stock price performance of active acquirers 	as worse than their 
earning per share performance: it implied that mergers are a risk\ form of investment. 
While most active acquirer did not obtain an attractive return, a fe\\ did. The 
rclati\el\ few successful acquirers obtained er\ large returns. The prospect of these 
large returns tempted the other firms to engage in merger activity. 
Neel% and Rochester i 1982) analyzed the risk characteristics, profitahilit\ and 
performance benefits attained by mcrging savings and loan associations( S& Ls). A 
sample of' associations merged in 1Q76 as matched \\ith a group of non-merged 
associations. Data for up to ti\e semi-annual periods after merger \\ere examined fi r 
dit't rences bet\\een the t\\o groups in the Periods coincident \\ith and after the 
merger. Differences in ratios intended to measure income!profitahilit\. 
expense%efficiencv, asset structure, and risk asset quality vyere analyzed. The two 
groups were also anabzed through multivariate procedures by employing Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) in order to detennine if additional variables, in 
combination. contribute more information and are more po\verful than the tin ivariate 
tests in distinguishing bet\\een the two groups. 
This stud\ has pros ided the e\ idenee that significant differences do exist in key 
financial measures bet\\een merging and non-merging SKI.s in I. 5, Yet evidence of' 
synergy as measured h\ increased profitability of merging associations in net income 
to assets. could not he \erified. Only \Neak e\ideuce of s\ner<g\. as measured b\ 
return on net-worth. was preyed tier merging associations. Acquiring, S&Ls operating 
performance improved from the merger period throughout the post-merger period. 
particularl\ \v ith respect to gross operating income. 
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Lubatkin (1983) in his paper has reported an in-depth review of the findings of studies 
that have investigated either directl\ or indirectly the question, "I)o mergers provide 
real benefits to the acquiring firm''" Literature primarily from the field of industrial 
organizations suggested that acquiring firms nla\ benefit from merging because of 
technical. pecuniar\. and diversification s\ncrgics. I.mpirical studies, however, 
almost e\clu,i.cl\ in the field of finance and usin`_ a performance measure recentl\ 
developed from the capital asset pricing model, found that all the significant gains of 
merger go to the acquired firm,.. problem ith these studies \\a, that the treat 
merger as a homogeneous phenomenon. Strategic management literature recognized 
that mergers are not a homogeneous phenomenon. no . Rather, the can lead to a range of 
possible outcomes contingent on the strategic fit bet\veen acquired and acquiring firm. 
Ras.enscraft and Scherer (1989) tested the hypothesis that other variables maintained 
equal, if mergers result in economies of scale or scope. the post-merger profits should 
he higher than the pre-merger profits and/or their industry averages. Their study of 
2.732 lines of business for the \-cars 1975-77 did not find an improvement in the 
post-merger operating performance. In fact. N\ith no control for the merger accounting 
methods (purchase %s pooling). there was a significant negative impact of I 3.34 per 
cent on the post-merger profitahilit\. One important shortcoming of' the Ravenscraft 
and Scherer stud\ 	as the nonalignment of' the post-acquisition period \pith the 
acquisition e%ent. leading to non-validit\ of the results. 
Heal\. Palepu and Ruback (1992) addressed the issue of whether mergers improved 
performance, and if they did so, what the sources of' economic (lain %ere. l he\ stated 
that traditional stock price performance studies have been unable to determine 
~sllether mergers lead to long-term economic gains, resulting in a gap in our 
understanding of post-merger firm performance. They addressed this (yap through this 
research \%ork. The also tried to inlpro\c upon the methodolog\ of the earlier ork 
by Ravenscrafl and Scherer ( I989). A sample of the 5O largest mergers of public 
industrial firms in the (S. completed het\\een IQ7Q and mid-1984. 's as used. Cash 
tlo\\ measures were used to studs the post-merger performance. According to them, 
cash floo\\s are representati\e of'the actual economic benefits generated h\ the assets. 
Pre-tax operating, cash tlo returns on assets \sere used to measure the impro'ements 
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in operating performance. Their definition of operating cash tlo was sales. minus 
cost of goods sold and selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and 
goodwill expenses. This measure was deflated bN the market value of assets (market 
value of equit\ plus book value of net debt) to make it comparable across time and 
firms. This measure as unaffected b depreciation. goodwill, interest expense and 
income, and ta\es. I he aregate industry 	pre-merger and post-merger 
performance measures \\ere calculated. fire \car, prior to and subsequent to the 
merger. and then these t o \\ere compared to stud\ the change in post-merger 
performance. The firm-specific. econom\. and industr\ factors that might influence 
post-merger performance. crc thu1, controlled fir. An increase in the post-merger 
operating cash tlo\\ returns v is-:i-vi, the firms' industries was observed. The increase 
was 2.8 per cent per \ear. alter controlling for the pre-merger performance. I he 
improvements in operating cash flows after merger were due to enhancement of asset 
productivit\ post-merger. I lea!). Palepu and Ruback also correlated their post-merger 
cash flo%% performance and merger-announcement related stock market performance 
and found a significant positive correlation bet%\een these to measures indicating 
that the stock market correctl\ re \ clues the merging firms at announcement in 
expectation of the iinpro\ement. in operating performance in the future. 
Cornett and Tchranian (1992) studied the post-acquisition performance of 30 large 
banks in the United States. I hese acquisitions took place hety een 1982 and 1987. 
Each of these acquisitions had a purchase price exceeding S l00 million. i he) 
measured economic performance related to the mergers in a manner similar to Heal\. 
Palepu and Ruback (1992). Operating cash Ilo s divided b\ the market value of 
assets were used for performance evaluation. The pre-merger performance was 
computed for years -I to -3 before the merger. \%hereas post-merger performance was 
studied over the \ ears - I to • 3 after the merger. Comparing the latter v. ith the former 
is indicative of the impact of the merger on firm performance. The industry mean data 
as subtracted from the ra 	sample-firm data to proside the industry-adjusted 
performance. prior to the comparison beth\een the pre and post-merger figures. This 
was done to ensure that the influence of' econom\-wide or industr\ factors on the 
performance data calculated as asoided. l here as a significant (at the 1°'% level) 
increase of I.2 per cent in performance post-merger as compared to before the 
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merger. This stud\ pertained spccilieal1\ to the t S banking industr\ and hence its 
results ma' not he Leneralizahle across other industries. Also. like in the Heals. 
Palepu and Ruhack's (19921 paper, selecting onl\ the largest mergers may lead to 
results that cannot he generalized across all sizes of mergers. such as the ones taking 
place in India. Nevertheless, the nlethodolog adopted here serves as it guiding post 
for future studies ol'the same kind. 
S\\ itier (1996) used the nlethodolog\ l'o1lo' ed b\ I Iea1\. Palepu and Ruback (1992), 
focused on anal' sing the post-merger changes in operating performance. Researchers 
contention as that the latter stud co\cred the "merger mania" period in the I. 'S and 
not nlcrgers in general. It thus made sense. according to S itzer. to take up a longer 
period of mergers in the l'5. in order to he certain about the applicability of the results 
of such a stud' to periods not \\ itness to a merger \\a\e. I he studs '\as of 324 
acquisitions occurring between 1967 and 1987 in the (iS. using the cash flow-based 
measure of operating performance as in Heal. Palepu and Rubach (1992). It 
concluded that mergers led to synergistic gains and better performance in the long-
term. the median improvement over five \ears post-merger being a significant 1.97 
per cent. 
Larsson and Finkelstein ) I999) 1o110\\ed an approach that differed from traditional 
methods of studying mergers and acquisitions in three \\a\s (I) the success of a 
merger or acquisition as gauged h\ the degree of s nerg realization rather than 
more removed and potentiallk ambiguous criteria such as accounting or market 
returns: (2) the he' attribute of combination potential as Conceptualized not only in 
terms of the similarities present across businesses, as in most studies of mergers and 
acquisitions, but also in terms of the production and marketing conlplementarities 
between the two businesses: and (3) the data were derived from a case survey method 
that combined the richness of in-depth case studies with the breadth and 
generalizahility of large-sample empirical investigations. The framework was tested 
empiricall\ across a sample of 61 mergers and acquisitions. The extent to which a 
merger or acquisition resulted in synergistic benefits was related to the strategic 
potential of the combination, the degree of organizational integration after the deal 
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as completed. and the lack of emp)o\cc resistance to the integration of' the joining 
firms. 
Manson ct. al. (2000) studied 44 takeovers in the l:K completed betecn Januan 1. 
1985 and December 11. 1987. \\ herein the total market value of each of the acquired 
firms was over £ 5 million, in a re-examination of the issue of whether UK takeovers 
resulted in operating gains for the merging firms. They used the cash-flow based 
measure of operating performance as also the research methodology innovated and 
introduced b\ I Ieal\. Palepu and Ruback (1992) and Cornett and Tehranian (1992). 
Regressing post-takeoser operating performance on pre-takeover operating 
performance ruing eight %ariants of the measure. the\ found that takeovers had led to 
operating gains ranging from 2 per cent to 14 per cent per sear postmerger. This study 
also pro\ ided c%idence for non-operating gains resulting from takeovers. 
Ghosh (2001) focused on merging firms' operating performance after corporate 
acquisitions. The sample consisted of 315 pairs of' target and acquiring firms for 
which mergers were completed bet\~een 1981 and 1995. The performance measure 
used was operating cash flows, both pre- and post-merger, defined as sales minus cost 
of goods sold. minus selling and administrative expenses. plus depreciation and 
good \\ ill amortization expenses. the studs compared the pre- and post-acquisition 
performance of merging firms using.; control firms as benchmarks. instead of using 
industry-median benchmarks as used in I leak. Palepu and Ruhack (1992). Ghosh 
contended that using industry-median benchmarks could lead to 	non-random 
measurement errors since firms undertake acquisitions following a period of superior 
performance. The control firms' ere matched on the basis of' similar operating cash 
tlo\% performance and total asset size before the acquisition. loth size and 
preacquisition performance \\ere thus accounted for. Using a methodology similar to 
Heal\. Palepu and Ruback (1992), the stud' found that the cash flows of merging 
firms increased significantly by 2.4 per cent every year. The median increase in cash 
(lows post-merger by 0.26 per cent per year %%as statistically insignificant. when the 
sample firms were compared with matched firms. This paper assumed that only large-
sized and \%ell-performing firms gcncrall\ go in for mergers. I his assumption may 
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not be valid in the Indian \1&A context \\here we have even small and under-
performing firms adopting the merger route to ;gro' th and to satisfs other motives. 
Sharma and Ito ( 20021 ins estigated. \\ hether corporate acquisitions create s\ nergies 
reflected in corporate operating performance measures. They analyzed a sample of 36 
Australian acquisitions occurred between 1986 to 1991 using matched firms to control 
for industry and econonl\-wide factors. The study found that on the basis of four 
accrual and tour cash tlo%\ performance pleasures. corporate acquisitions did not lead 
to significant post-acquisition improvements in corporate operating performance. The 
results were consistent \\ith Case\ et al.'s, (1987) ,Australian capital markets studs. 
the \arious performance Indicators employed in this study explained that 
inconsistencies in prior research could be attributed to diflcrences in performance 
indicators used to capture s\ncrgistic benefits. the stud> also found that the type of 
acquisition (conglomerate \ersus non-conglomerate) and the form of acquisition 
financing (cash. share or a combination) do not signiticantl\ influence post-
acquisition performance. Similarly. the size of' the acquisition and the payment of a 
premium (good \\ ill) do not influence post-acquisition performance. While the results 
\\ere not consistent \pith the synergy theory underlying corporate acquisitions, the 
results v ere interpreted consistent with the agency. the hubris and the financial 
moti\ation hypotheses. This was consistent with the arguments of Bujega and Walter 
(19951. SpeciticalI>. B ujega and Walter (1995) concluded that management of 
Australian acquirers tend to elevate their interests to the detriment of the 
shareholders'. This suggests that corporate acquisitions in Australia may not be 
undertaken tOr synergistic reasons. 
.Agra~~al and Jaffe (2003) examined the issue of underpertormance of takeover targets 
in a large scale empirical stud\ and \\ ith a number of methodological improvements. 
First. they examined both operating and stock return performance prior to acquisition. 
Second, they measured operating performance after adjusting for size, industry, and 
past performance. as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996). Third. they calculated 
long-term abnormal stock returns for the 1965-1996 period, after adjusting for firm 
size, book-to market, and nf(rm1entunl. In addition, based on the findings of' Lyon, 
Barber. and Tsai (1999). their anal> sis used equall\ -weighted portfolios of monthly 
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abnormal returns and avoided the ne\\ listing_ bias in forming control portfolios. They 
computed f- statistics using the Calendar time abnormal returns (('TAR) methodology. 
Fourth. they proposed an improvement on the calendar portfolio method of Jaftc 
(1971) and \landeIker ( I9741. t -itth. the\ used a large sample of' acquisitions spanning 
a 71-\ear time period and examined performance over 100 months before the 
acquisition announcement. sixth. they performed a rigorous examination of 
subsamples where takeovers \sere more likely to he disciplinary. 
Whether analysing operating or stock returns. the found no evidence of pre-
acquisition underperformance lax the target sample as a whole. The test statistics were 
insignificant o\er \irtuall\ all the inter'als they examined prior to the acquisition 
announcement. In addition. pre-acquisition performance \%as economically small. The 
median \aloes of (WA and ()PS "cre actuall\ greater for tarr;ets than tor controls in 
most of the pre-acquisition years that the examined. For stock returns. the CAAR 
from month -100 to month - I tier the entire 1926-1996 period was onl\ -1.9 i%. lhe 
results here are consistent \+ith the previous literature \\here there is little evidence of' 
pre-acquisition underpertOrmance for the entire sample of targets. 
Rarnas\vamv and \Vaegelein (2003) studied the post-merger financial performance of 
162 merging firms that occurred during 1975-1990 in the US. They used industry-
adjusted operating cash flow returns on market ralue of assets as the measure of 
performance. which as similar to the one used by Heal\. Palepu and Ruback (1992). 
Even their methodology \\as the same as in the latter. except that they used only firms 
that had not (lone in for any merger during the studs period as part of their control 
sample. since the felt that onl\ that \could make the data incorruptible and the results 
more robust. The examined the financial performance of the combined target and 
acquiring firms over a period of 5 \ears post-nmcr~acr period in relation to the 
corresponding pre-merger period. The stud\ found a significant increase in firm 
performance after the merger had taken place. The study found that the post-merger 
performance 	as negativel\ associated \\ith the relative target size and positively 
associated with long-term incentive compensation plans. Firms that %ere in dissimilar 
industries also shoed improved performance. 
Rahman and I nnnack (2004) tested for evidence of operating improvements in 
Malaysian acquisitions by examining operating perfonnanee for a sample of 94 
quoted acquiring and 113 target Vlalmsian companies involved in acquisitions over 
the period January I. 1988 to December 31. 1992. The majority of target companies 
that were included in the sample were private companies and were therefore much 
more likely to be entering into voluntary combinations with their acquirer than is 
often the case in other studies. Therefore they did not e pect to observe the same 
characteristics in their sample as those that were hypothesised for companies involved 
in disciplinary takeovers. 	 - 
The initial analysis confirmed this view as, prior to the acquisition, target companies 
had higher operating performance than their control companies, but acquiring firms 
have lower operating performance than either their controls or the target companies. 
The results of subsequent analysis suggested that operating cash flow performance for 
combined firms in Malaysian acquisitions improved significantly following 
acquisitions. 
Analysis of the components of operating cash Flow indicated that improvements in 
post-acquisition performance were driven both by an increase in asset productivity 
and also by the higher levels of operating cash flow generated per unit of sales. 
Increases in capital expenditure rates in the post-acquisition period suggest that the 
combined firms have not sacrificed their long-term investments for the sake of short-
term profitability. 
The findings of this paper raised several interesting issues for failure research. The 
conclusion that acquisitions improve post-acquisition operating performance, based 
on analysis of operating cash tlows, appears to be contrary to the results reported in 
those studies in the UK and the US that have employed accounting data to examine 
improvements in operating performance. A pattern of negative post-acquisition 
performance reported in accounting-based studies may be a consequence of the 
acquisition accounting methods adopted or potential earnings manipulation, neither of 
which affected the measurement rules used in this study. The results, however, 
suggested that at least in Malaysian acquisitions, there is the potential for 
improvements in operating performance. The results also suggested that opportunities 
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for economic gains from takeover activit\ may also differ according to the form and 
ownership characteristics of targets 
Yook (2004) examined post-acquisition pertorrttance of acquiring firms using EVA. 
Ile stated that \\hereas examining long-term stock returns has been a popularly used 
approach. the use of accounting and financial data is appropriate to measure directly 
post-acquisition operating performance ;gains. I raditional accounting rate of returns 
and profitabilit\ measures are criticized fir their deficiencies in measuring 
performance, particularly because they ignore capital costs and have the potential for 
manipulation of' accounting data. A nevv performance measure. EVA, overcomes 
these flaws existing in conventional financial metrics as a true performance measure. 
After examining 75 large acquisitions occurring. during 1989 to 1993, this study found 
that acquiring firms experienced significantly deteriorating, operating performance 
after the completion of acquisitions. The results indicated that the sharp decline in the 
ra\\ I.VA as mostl\ accounted liar h\ the industr\ effects. This reinforced the vie\% 
that industries experiencing relatikcly poor operating, performance are likely to be the 
object of takeover activit\. 
A different picture unfolded \\hen premiums paid to target firm~ were taken into 
account in the analysis. When NV  \\as calculated assuming that no premium was 
paid to target firms. i.e.. the premium vas excluded from the acquiring firm's capital 
in the post-acquisition period. industrN-adjusted EVA showed a slight improvement. 
The post-acquisition aggregate median EVA for this sample increased $5 million 
compared to the pre-acquisition period. These results suggest that acquiring firms tend 
to experience slightly improved performance relative to their industry counterparts 
after completion of the acquisition. But the improved operating performance is 
negated b\ the capital costs of the large premiums paid to the target firm, creating no 
real economic gains to the acquiring firm's shareholders. These findings indicate that 
acquisitions are zero net present value investments for acquiring firms. 
In addition, this stud\ examined hether post-acquisition performance differs across 
the transaction characteristics that include type of acquisition (mergers or tender 
otters). method of payment (cash or stock). business similarity between the acquiring 
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firm and the target firm, and premiums paid to target firms. Among these four 
characteristics only the mergers/tender offers variable is statistically significant. The 
findings indicate that larger premiums paid in tender offers can he justified by the 
higher improvement in operating performance later. 
Gregory (2005) used a dataset of UK take-overs and proxies for free cash flow similar 
to those used by Lang. Stulz and WaIking t 1991), they Ibund no support I'or the FCF 
hypothesis and showed that this conclusion was robust to the model of long run 
returns employed. Contrary to the free cash flow hypothesis there was evidence that 
acquirers with high Gee cash Ilow performed better Than acquirers with low free cash 
flow. Although not consistent with the Jensen hypothesis. this evidence was 
compatible with the emerging UK evidence that shows cash flow-to-price measures 
are associated with market returns. 
Cornett, Mcnutt and Tehranian (2006) examined hank performance around mergers. 
While previous research has examined the performance of banks around a merger, 
changes in long-term operating performance (including art extensive examination of 
the revenue enhancement and cost reduction sources for any performance changes). 
for both large and small bank mergers were not examined. This paper filled this void. 
Further, the paper examined performance changes before and after the passage of the 
Riegle-Neal Act. The empirical results led to the conclusion that industry-adjusted 
operating performance of merged hanks increased sign i licantl} after a merger. They 
also found that large bank mergers produced greater performance gains than small 
bank mergers, activity focusing mergers produce greater performance gains than 
activity diversifying mergers. geographically focusing mergers produce greater 
performance gains than geographically diversifying mergers. and performance gains 
were larger after the implementation of full nationwide banking in 1997 via the 
Riegle-Neal Act. Further, they found the improved performance was the result of both 
revenue enhancement and cost reduction activities. Additionally. the revenue 
enhancement opportunities appeared to he most profitable in those mergers that 
offered the greatest opportunity for cost cutting activities. i.e.. activity focusing and 
geographically focusing mergers. Finally, they found that along with the increase in 
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accounting-based operating performance, the merged banks also experienced positive 
abnormal long-run stock returns. 
I lomburg and Bucerius (2006) stated that previous research on mergers and 
acquisitions has neglected the issue of .speed of post-merger integration by and large. 
This paper argued that there are benefits and detriments associated with speed of 
integration. Thus. in some situations speed may he highly beneficial whereas in others 
it ma y be harmful to the success ofa merger or acquisition. Results from a survey of 
232 horizontal mergers and acquisitions showed that speed is most beneficial when 
external relatedness is logs and at the same time internal relatedness is high. In 
contrast, speed is highly detrimental in the case of low internal and high external 
relatedness. 
Cloodt. I lagedoorn and Kranenburg (2006) examined the post _M&A innovative 
performance of acquiring firms in Ibur major high-tech sectors. Von-technological 
M&As appeared to have a negative impact on the acquiring firm's post-M&A 
innovative performance. With respect to technological M&As, a large relative size of 
the acquired knowledge base reduced the innovative performance of the acquiring 
firm. The absolute size of the acquired knowledge base only had a positive effect 
during the first couple of years alter which the effect turns around and it negative 
effect on the innovative performance of the acquiring firm was visible. The 
relatedness between the acquired and acquiring l firms knots ledge bases had a 
curvilinear impact on the acquiring farm's innovative perlhnnance. This indicated that 
companies should target M&A pamper' that are neither ton unrelated nor too similar 
in terms of their knowledge base. 
Liu. Chen and Pai (2007) investigated the difference in corporate performance 
evaluation between telecommunications companies that did and did not pursue M&A 
strategies. It also discussed the corporate performance of specific companies before 
and after M&A transactions. Data cnvelopntent analysis was applied to assess the 
performance of 60 t ai,%anese telecommunications companies, based on 20 financial 
indicators. The empirical results revealed that M&.4 strategy does not seem to 
enhance corporate performance in the telecommunications industry, whilst an Internal 
growth strategy does improve corporate performance. 
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titcnamara. Ilalehlian and D\kes (2008) assessed industr\ acquisition \\aver from 
1984 throuih 2004. Acquisitions often occur in 	a\ es %\ ithin industries. They 
extended the theoretical understanding of such \paves by dra\\ing upon research on 
earl\ mover advantage and band~\agon effects to develop arguments regarding the 
likel\ performance potential of participating at different points in an acquisition wave. 
In line \\ ith their theoretical model, they found acquisition performance was higher 
for earl\- movers but lo\\er for acquirers that participated at the height of the 
acquisition wave. Although the found this general performance trend, their findings 
suuuest both industr\ and acquirer characteristics influence the degree to t\hich firms 
seize earl\ mover advantages or fall pre\ to band\\agon pressures. 
Ulah. I arooq, Ullah and Ahmad (2O10) examined \%hether corporate marriages 
(M&A) long lasting and productive in term of value? I he\ have analyzed the pre and 
post-merger performance of (ila\o Smith Kline h\ applying the net present value 
approach of valuation. Compan\ has suhstantiall\ reduced the cost $1.8 a year, to be 
comprised of combining their R&D operations. manufacturing consolidation and 
substantial headcount reduction. Any ho\\ the debate of value creation in future is still 
questionable. 
Abd-Kadir. Selamat and Idros (2010) investigated the extent of merger and 
acquisition activitv affect Malaysian banks' productivity over the period 2003-2007. 
It analyzed both the technological changes and also technical efficiency changes of 
the merged banks in Malaysia using a nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and Malmquist Index approach. It \vas found that total factor productivit\ 
(1'TTP) had increased in si\ out of the nine banks tested t%ith the mean total TFP for all 
banks also recorded an increase of 10.1% this increase \ti as attributed solely to 
technological advances, such as innovations in the banking technology. Moreover. 
this study revealed that the process of mergers and acquisitions has actually increased 
the efficiency and productivity growth ofthe banking groups in Malaysia. 
Ismail. Ahdou and Annis (201 1) examined the operating performance of a sample of 
E,\ptian companies involved in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) transactions for 
the period 1990 to 200. I he anaf\ sis \\ as based on the accounting measures to test 
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the effects of' M&A on the corporate performance of the construction and technology 
sectors. 
Total sample analysis indicated that \l&A did not affect the operating performance of 
the Egyptian merged companies. \\ ith respect to sector level, the findings suggested 
that M&A in the construction sector has contributed in improving firms' protitabilit) 
but failed to improve efficiency, liquidity, solvency and cash flow position, whereas 
in the technology sector it has riot. The results might be explained and justified based 
on the following first. the industry sector has an effect on the success of M&A. By 
anal zing the financial statements of both the sectors, reports of the board of 
directors. and information published in Kom pass kgvpt Financial Year Book. it can 
be concluded that none of the thou sectors encountered different circumstances 
internall\ or externall\ other than M&\ transactions. Therefore. differences in 
performance resulting in the t\\o sectors relate mostly to the t\ pe of sector. 
Lahovnik & Malcnkovic (201 1) examined the factors that influenced the performance 
of acquisitions in Slovenia. The performance of an acquisition was measured by 
comparing the acquisition's motives with its outcomes. The acquisitions were divided 
into three types hori7.ontal. vertical and conglomerate. The research sample included 
31 horizontal acquisitions, 23 conglomerate acquisitions and 4 vertical acquisitions 
for the period 1998-2008. Managers \\ho answered the questionnaires had been 
included from the start of the acquisition process and were well aware of all strategic 
factors that determined the acquisition. The result of this research implicated that the 
so-called strategic and organizational tit bet een companies in%olved in M&A play 
an important role in improving the operational performance of the acquired 
companies in the post-acquisition period. Increasing relatedness 	especially \\ith 
regard to certain competencies and skills 	between companies involved in an 
acquisition increases the chances ofsuccess. 
Hao and Howe (201 1) examined the effects of the two types of merger structures from 
the shareholder point of view. \\-here two structures are one-step and two-step 
transactions. In order to compare the shareholder wealth effects of merger structure. 
the authors control for deal and firm characteristics and the endogenous nature of the 
choice of transaction form. Speciticall'. the authors follo\\ the literature to use a 
switching regression framework with endogenous switching to address endogeneity. 
No evidence was found of detrimental cl7ecls of two-step mergers on target 
shareholders. The findings suggested that at least some one-step mergers could heneft 
from using the two-step structure. The authors provided several explanations for the 
continued use vt one-step mergers. 
good and Kaur (2004) analyzed the post-takeover performance of the target firms. 
The study utilized a sample of 20 companies targeted during the financial year 1997-
98. The mean value of a set of eight financial ratios based on a period of three years 
each immediately preceding and succeeding the takeover attempt were calculated and 
compared. 	the two profitability ratios viz. BBITISalcs and ROCS Indicated a 
significant decline in the performance of target companies in the post-takeover period. 
This as reinforced by the fact that their efficiency, as measured by Asset Turnover 
ratio also declined substantially. Also the liquidity and solvency position of these 
companies, as shown by current ratio, cash flow to sales aid debt-equity ratio, have 
not shown any significant improvement. Fur?her the market response to these 
takeovers as indicated he F V/F.BIDA and market price to hook value also presented a 
dismal picture. None of these ratios was found to be significantly different in the two 
periods when tested in terms oft-test. In sum, the results reported indicated that post-
takeover performance of the target firms have, in general, deteriorated on different 
parameters. 
Kumar and Rai ib (2007) examined the post-merger operating performance of merged 
firms. The analysis in this studs was based on the 57 large mergers that occurred 
during 8-year period between 1995 and 2002. To be included in their sample, a Firm 
had to meet the following conditions. First, it acquired a firm whose asset size 
constituted at least 10% of its own asset size. The asset size for both Firms were 
measured at the beginning of the year in \, hich merger took place. The first condition 
was imposed to concentrate on large mergers. Second. the acquiring firm's financial 
data were available for a period of three years before and after the year of merger. 
third, those mergers were eliminated from the sample if the acquirer firm was 
involved in more than four mergers over the event period in order to reduce the 
problem of confounding events. For each of the acquiring firm and target firm, a 
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matched control firm %%as selected from the same industry and asset size group. The 
pre and post-acquisition operating cash tlo\\ perti~rmance of merging firms relative to 
matched firms crc compared to determine hether operating performance improved 
following mergers. Merging firms %\ere matched on the basis of pre-acquisition 
performance and size. Three alternate methodologies were utilized for the study in 
\%hich cash tlrn\ \\as deflated h\ market \aloe of assets, hook value of assets and the 
sales value. The results based on book \aloe of assets and sales model provide some 
evidence to suggest that corporate performance improved after mergers. The model 
based on market value of assets doesn't support the hypothesis that operating 
performance improves after mergers. The use of' different deflators - accounting 
measures versus market measures which \\ere sensitive to market revaluations have 
contributed to different results. 
Mantravadi and Redd\ (2007) studied the impact of mergers on the operating 
performance of acquiring corporates in different industries, by examining some pre-
merger and post-merger financial ratios. \\ ith the sample of firms chosen as all 
mergers involving public limited and traded companies in India between 1991 and 
2003. The pre-merger and post-merger a~crages fir a set of' key financial ratios were 
computed for 3 years prior to, and 3 \.ears after, the year of merger completion. For 
the 'ears prior to a merger. the operating ratios of the acquiring firer alone \%ere 
considered. Post the merger, the operating ratios for the combined firm were taken. 
The post-merger performance was compared with the pre-merger performance and 
tested for significant differences. using paired "t" test. Only mergers where equity 
stock of' acquiring firm 	as issued to acquired firm (target) shareholders, as 
consideration for the acquisition 	merger have been considered for the study. 
Instances where there have been onl\ cash acquisitions \\ere excluded from this 
study. to ensure comparahilith of results across the sample. Also deleted from the list 
were mergers where the relative size was less than IO%. as it as felt that such low-
size acquisition cannot make a significant impact on operating performance of the 
acquiring company. The results suggested that there are minor variations in terms of 
impact on operating performance following mergers. in different industries in India. 
In particular, mergers seem to have had a slightly positive impact on profitability of 
firms in the banking and finance industry, the pharmaceuticals, textiles and electrical 
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equipment sectors saw a marginal negative impact on operating performance (in terms 
of profitability and returns on investment). For the Chemicals and Agri-products 
sectors, mergers had caused a significant decline, both in terms of profitability 
margins and returns on investment and assets 
Ramakrishnan (2(1)8) tested the hypothesis that mergers in India have helped firms 
perform better in the long-term. lie initial IN identified 414 mergers between 1993 and 
2005. Mergers taking place in the linanclal sector were dropped due to differing 
accounting standards applicable to them that make comparison with other ftnns 
difficult. Only domestic mergers taking place in India were selected. Cross-border 
mergers, i.e., in which either the bidder or the target was based outside India. were 
dropped. 
The final sample size used for analyses was thus 87 pairs or mergers consisting of 174 
firms (87 each of targets and bidders). the average relative size of the target to the 
bidder firm was 0.59. where size was measured as the total assets of the first. He 
applied paired t-test on 3 wars pre and post merger industry adjusted performance 
measure, CFFO. He also applied regression analysis to fitter out the impact of pre-
merger performance on post-merger performance. 
He concluded that, on an average, merging firms in India appear to have performed 
better financially after the merger, as compared to their performance in the pre-merger 
period. This improvement in performance can be attributed to the merger. Synergistic 
benefits appear to have accrued to the merged entities due to the transformation of the 
uncompetitive, fragmented nature of Indian fines before merger. into consolidated 
and operationally more viable business units. What this study thus indicates is that in 
the long run, mergers appear to have been financially beneficial for firms in Indian 
industry. 
On studying the long-term post-merger performance of firms by the two constituents 
of the measure of performance (operating cash flow scaled by the assets) --operating 
margin and sales turnover — this study obtained some insights into the sources of 
economic gains. The long-term post-merger operating margin of firms, on an average. 
appears to have improved. This means that higher incremental operating cash flows 
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are being generated per unit net sales by the firms after the merger. This means that 
higher profits (before accounting for depreciation, interest, and taxes) being generated 
through the net sales. This might also indicate size effects. i.e., the economies of scale 
obtained by the merged firms due to tshich the fixed costs appear to have been 
lowered. On the other hand, there does not appear to he am change in the sales 
turnover of the arms. on an average, after the merger. Therefore it cannot he 
concluded that the net sales per unit of asset invested have increased after the merger. 
i.e.. the increase in the efficiency of utilisation of assets to generate higher net sates 
cannot be inferred from these findings. To sum up, this study renews or reaffirms 
confidence in the Indian managerial fraternity to adopt M&As as fruitful instruments 
of corporate strategy for growth. 
Singh and Mogla (2008) studied a sample of 56 companies merged between 1994 and 
2002 and compared the pre-merger and post-merger operating performance of merged 
companies. The analysis was done by calculating the mean performance values as 
well as the significance of their differences using the t-test across the pre-merger and 
post-merger periods. Besides, regression analysis was applied to find the significant 
variables affecting the profitability. Regression results indicated That profitability 
declined significantly after the merger. Current ratio, debt equip ratio and size bear a 
negative impact on profitability. Interest coverage ratio contributes positively towards 
profitability. Group firms  "ore likely to show improved performance in future. 
The study highlighted that even after five years of merger. the firms could not 
improve their performance. Similar decline in performance was observed for 
matching firms. Thus, the decline in the performance of merging firms cannot be 
attributed to merger alone, rather it seems to be economy specific. It was found that 
there were strong prospects oilmprovements in prolitabi lity. Group and unrelated 
firms may improve when compared to non-group and related Runs in terms of 
RONW. while ROCE would improve in related and group firms. Interest coverage is 
a better predictor of prnfitabi lity than debt-equity ratio. Overall, it can he said that 
with the passage of time the profitability of merged firms would improve as indicated 
by the significantly positive coetlicicnls of constant and age. 
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Mann and Kohli (2005) empirically evaluated the synergistic gains from bank 
mergers by dividing them into two categories of forced mereerc and market driven 
mergers. In order to evaluate the market reaction towards the announcement of bank 
mergers. first Iy. the standard event study methodology as pronounced by Fama (1976) 
and Tama and MacBeth (I Q73) has been applied. Thereafter the paired sample 
technique has been applied to measure the post-merger financial performance ofthese 
banks to find out whether the market has correctly assessed the worth of the merger at 
the time of its announcement or not. 
The empirical results indicate that markets have reacted negatively to the 
announcement of forced mergers while the reaction has been positive to that of 
market driven mergers. In line with the market expectation, forced mergers have not 
added any value to both the balance sheet and profitability variables of merged banks 
in the post-merger period. Although market driven mergers have not immediately 
improved the profitability of merged banks, but they have improved the balance sheet 
variables of merging banks and have provided these banks an edge over the 
competitors in terms of geographic dispersion, influence in new regions where the 
merging entity lacked presence and extended product portfolios and thus have 
provided a better vehicle for growth. 
Singh (2009) analyzed the recent mergers (involving both private and nationalized 
banks) by using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). They analyzed 10 mergers of 
reasonable size in the post-2000 period. "Ihey analyzed the profit efficiency and cost 
efficiency of the acquiring bank to see whether there have been gains from 
consolidation. They found that while mergers don't seem to impact the cost and profit 
efficiency in an adverse manner and whatever loss that happened initially was 
recovered quickly. The private sector mergers that have taken place since the turn of 
the millennium have shown positive results. In case of pSBs there has been no market 
driven merger. They maintained that they do not have sutticiett evidence to accept or 
reject any of the efficiency hypothesis in case of PSBs. 
Sinha and Kaushik (2010) examined the impact of mergers and acquisition, on the 
financial efficiency of the selected financial institutions in India. The analysis 
consisted of two stages. Firstly. by using the ratio analysis approach, they calculated 
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the change in the position of the companies during the period 2000-2008. Secondly. 
the examined changes in the efticienc\ of the companies during the three years pre 
and post-merger periods h\ using nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. This 
stud\ concentrated on the financial sector companies. The sample under stud\ 
included 17 companies in financial sector. 
O erall. the result of the stud' Indicated that in most of the \1&A cases, in the long 
run the acquiring firms \\ere able to generate \clue creation in one or the other form. 
that is higher cash flo%%s because of cost cutting and greater market po er. however in 
spite of improved financial pert rmance .,i\t\ four per cent of cases shoed increased 
debt to equity ratio. Profit hetore tax in all the merging cases has sho n a positive 
trend for financial sector companies. 
Singh and Mogla (2010) examined the protitabilit,, of acquiring firms in the pre- and 
post-merger periods. The sample consisted of 153 listed merged companies. Five 
alternative measures of profitability \ere employed to study the impact of mergers on 
the profitahilit' of acquiring firms. The results reveal that profitability declined in 
55% of companies, and only 29% of companies could improve their protitabilit\. 
Protitabilith results %ere not robust to the \arious measures applied in the studs. For a 
fe\\ companies. though OPM. \P\1. and ROCS declined, their RONW improved. 
ROCI., 	hich is called master ratio. seemed a better measure of profitahilit\ than 
RON\\ . Out of the total 153 acquirers. 38 companies acquired sick units. and the 
remaining I IS acquired health\ units. Profitability anal\sis was conducted for these 
to groups. Around 55% of the companies experienced a decline in profitability in 
both the groups. DuPont analysis revealed that ATR declined significantly, whereas 
OPM improved significantly follo\\in,, the merger. Therefore, profitability declined 
due to poor asset utilization. Irrespective of the fact whether the acquired units were 
health\ or loss-incurring. profitahilit\ of acquirers remained the same in both the 
cases. It suggests that managers should gi\e due attention to proper utilization of' 
ne%%I\ acquired assets. 
Ramakrishnan (2010) anal\zed the performance of merged companies and factor 
influencing it. Pre-tax operating cash tlo\\ deflated h\ the operating assets was used to 
measure firm Performance The ra\\ firm operating perti~rmance figures calculated 
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%ere adjusted for industr% and economic effects. the change in performance on 
account of the merger 	as captured h) comparing the post and pre-merger 
performance measure. A paired-samples t-test was carried out to evaluate whether the 
difference between AIACFI.POST and AIACFI.PRF was statistically significant. He 
concluded that mergers have enhanced the long-term performance of firms in India. 
This improvement as on account of higher efficiency of utilization of assets. 
Unrelated mergers appeared to he performing better in the long term. contrary to 
strategic management theory. Ilo\\e\er. due to a majorit\ of the unrelated firms in the 
sample belonging to the same business group` the result ma' he indicative of other 
benefits of such mergers leading to better results. 1 his needs to be probed in future 
research. fhe relati\e size of' the acquired firm and the method of' pa)ment did not 
seem to be playing a significant role in influencing post-merger returns. 
The studies based on pre and post merger analysis of accounting measures have 
sho\\n mixed results. On the other hand, studies \\hich have used cash flow measures 
have sho\kn the improvement in the performance as a result of merger. 
2.2.2 Studies using Event Stuck Methodology 
Clark and Ofek (1994) tested the ctiecti eness of restructuring of failing firms by 
mergers. The collected a sample of 38 takeo\ers Occurring bet%\eenl981 and 1988 
that \Here attempts to restructure distressed targets. I he used fire measures of post-
merger performance to examine the ahilith of an acquirer to successfully revitalize a 
target that is experiencing operating or financial difficulties. Bidders had negative 
post-merger performance using all tie pleasures. Much of' the post-merger decline 
appeared to be caused by industry factors. While their results indicated that bidders' 
shareholders lose, the) could not conclude that mergers are a poor choice for 
restructuring a distressed target. 
Abnormal announcement period return on the bidder's shares was positively and 
signiticantl related to the post-merger return earned by bidders on their investments 
in the targets. The studied the influence of' various factors in post-merger 
performance. Bidder overpayment helped to explain poor restructuring perfilrrnance. 
Distressed targets that %sere smaller relative to bidder \ere associated %\ith 
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restructuring efforts that ield positive returns to the bidder. I arget firms that were 
tinanciall\ distressed prior to the takeo\er \\ere more likel\ to he successful!\ 
restructured. Iligher Ie\els of post-merger le\erage for the combined firm were 
associated with \\orst merger performance. Buyers of distressed firms seldom got 
concession but concession increased the post-merger performance. 
Tsung-\'ling and Iloshino (2000) attempted to find out whether value was created in 
aianew mergers through tapping cif economies of scale. Their sample consisted of 
20 firms that acquired other firms het\~een 1987 and 1992. Both stock market-based 
and accounting-based measures erc used to assess shareholder \\ealth gains and 
impro\ements iri corporate performance post-merger. Accounting measures \ere used 
to determine the protitabilit\. financial health. and <gro th of the acquirers post-
merger. Industr\ medians \%ere computed t'Or each sear corresponding to the merging 
firms. The industry median pertained to all the publicly-listed firms of the same 
industr\ as per the sample and )ear. I hese control firm aluesiindustry medians were 
then subtracted from the pre- and post-merger values obtained for each firm. These 
pre- and post-acquisition adjusted values ere compared to arrive at the performance 
of the merged firm. The found no prohtabilit\ improvements post-merger for the 
acquirers. In Iirct. there as deterioration in some profitabilit\ indicators. There was 
no significant difference in the pre- and post-merger values for leverage and debt 
equit\ \\hue the Current ratio tell siwiitieant1\ in the first year after the merger white 
not being significantly different in the later \ears. I hey calculated sales growth as 
(sales of current .ear sales of pre \ ions .ear) 	I ). The acquirers signiticantl\ 
underperformed on this measure post-merger. The stud\ had taken into account only 
the acquiring compan\. Most of the targets \\ere pri\atet\-o\\ned companies. In most 
cases. the merger as a result of' government intervention since the health\ acquirer 
was forced into taking over the distressed and financia)l 	eak acquired firm. l his 
might have led to the deterioration in the condition of the acquiring firm leading to a 
do~\nturn in profitabilit\ post-merger. The results of' this stud\ are hence not 
generalizahlc. 
Baesel and Grant (2001) examined the risk-adjusted performance of a sample of 
Canadian firms activel\ involved in acquisition programmes. There was a wide 
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~ariet\ of types like horizontal. \ertical and di\ersihing and of motivations like 
defensive and di\ersitied. As per them. \'ithin the limits of their sample they 
concluded 
• Acquisition oriented firms performed in a manner similar to a control group of 
non-acquisition oriented firms. The performance of the control and acquisition 
sample was approximately the same in both the good market period. 1960-69, 
and the poor market \ cars. 1970-75. 
• Both the control ,group and the acquisition oriented firms performed at least as 
\\ell and possihl\ better than the market index. The performance of both the 
control sample and the acquisition sample as significantly better than the 
market index in the ood market period. 1960-69. and approximately the same 
as the market in the poor market period. 1970-75. For the entire period. 1960-
75. both the acquisition sample and the control group out-performed the 
market, and the mutual funds. but did not exhibit statistically significant 
difference in performance from each other. 
DeLong (2003) stated that there is a paradox in hank mergers. On average, bank 
mergers do not create value, yet they continue to occur. Using cross-sectional analysis 
to examine 54 hank mergers announced between 1991 and 1995, the researcher tested 
several facets of ti~cus and di\ersitication. Upon announcement. the market re ards 
the mergers of partners that focus their geography and activities and earnings streams. 
As per the results of this stud\. only one of these facets. focusing earnings streams, 
enhances long-term perturmance. 1'o other circumstances improve long-term 
performance I) When a meager involves a relati\el\ inetlicient acquirer and 2) When 
partners reduce hankruptc\ costs. 
Jakobsen and Voetmann (2003) investigated the short-run price adjustment around 
acquisition announcements and the long-run upward bias of cross-sectional average 
buy-and-hold returns. The geometric Bro\Nnian motion model was applied to 
decompose the cross-sectional arerage long-run returns into transformed mean and 
volatility components. l he decomposition improved the interpretation of security 
performance. The methodolog\ '.as demonstrated on the securit\ performance of 
bidding firms listed on the C openhagen Stock Exchange. The most surprising finding 
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%%as that the long-run abnormal return after three sears %%as not significantl\ different 
from zero. This implied that the bidding firms did not under-perform relative to the 
market. This result stands in contrast to findings in other studies and it ma\ reflect 
that earlier studies did not adjust correctl\ for the volatility component. These 
findings indicated that the market efficiency h>pothesis is intact in the long run. It is 
only in the very short run, a fex\ days around acquisition announcements, that the 
market makes a significant adjustment to uphold the efficiency hypothesis. 
Andre. Kooli. and l.'ller (2004) investigated the long-run performance of Canadian 
acquirers, using it sample of 267 acquisitions between 1980 and 2000. The stud\ 
focused on t\\o issues I ) the magnitude and reliability of abnormal returns and 2) the 
possible explanations of the long-term beha\ iour of \I&A firms. 
The main results \ere as follos First. focusing on a calendar-time portfolio approach 
and a \Vl, estimation procedure. the stud' found that the three-year post-acquisition 
returns for Canadian acquirers underpertorm significantly on an equal-weighted basis. 
Value-weighted abnormal returns \ere positive, but driven by a very large acquirer 
which participates in four transactions during the peak of the M&A wave. The mean 
monthl\ calendar-time abnormal returns ; M(''I ARs) confirmed these observations. 
When the examined the case in which there is no overlapping, they found that 
Canadian acquirers signiticantl) underperfo rm over the three-year post-event period. 
hether the use an equal- or value-\ eight scheme. 
Second. they examined possible explanations for the long-run performance of M&A 
deals. The\ found support for the extrapolation hypothesis, and for the method-of-
pa\ ment h\ pothesis. Glamour acquirers underperformed relati\ e to value acquirers 
and 11&As financed entirel\ h\ egluit\ underperformed relative to cash transactions. 
They also found that cross-border deals perform poorly in the long run. Although they 
found some explanations for the post-M&A performance in Canada, the issues raised 
and the complex nature ofthese transactions calls for further analysis. 
Pangarkar and I,ie(2004) h\pothesize that acquisitions undertaken during low market 
c\cles \gill exhibit better performance than other acquisitions for to key reasons 
lo\\er likelihood of overpa\ ment due to hubris and ease in implementing restructuring 
initiatives such as retrenchment They defined perlormance as the cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition event and deployed a trend-based 
measure for market cycle. Based on an analysts of I I acquisitions by Singapore 
firms between 1990 and 1999, the found strong support for the hypothesized 
relationship. 
Olson and Pagano (2005) studied the mergers of US publicly traded bank holding 
companies during 1987 2000. They identified the impact of bank mergers on the long 
run performance of the aaluiring bank during 1987-2000 by analysing 3-year 
cumulative buy-and-hold returns for each dual on a cross-sectional basis. They found 
that the acquiring firm's sustainable growth rate was an important determinant of the 
cross-sectional variation in the merged entity's long-term operating and stock 
performance. I he most economically sign itcant determinants of the merged banks 
abnormal stuck return performance were the acquiring bank's estimated sustainable 
growth rate prior to the acquisition, as well as post-acquisition changes in this growth 
rate. and the bank's dividend pay-out ratio. The findings are robust even after 
controlling fbr several potentially confounding factors. 
Uysal (2005) scrutinized two important factors in M&A bidders excess debt capacity 
and asymmetric information. First, he examined how leverage affects kidding 
behavior. lie found that bidders which were underleveraged relative to their target 
debt ratios pay higher premiums than other bidders. Probability that they successfully 
acquire their targets was also found to be Iiigher. Consistent with the free cash 
hypothesis, stock prices react more unfavorably to takeover announcements of 
underleveraged bidders. 
Second. lie empirically studied the role of asymmetric information in takeover 
contests. A large body of work suggests that better informed bidders have advantages 
in takeover contests. I lowever, testing these theories is quiet difficult, as the 
informational advantage of bidders is typically unobservable. The approach used in 
this paper was to use geographical proximity between a bidder and a target. He found 
that (i) stock prices react more favorably to takeover announcements of local bidders; 
(ii) target shareholders of local bidders receive lower premiums: and (iii) locally 
merged firms show superior operating performance in the long run. These findings are 
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consistent 	ith the idea that there is less as' mmetric information between 
geographicall> proximate bidders and targets. 
Yuce and Ng (2005) investigated the announcement effects of mergers and 
acquisitions on shareholders' returns beteen 1994 and 2000. The results shoN\ed that 
both the target and the acquiring company shareholders earn significant and positi\e 
abnormal returns for a two-da\ holding period starting with the announcement day. In 
the context of a \\orld\%ide merger boom during the 1990s and previous U.S. and 
Canadian studies. then found that mergers and acquisitions continue to benefit both 
target and acquirer firm shareholders. It was consistent with man` findings that 
mergers do pay. 
Their results tiho\\ed that acquirers pa\ less for private companies than public 
companies. especial! 	hen the\ offer stock. they observed that risk-adjusted returns 
do not appear to differ substantially between these sub-samples of acquirers. Although 
Chang and Fuller et al. found higher returns to acquirers of' private targets, the\ 
argued that these higher returns \\ere negated h> higher risk. Therefore. on a risk-
adjusted return basis, there appeared to be no dit'ference beteen buying private 
versus public targets. Overall, the findings suggested that the market can value 
acquisitions under asymmetric conditions %%ith private firms. 
Hassan. Patro, Tuckman and Wang Ike 12007) examined short-term abnormal returns 
separating mergers from acquisitions and US-based from foreign-based M&A targets. 
It examined 405 mergers and acquisitions during 1981-2004 to address the issues of 
the research. Evidence ot'short and long-term abnormal returns, as ell as accounting 
and efficienc> effects \Here found for acquisitions but not for mergers. However, the 
tests do suggest that mergers \\ith US-based targets \\ere not \alue destro>ing. It \k as 
also found that there \%ere differences as to the effects of' acquisitions of' foreign-
based, as opposed to US-based targets. Taken in total. the results provide support for 
the vies that in the pharmaceutical industr>. acquisitions of US-based companies 
have a positive impact on ealth creation for compan\ shareholders. 
Oler (2008) in\estigatedi 	hether an acquirers pre-announcement cash level can 
predict post-acquisition returns. This stud\ revealed that acquisitions where the 
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acquirer had a high cash balance %%ere likel\ to underperform ( hether or not they are 
di'.ersif\inel. 
Overall, the results suggested that the market failed to fully incorporate the 
implications ref the acquirer's cash Ic\el into its stock price around announcement. 
More investors seem to attend to the fundamental performance of the acquiring firm 
after the acquisition (proxied here h% acquirer return on net operating assets). 
Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) provided the first analysis of value performance of 
the European hank `1&.A wave of 1996-2004 that accompanied the general 
consolidation process of the European financial sector in the last decade. Using a 
sample of 75 publicly traded banks from 19 European countries. they examined gains 
to acquirers over fi\e alternative periods ranging from I to 20 days upon the 
acquisition rumour. The results suggested that European acquirers earn positive and 
statisticall\ significant abnormal returns around the time of the deal 
rumour/announcement. Partitioning the sample vv ith respect to product-market and 
geographic diversification indicated strong statistical evidence that all types of 
domestic deals as \\ell as bank-to-bank cross-border deals created shareholder value. 
Gains to cross-border diversif\ ing deals \\ere insignificant. 
Sharma (2010) examined mergers and acquisitions in the United States banking 
industry involving the formation of mega banks. In this research he studied the cases 
of five mega mergers. Objective was to analyze whether these acquisitions 
pronounced success. TNNo techniques were used to examine the success of M&A. The 
first '.gas the event studs methodolog'. for which the target variables %\ere abnormal 
stock price return (ASRP). cumulati'.e abnormal stock price return (CASRP) and the 
Sharpe ratio. The second method \gas the accounting performance techniques. in 
which the target variables %\ere return on equit\ ( ROE), an indicator of profit, and the 
cash flow variables such as operating cash flow (OCI) and absolute cash flow (ACF). 
Here the event study methodology tend to dif'tcr from accounting study methodology 
as event stud\ has shown that value creation didn't happen for any of the mergers 
whereas accounting studs has shown that the value creation did happen for three out 
of the five mergers studied. 
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Sharma (2010) examined correlation between accounting and event study 
methodologies. which are used to anal}ie \alue creation in mergers and acquisitions. 
The stud\ involved tine mega mergers in the banking industr\ in the United States 
banking. The correlation process included using Pearson product moment correlation. 
non-parametric Witcoxon test and multiple regression analysis. the studs reflected 
only partial correlation can be tinund but no constructive relation could be established. 
This stud\ did sho\s that \chile there is partial correlation beteen these methods, a 
predictive relationship could not be established. These results imply, within the 
construct of this stud`. that accounting performance technique. as measured by ROE. 
OCF and ACF. are not significantly predictive of' event study's methodology, as 
measured by ASPRs. 
Alexandridis. Petmezas. and Travlos (2010) used a global M&A data set and provided 
evidence that the empirical observations relating public acquisitions to. at best, zero 
abnormal returns. and their stock-financed subset to negative abnormal returns for 
acquiring firms around the deal announcement are not unanimous across countries. 
Acquirers be'ond the most competitive takeover markets (the United States. United 
Kingdom. and Canada) pay Io\%er premia and realize gains, while share-for-share 
offers are at least non-\ a(ue-destroying for their shareholders. In contrast, target 
shareholders within these markets gain significantly less, impl\ ink: that the benefits 
generated are more evenly split bet\vicen the involved parties. 
In this paper, they presented new evidence regarding the gains from public M&As to 
acquiring and target firms using a world%ide sample covering 39 countries from all 
continents. Accordinglk, the first demonstrated that public acquisition 
announcements. in general. enhance acquirers' value in countries beyond those with 
the most competitive takeover markets (the Ul_C). Acquirers'. ithin the latter markets 
significantly underperfonn those in the rest of the \\orld. Second. they also provided 
evidence that deals financed '. ith equit swaps do not overall destroy value for 
acquirers in countries beyond the U 1 C. One potential explanation for the nonnegative 
reaction in equity-financed public acquisitions within the Rest of the World (RoW) is 
that the negative information effect of an equity offer can, in practice, he subdued by 
the positive effect of lo\\er premiums paid due to inferior competition. 'l'hird, they 
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found that RoW acquisitions were subject to superior synergy gains only for stock 
swaps, implying merely a redistrihution of gains from the acquirer to the target in 
other types of transactions. Fourth. they examined the relationship between 
competition in the inarkct for corporate control across time and markets and 
acquisition gains and premiums paid within the entire sample. as well as in the RoW 
and UUC subsets, Findings indicate that the level of competition is negatively 
associated with acquirer returns and positively associated t'lth target returns and 
premia after controlling for other l irm. deal. and market legal and institutional 
characteristics, as well as other country fixed effects. Overall, the paper provided 
evidence that public acquisitions do generate gains, but the distribution of gains 
between acquiring and target firms depends on the degree of competition in the 
market for corporate control. As a result, the empirical observations relating public 
acquisitions to, at best, zero abnormal returns, and their equity financed subset to 
negative abnormal returns for acquiring Firms around the dcul announcement are 
maim} limited to the most corn petiti ye acquisition markets. 
Soongswang (2010) analyzed takeovers occurring on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET), focusing on the eftcctss on successful bidding firms performances during a 
period of twelve months before the announcements. The stud} measured abnormal 
returns using an event study approach; applying two models and three parametric test 
statistics. The results suggest that the takeover cltects are wealth-creating for 
successful bidding firm's shareholders. Evidence was also found regarding the 
available takeover news being considered as good news in the market, four and three 
months prior to the announcement month, resulting in positive abnormal returns of 
approximately 17% and 10% for the bidders, as estimated from the market-adjusted 
and market models respectively. 
Francis and Martin (2010) investigated if timely loss recognition is associated with 
acquisition-investment decisions. Using a piece-wise linear regression model, they 
found that firms with more timely incorporation of economic losses into earnings 
make more profitable acquisitions, measured by the bidder's announcement returns 
and by changes in post-acquisition operating performance. These firms are also less 
likely to snake post-acquisition divestitures (consistent with better ex ante investment 
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decisions). but act more quickly to divest. They also found that the positive 
association bet%%een timel\ loss recognition and acquisition profitability is more 
pronounced for firms with higher ex ante agency costs. 
Liar go\as and Repousis (201 1 I examined the impact of mergers and acquisitions on 
the performance of Greek banking sector ocer the period 1996-2008. The results from 
event studs methodology. using_ a 30-da\ e'ent \\indo indicated that stock prices 
sho\k significant positive cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) before the 
announcement tier a period of ten da\s (for targets and bidders banks). Moreover, cash 
deals created more significant positive CAARs for bidder shareholders than stock 
deals. ten days before announcement. Also the results showed that significant positive 
CAARs %\ere gained upon the announcement of horizontal and diversifying bank 
deals for target's shareholders. The overall results (the weighted average of gains to 
the bidder and tar,et bank), indicated that bank mergers and acquisitions have no 
impact and do not create \\ealth. The empirical results also indicated significant 
implications for rejection of the "semi-strong form" of Efficient Market If\pothesis 
(EMMH) of the Athens Stock Exchange. possibly reflecting leakage of information. By 
measuring twent\ financial ratios. they found that the Greek banking industry is 
moderate and not highly concentrated (man\ banks 	ith lo\\ market shares). 
Operating performance did not improve follo%\ing mergers and acquisitions while 
there ere controversial results when comparing merged banks \%ith the group of non-
merging banks. 
Farin6s. Herrero & Latorre (201 1) investigated shareholder value creation of Spanish 
listed firms in response to announcements of acquisitions over the period 1991-2006. 
Similar to foreign markets, bidders earned insignificant aserage abnormal returns 
regardless of the pricing model used in the estimation procedure. When they related 
these results to compan\ and transaction characteristics the evidence suggested that 
the listing status of' the target firm 	as a critical key in the strategic decision to 
acquire a company. This listing status effect vas mainly associated \Kith the fact that 
unlisted firms tend to be smaller and lesser-kno%%n firms, and thus suffer from a lack 
of competition in the market for corporate control. Consequentl'.. the payment of 
lower premiums and the possibilit\ of diversif\ing shareholders' portfolios lead to 
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unlisted firm acquisitions being vie%%ed as value—orientated transactions which have 
major implications for managers 
Javadev and Sensarma (2007) anal\zed some of the critical issues of consolidation in 
Indian Banking \%ith special emphasis on the views of two important stakeholders 
viz.. shareholders and managers. First. they revie\%ed the trends in consolidation, in 
global and Indian banking. I hen to ascertain the shareholder's \ ie\~. the conducted 
an e\ ent stud\ analysis of bank stock returns hich revealed that in the case of forced 
mergers. neither the bidder nor the target hanks' shareholders have benefited. 
Ho\\ever. in the case of voluntar\ mer<iers. the bidder banks' shareholders have 
gained more than those of the target banks. They conducted a survey of bank 
managers and in spite of absence of an gains to bidder bank. they strongly favoured 
mergers. The sunev revealed that the critical issues in a successful merger are 
valuation of loan portfolio, integration of IT platforms, and issues of human resource 
management. 
Ramakrishnan (2010) used a standard e\ent stud' method and statistically anal\zed 
share price and other secondary data. It as found that the acquired firm shareholders 
enjo\ significant wealth gains of I I.6 per cent in a 21-day event window period, 
whereas the acquiring and combined firm shareholders do not do so. Mergers that 
do not see transfer of corporate control hesto\\ significant \\ealth gains of 21.1 per 
cent on announcement on the target firm shareholders, '\ hereas those where such a 
transfer takes place do not \\ itness such gains. 
Mann and Kohli (201 1) used standard event study methodology has been applied to 
compute the announcement returns for domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Cross-
border effect is calculated to compare the value creation in the two sets of 
acquisitions. Furthermore, cross-sectional regression analysis is conducted to capture 
the impact of bid-related features on target shareholder's value creation. The results 
indicated that both domestic and cross-border acquisitions have created value for the 
target company shareholders on the announcement. Nonetheless. the analysis of cross-
border effect as sell as rezression anahsis made it evident that value creation was 
higher for domestic acquisitions as compared to cross-border acquisitions due to the 
influence of various bid-specific factors. Thus. in India. bid-related variables are the 
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fundamental drivers of the target's announcement wealth gains irrespective of the 
nationality of the acquirer. 
When s%e revie%\ed the studies done in the other countries specifically U'S and Europe. 
the results shoed improvement in man\ studies. Flo\.ever some of these studies 
sho\% either poor or a\erage performance. The collective number of studies sho%cing 
average and poor performance as equal to the number of studies shoving post-
merger impro\ement in performance. Further %k hen the researches done in Indian 
context are re \ ie\\ed. the results found are similar to those of VS and European 
studies. 
Because the anal\sis does not lead to strong conclusion regarding the impact of M&A 
on firm performance. it is important to analyze a large sample of merged companies 
from all the possible perspectives. Because it lead to the question that %\hy some 
studies report \1&A as a successful tool for firm growth \chile some other report poor 
post-acquisition performance? It implies that there are some underlying factors which 
male some deals successful and others futile. Therefore performance of combined 
entities should he measured by groupin them on the basis of payment method, size. 
relatedness or strategic tit, group vs. non group mergers. single vs. multiple 
acquisitions etc. This type of analysis ma\ be helpful to identify the factors which 
make M&A an effective growth strateg\. 
Another aspect of the literature rev ie 	is that these studies have used cumulative 
abnormal returns. accounting ratios and cash tlo%\s as performance measures. When 
the results of several studies \\ere analyzed \\ith reference to the methods of 
performance evaluation used. following facts "ere found 
• Bent studies have sho~~n mixed results for other countries and favorable 
results in Indian context. 
• Accounting studies have sho n mixed results f or Indian as well as other 
economies. 
• Cash flo\\ based studies ha'.e sho\\n favorable results for Indian as well as 
other economies. 
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From these results of pre\ ioils studies %%e can inter that choice of method of 
performance evaluation ma\ influence the results of the stud\. Therefore it is 
important to apply the different methods on the same sample to know the difference in 
performance measurement caused b\ the choice of method. 
Whereas examining long-term stock returns has been a popularl\ used approach, the 
use of accounting and financial data i,, appropriate to measure directl\ post-
acquisition operating performance gains. I raditional accounting rate of returns and 
protitabilit\ measures are criticized for their deficiencies in measuring performance. 
particularl\ because they ignore capital costs and have the potential for manipulation 
of accounting data. A ne 	performance measure. f V A. o\ erco,mes these tla\\ 
existing in conventional financial metrics as it true performance measure. Therefore it 
kill he fruitful to anal\se the same sample h\ applying [VA as a measure of 
performance. in addition to accounting ratios and cashflows. 
2.3 Impact of mode of payment on the performance of NI&A 
Meliaher and Flarter(1972) found that. on the average, acquisitions characterized by 
the acquired compan\ as being, more than one-half the site of the acquiring compan\ 
exhibited significantly higher price increases than companies engaging in smaller 
relati\e-size acquisitions. 
The method of financing and acquisition activit\ characteristics Indicated possible 
significance over the three months post-merger to six months post-merger period. 
Common stock financed acquisitions \\ere characterized, on the average. b\ a 
decrease in trend-adjusted stock prices o\er the second post-merger quarter in contrast 
to an increase for non-common stock financed acquisitions. Likewise, non-active 
acquirers suffered a price decrease o\er the second post-merger quarter in contrast to 
an increase for the active acquirers. Companies financing acquisitions with non-
common stock securities probably were able to diminish or avoid post-merger dilution 
in earnings per shares and acquisition-oriented companies seem to have been able to 
avoid the post-merger stock price let-don h\ entering into additional acquisitions. 
Vl'anslev. Lane and Yang (1983) tested abnormal returns to shareholders of acquired 
firms around the da\ of'erger announcement tier systematic differences across 
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merger types (non-con_(loinerate. other conglomerate, and pure conglomerate) and 
pa\ment method (cash. securities. and combinations). Significant differences in 
abnormal returns appeared to exist. ho\%ever. when the mergers were compared by 
payment method. Seller shareholders in cash acquisitions earned, on average, 33.54 
percent abnormal returns from 40 days prior to the original merger announcement 
through the announcement day. This figure was almost t ice the corresponding 
number (17.47 percent) for mergers employing securities as the medium of exchange. 
The attributed this difference to it tax effect. retulator\ requirements that tor cash 
as the medium of exchange. and the increasing popularit\ of cash mergers during a 
period of generally higher premiums associated ith all mergers. 
Cornett and I)e ( 1991 ) examined the role of medium of pay ment in corporate 
acquisition-, v, ith the help of e\ idence from a large sample eft interstate hank mergers 
"hick took place over the f i\ e-\ear period from 1982 through 1986. The results of 
this study indicated that \%hen the full sample of banks involved in interstate bank 
mergers was divided into subsamples by medium of payment the abnormal 
announcement period returns for the subsamples were found to be equal to each other, 
as %ell as to the results for the full sample. The finding that bidder returns are not 
affected h\ the bidder's choice of medium of payment Is in contrast with findings of 
the existing empirical studies that hate explored this Issue in the context of nonbank 
mergers (Asquith. t3runer. and Mullins 1987: Travlos 1987: Fckbo and Langohr 1989. 
Franks. Ilarris. and tita\er 1988). The\ all report significantly higher bidder returns 
From cash-financed acquisitions than from stock-financed acquisitions. 
agar and S fiver (1998) examined the use of debt in the payment package employed 
by bidding firms for corporate acquisitions. They compared the announcement period 
stock price reactions for 41 bidding firms that incorporated some debt in the total 
consideration paid to target shareholders ith reactions for a large sample of bidders 
that used internally generated cash. all stock, or some combination of cash and stock 
otters. The e\ idence indicated that the bidder's stock price reaction was associated 
vpith the riskiness of'the debt. the ahilith to benefit from the tax shield afforded b the 
interest pa\ nlents. and the amount of stock included in the offer together with the 
debt. The results \%ere consistent \%ith the notion of optimal risk sharing/capital 
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structure realignment b\ the bidding firm. Their results prosided an insight into the 
issue of how firms should pa\ for acquisitions. l hey stated that it' firms want to avoid 
the diverse selection costs associated \\ ith it pure equity offer but desire to obtain 
contingent pricing and tax benefits. the should use debt as a part of the payment 
medium to target shareholders. They should balance the increased use of debt by also 
employing some equity if the pre-existing debt levels are high. 
Heron and Lie (2002) analyzed the relationship between operating performance and 
the method of payment in takeovers. They used a large sample of acquisitions 
announced and completed het\\een 1985 and 1997. When the categorized the sample 
according to pa\ment type. the\ found no dillerence in the pre-acquisition 
discretionary accruals or post-acquisition changes in operating performance across 
pa%ment categories. These results persist in a multivariate frame\~ork. Consequently. 
the method of' pa\ merit does not appear to provide information regarding the firms' 
future operating performance. Instead. the found that impro\ements in operating 
performance subsequent to acquisitions were significantly greater when firms with 
higher market-to-book ratios acquired firms vvith low market-to-book ratios and when 
the acquirer and target belong to the same industry. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) examined the effect of different acquirer types on 
their short and long term performance. (I) the performance of acquirers, both in the 
short- and long-run, using' a variety of benchmark models: (2) hether the short- and 
long-run performance of acquirers is dependent on their pre-bid status as glamour or 
value acquirers. measured b\ the PE ratio and \1'fI3V: (3) the interaction between the 
acquirer status and the method of' pa merit used by acquirers (in particular. they 
argued that glamour acquirers are more likely to use equity as a method of' payment 
and value acquirers to use cash). and (4) hether the pre-bid financial status or the 
method of payment dominates long-run performance of acquirers. Their sample 
included 519 UK takeovers completed between 1983 and 1985. 
The provided some support for the argument that glamour firms are more likely to 
use equity tinarncing than cash. Value acquirers are more likely to use cash. Glamour 
acquirers offering equity seriously underperform than those offering cash. "I They found 
that Irrespective of their pre-bid financial status, cash paying acquirers generate 
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higher returns for their shareholders than equip offering acquirers in the three \ear. 
post-acquisition, period. 
I.immack (2003) \corked on the paper b) Sudarsanani and Mahate (2003) While 
Suriarsanam and Mahate find that glamour stocks consistently onderperform value 
stocks in the long-run folio\+ing takeovers, they nevertheless find that, on average. 
value stocks also record significantly negative abnormal returns. The authors also 
report that glamour acquirers are more likel\ to use a pure equity offer than a pure 
cash otter, consistent \\ ith the use of' 'over-valued' equity. The final result reported by 
the authors as that the cash-financed bids outperform equity-financed bids, both for 
glamour and value acquirers. 
Dhiensiri. Sahin and Sarajoti (201 1) investigated ho\\ the equity-based compensation 
(EBC) of top executives affected the performance of acquisitions. In contrast to the 
results of' I)atta et al. (2001 ). the\ found that high [BC acquirers pay higher 
premiums for targets than that of lo\v FBC acquirers. The cumulative abnormal return 
around the acquisition announcement as lower for acquiring firms with high EBC. 
However, they found that the long-run performance of acquiring firms was positively 
correlated with EBC. The results suggested that high [BC acquirers experienced 
lower sensitivit\ to size and momentum factors that unexpectedly lowered the cost of 
equit\. leading to higher returns. 
Mann and Kohli (2009) examined the effect of' mode of financing employed in 
mergers and acquisitions on the announcement period returns of the acquiring and the 
target companies' shareholders in India. They found that maximum value has been 
created for the shareholders of the target companies engaged in cash offers föIlo\~ed 
b\ the shareholders of acquiring companies engaged in cash offers, target companies 
engaged in stock offers. and lastly. for acquiring companies engaged in stock offers. 
Ramakrishnan (2010) analyzed the performance of merged companies and factor 
influencing it. Pre-tax operating cash flow deflated by the operating assets was used to 
measure firm Performance The raw firm operating performance figures calculated 
were adjusted for industry and economic effects. The change in performance on 
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account of the merger was captured b} comparing the post and pre-merger 
performance measure. 
lie concluded that mergers have enhanced the long-term performance of Firms in 
India. This improvement was on account of higher etficienec of utilization of assets. 
Unrelated mergers appeared to he performing better in the long term, contrary to 
strategic management theory. The relative size of the acquired firm and the method of 
payment did not seem to be playing a significant role in influencing post-merger 
returns. 
The studies which have investigated the phenomenon of impact of method of payment 
on the post-acquisition performance of firms are small in number and have given 
mixed results. Few have concluded that non-common stock financed mergers perform 
better while some other studies have concluded that there is no impact of method of 
payment on performance. Some studies have favoured the stock as a medium of 
payment. Very few studies were available in Indian context which have studied the 
impact of medium of payment on M&A performance. One of these research work 
concluded that mergers which have used cash as a medium of payment have 
performed better. Another study concluded that method of payment did not seem to be 
playing a significant role in influencing post-merger returns. Because not much work 
has been done in India in this direction therefore it is important to evaluate this aspect 
of M&A in Indian context. 
2.4 Impact of size of the target firm on the performance of M&A 
Meliaher and Harter (1972) found that, on the average, acquisitions characterized by 
the acquired company as being more than one-half the size of the acquiring company 
exhibited significantly higher price increases than companies engaging in smaller 
relative-size acquisitions. The near total significance of the relative asset size variable 
seemed to bear out a priori expectations. When a company acquires another company 
approaching its size (or even larger), significant immediate growth in book values, 
earnings, and often earnings-per-share figures can be created through the "pooling-of 
interests" accounting method. In addition to the immediate altering of the acquiring 
company's financial statements, the potential Impact of longer-run operating synergies 
would be expected to be greater in contrast to the acquiring of relatively smaller 
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companies. Finall\. the pub(tcit\ surrounding the merger of relativel\ large 
companies might lead to generally greater speculation and anticipation. 
l)utta (2006) empirically examined the short and long-term performance. and the 
differentiating characteristics of acquiring firms h\ using a comprehensive sample of 
1 300 Canadian acquisition Cents during the period of 1993-2002. With respect to 
short-term abnormal returns. they found significant and positive abnormal returns for 
Canadian acquiring firms' shares around the announcement date. With respect to 
long-term stock return performance, they found no strong support for positive long-
term abnormal returns for acquiring, firms that was robust across all methodologies. 
They also do not found an improvement in long-term operating performance in 
general. Ho%\ever. the found that long-term operating performance increases 
significantly for the relati\el\ larger deals and the market reacts more favourably to 
those deals around the announcement date. This implies that only relatively larger 
deals bring economicall\ significant benefits to the acquiring firms and market 
reeogni/es this aspect. 
Ramakrishnan (1-010) analyzed the performance of' merged companies and factor 
influencing it. He concluded that mergers have enhanced the long-term performance 
of firms in India. This improvement was on account of higher efficiency of utilization 
of assets. Unrelated mergers appeared to be performing better in the long term, 
contrary to strategic management theory. The relative size of the acquired firm and 
the method of payment did not seem to he playing a significant role in influencing 
post-merger returns. 
The studies \\hick have e\aluated the impact of size are er\ limited. In India ver\ 
small number of studies are found '\hich has probed this aspect of M&A 
performance. One of the study concluded that the relative size of the acquired firm did 
not seem to he playing a significant role in influencing post-merger returns. 
The studies from other economics have resolved that if the size of the target is big 
then the benefits of mergers are more probable to occur and more visible. However 
fe%\ studies have resolved that if' the size of acquired firm is small then post-merger 
integration is effective and ill lead to better performance. One of the research %korks 
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has also thrown the light on the impact of size of acquirer. It concluded that small size 
acquirer is IikeI% to make successful acquisitions because of the less probability of 
overpa\ merit b} them. Because this facet of \1&A perti~rmance is almost untouched 
in Indian context therefore it is important to c\aluate the sample from this perspective 
too. 
2.5 Comparison in the performance of related and unrelated N1&A 
W'ansle\ . Lane and Yank, ( 1981► tested abnormal returns to shareholders of acquired 
firms around the dad of merger announcement for systematic differences across 
merger types (non-conglomerate, other conglomerate, and pure conglomerate) and 
pa \ rent method (cash. securities, and combinations). Contrary to their original 
expectations that returns to seller shareholders are larger in horizontal or vertical 
mergers than in conglomerate mergers. the found that pure conglomerate 
acquisitions are associated ith slightl\ larger. although not signitieantl' larger. CAR 
to the shareholders of the acquired firms. 
Seth (1990)   re-examined the tollo\\ing research questions towards resolving the 
inconsistent findings 
I. Do acquisitions result in the creation of economic value? 
2. Are different acquisition strategies associated with different degrees of value 
creation? 
This studs used the event stud' methodology as the basis for estimating synergistic 
gains in acquisitions. The time-series of combined returns were used to estimate pre 
acquisition market model coefficients, fir each pair of combined firms. The sample 
consisted of 104 tender offers for control \%hich took place between 1962 and 1979. 
Regardless of the basis of classification, both unrelated and related acquisition 
strategies have been sho\\ n to create significant s\ ncrgies. in accordance \\ ith the 
expectations. Ile mentioned that the data do not appear to indicate that related 
acquisitions create more value than unrelated acquisitions on average. 
Datta and Grant (1990) examined the degree of autonomy provided by acquiring 
companies to the management of acquired firms in the managing of post-acquisition 
operations as well as the relationships between such autonomy and the perceived 
success ot'the acquisition. Results shoed that in unrelated acquisitions the extent of 
autonomy as signiticantl\ greater than in related acquisition. Also it was found that 
autonom\ 	as positivel\ associated \\ ith superior performance in unrelated 
acquisitions. but the relationship \\as not significant in related acquisitions. They 
stated that future studies Should incorporate factors related to post-acquisition 
managerial decisions and ori.anizational fit. 
Chatterjee (1991) investigated the factors that can explain the gains resulting from 
vertical mergers. The findings suggest that acquiring firms gain the most when they 
come from concentrated markets and target firms come from fragmented markets. The 
findings also suggest that. on the average, the firms studied increased their market 
power as a result of mergers. 
Heal\. 1 alepu and Ruhack (1997) examined acquiring companies cash flo\\ 
performance after it merger in the tilt largest t:.S. industrial takeovers from 1979 to 
mid- 1984. {In an earlier study, they shoed that the mergers in this same sample 
created ne\% value for the stockholders of the target compan\ and the acquiring 
company combined But their results here shoed that the acquirers did not generate 
an additional cash flows beyond those required to recover the premium paid. 
Flo\\ever. while the takeovers \\ere break-even investments on average, the 
profitability of the individual transactions varied widely. There were two distinct 
t\pes of takeovers in their sample (I) friendly transactions that typically involved 
stock pa\ ment for firms in overlapping businesses. which the called "strategic" 
takeovers: and (2) hostile transactions that generally involved cash payments for firms 
in unrelated businesses. hich the labeled "financial" takeo\ers. 
I he also examined the relation between the protitabilith of takeo\er transactions and 
three transaction characteristics that management controlled.' Those characteristics 
were (1) the target managers' attitude. (2) the form of' pa ment. and (3) the degree of 
overlap of the merging firms' businesses. Paired comparisons showed that friendly 
takeovers outperformed hostile takeovers, acquisitions with stock payment 
outperformed cash transactions, and takeovers with a high overlap between acquirers 
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and target companies performed better than tho oc' inrelated businesses. Each 
comparison showed superior performance because of both higher takeover synergies 
and lo%\er premiums paid to the stockholders of target companies. These results 
suggested that the transaction characteristics that \were under management control 
substantially influenced the ultimate payofts from takeovers 
Ramaswwam\. Kannan (1997) examined the impact of strategic similarities between 
target and bidder firms on changes in post-merger performance. Set in the U.S. 
banking industr\. the empirical examination sho\\ed that mergers between banks 
exhibiting similar strategic characteristics resulted in better performance than those 
involving strategically dissimilar banks. 
Capron (1999) examined how value is created in horizontal mergers and acquisitions. 
More specifically, he examined the impact of post-acquisition asset divestiture and 
resource redeployment on the long-term performance of horizontal acquisitions. The 
data carne from a detailed survey of acquiring firm managers and covered 253 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions that \+ere initiated b\ [.uropean and U.S. firms in 
manufacturing industries for the period 1988- 1992. Overall, results showed that both 
asset di~estiturc and resource redeplo\nwent can contribute to acquisition 
performance. with, ho%\ever. a significant risk of damaging acquisition performance 
when the divested assets and redeployed resources are those of the target. 
DeLong (2001) stated that bank mergers that enhanced value upon announcement can 
be distinguished from those that did not create value. Ile classified mergers of 
banking firms according to activity and geographic similarity (focus) or dissimilarity 
(diversification), and examined the abnormal returns to each group as a result of the 
merger announcement. Mergers that focused both activity and geography enhanced 
stockholder value b\ :.0°.% while the other t\pcs (lid not create value. Analysis 
revealed that abnormal returns upon merger announcement increased in relative size 
of'target to bidder. but decreased in the pre-merger performance of targets. 
Park (2002) examined the possible influence of a firm's prior performance on its 
choice beteen related and unrelated acquisition. This paper presented the e\ idence 
that firms in high-profit industries tend to pursue related diversification whereas firms 
in lo%%-profit industries folio unrelated diversification. Therefore. related diversifiers 
are more profitable than unrelated diversifiers. partly because they were in higher-
profit industries prior to diversification than unrelated diversifiers. That is, there is a 
spurious correlation het\%een diversification strategy and profitability, which is caused 
h\ prior industry profitahilit\. 
This paper thus suggested that related di~ersitiers are more profitable than unrelated 
diversifiers are. because related di\ersitiers \\ere not onl\ active in higher profit 
industries but also \\erc more profitable \\ithln their industries than unrelated 
diversifiers. prior to diversification. I'heretore. related diversifiers are characterized as 
firms in profitable industries and/or profitable firms \vithin their industries prior to 
diversification. whereas unrelated diversifiers are characterized as firms in less 
profitable industries and/or less profitable firms \within their industries prior to 
di\ ersitication. 
The results sho cd that related acquisition was not positi\ely related to post-
acquisition firm protitahilit\. This confirms that higher profitability of' related 
acquisition was primarily due to the t\%o types of spurious correlation, not to the 
superiority of related acquisition over unrelated acquisition. 
Yeh and Hoshino (2002) investigated the effects of' mergers on the firms' operating 
performance and the Keiretsu's roles in the performance variation. his was 
motivated by the contradicting arguments hether Japanese Keiretsu can eft'ectivel} 
control agency conflicts and increase firm efticiencv. Examining 86 Japanese 
corporate mergers completed from 1970 to 1994, they found that (1) Japanese 
mergers failed to improve the firm efficiency, and even caused deterioration in the 
firms' operating performances: (2) the Keiretsu relationship as particular 
detrimental to the mer<ging firms' post-mer~Ler performance. 
Park (2003) focused on a single event of a large acquisition. \\hich enabled him to 
better identify the sequential relationships between prior firm profitability, prior 
industry profitability, and subsequent acquisition strategies. This paper has presented 
two findings (I) related acquirers \\ere more profitable in their industries than 
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unrelated acquirers. prior to acquisition: and (2) related acquirers were in more 
profitable industries than unrelated acquirers. prior to acquisition. 
Kim and Finkenstein (2009) investigated the effects of strategic and market 
complementaritv on acquisition performance in the context of related horizontal 
acquisitions. They also proposed that to ke\ attributes of acquirers—strategic focus 
and out-of-market acquisition experience—\\ill moderate this relationship. The\ 
investigated the research questions in the context of all 2.204 acquisitions made b) 
puhlicl\ traded U.S. commercial hanks during, the 12-year period from 1989 to 2001. 
'their findings are generall\ supportive. suggesting complementarit' is an important 
antecedent of acquisition performance. and raising important issues on the nature of 
acquisition research in general. 
Laabs and Schiereck (2010) examined the short- and long-term wealth effects of 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions on acquirers in the automotive supply industry. 
Based on a sample of' 230 takeover announcements between 1981 and 2007, 
significant positive announcement returns to acquiring companies were determined. 
This stud\ also found that acquirers were unable to sustain this exceptional position 
be\ond a short-term horizon. A combination of the Fama-French- 3-Factor model in 
calendar time and the control firm approach in event time consistently revealed 
significant value destruction of about 20% o\er 3 \ears. The influence of product 
diversification remained inconclusive and could not ultimately he determined in this 
stud\. 
Shim. Jeungbo (2011) examined the relationship between mergers & acquisitions, 
diversification and Financial performance in the U.S. property-liability insurance 
industr\ over the period 1989-2004. The risk-adjusted return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE). Z-score and total risk measured by earnings volatility were 
considered as a relevant indicator of performance. "I'hey found that acquirers financial 
performance decreased and earnings volatility increased during the gestation period 
after the h1 & As perhaps due to increased frictional costs associated with post-merger 
integration and agenc problems. The\ found that more focused insurers 
outperformed the product-diversified insurers,. implying that the costs of 
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diversification outweigh the benefits. These findings were robust to alternative risk 
and diversification measures. 
Ramakrishnan (2010) analyzed the performance of merged companies and factor 
influencing it. The change in performance on account of the merger was captured by 
comparing the post and pre-merger performance measure. 
He concluded that mergers have enhanced the long-term performance of firms in 
India. This improvement was on account of higher efficiency of utilization of assets. 
Unrelated mergers appeared to be performing better in the long term. contrary to 
strategic management theory. 
Enormous work has been done in foreign countries for comparing the performance of 
related and unrelated acquisitions. Majority of the research work has favoured the 
relatedness or strategic fit or complementarity as an important factor towards the 
M&A success. Again in Indian context this issue has been scrutinized only by very 
few studies. This study concluded that unrelated mergers appeared to be performing 
better in the long term, contrary to strategic management theory. in the light of 
negligible work done in India. it will he fruitful for the industry to know that which 
type of acquisitions leads to better performance. Therefore there is a need to subdivide 
the sample into related and unrelated M&A and compare their performance. 
'There is another view also expressed by some researchers that it is not relatedness 
which leads to better performance rather it is other way round. Firms in high-profit 
industries tend to pursue related diversification whereas firms in low-profit industries 
follow unrelated diversification. Therefore. related diversifiers are more profitable 
than unrelated diversifiers, partly because they were in higher-profit industries prior to 
diversification than unrelated diversifiers. Specifically, this paper showed that high-
profit firms within their industries tend to pursue related diversification, whereas 
lower profit firms seek unrelated diversification. Therefore, related diversifiers are 
more profitable than unrelated diversifiers, partly because they were more profitable 
within their industries prior to diversification than unrelated diversifiers. Therefore it 
ma' be useful to s,c the impact of industry profitability on the type of acquisitions 
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taking place in that industry. Keeping in view the quantum of work required for this 
purpose, this aspect ma, be probed in future researches. 
2.6 Impact of capital structure of acquirer on M&A performance 
Pantalone and Platt (1993) focused on the risk and return performance of savings and 
loans that were active acquirers during the early and mid-eighties relative to that of 
non-acquirers. Acquirers took on more risks than non-acquirers, but were less 
profitable. Separating acquirers by the health of their acquisitions. acquirers of both 
healthy and troubled associations or of troubled associations only were more hiehly 
leveraged and saw their profitability erode over the post-acquisition period. While in 
case of acquirers of only healthy associations capital ratio was similar to that of non-
acquirers. they maintained a more aggressive financing position. That is. acquirers 
relied more heavily on borrowed money to finance their assets than did non-acquirers. 
However, they also had the highest net operating margin of the four groups. While 
acquirers of only healthy associations were more aggressive than were non-acquirers, 
they compensated for this higher risk by higher operating profit margins. 
Uysal (2005) examined how leverage affects bidding behaviour. This is an issue that 
has generated considerahle interest — his departure from the existing literature was 
that he considered how takeover activity was influenced by the acquiring firms' 
deviation from their target capital structures. Ile found that bidders which were 
underlevcraged relative to their target debt ratios paid higher premiums than other 
bidders. Probability that they successfully acquire their targets was also found to he 
higher. Consistent tcith the free cash hypothesis, stock prices reacted more 
unfavourably to takeover announcements of underleveraged bidders. In addition, 
leverage deficit subsumes effects of leverage and excess cash reserves which have 
been shown to be important determinants of bid ding behaviour and stock price 
reactions. 
Oler (2008) investigated whether an acquirer's pre-announcement cash level can 
predict post-acquisition returns. This study revealed that acquisitions where the 
acquirer had a high cash balance was likely to undcrperform (whether or not they are 
diversifying). There are some limitations to this research. Sample included only 
acquisitions where the acquirer and target were public firms with share price data 
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available on CRSP and financial statement data available on Compustat. Only 
acquisitions where the target was IO0 percent acquired. were considered. Pmvher 
research could investigate whether findings can he generalized to acquisitions where a 
minority interest remains publicly traded and acquisitions between public and private 
firms. 
The existing research work has not paid much attention to impact of capital structure 
of acquirer on acquisition performance. Such studies have inferred that 
underleveraged bidders pay higher premium. (heir negative stock performance is 
consistent with free cash flow hypothesis. High cash levels of acquirers have also lead 
to underperformance of such bidders. While the aggressive acquirers with higher debt 
levels are found to be compensating for this rick by higher operating performance. 
One of the contrary views is that value is created when firms with low financial 
leverage acquire firms with high financial leverage. Firms with unused debt capacity 
may be able to create value by using financial slack to acquire other firms. A low 
deht-to-equity or a low interest-expense to earnings ratio indicates the ability to 
service more debt. Value is created because slack rich bidders can pursue the 
profitable but unfunded investment opportunities of the previously slack poor targets. 
It is therefore important to see whether there is a difference in the performance of 
M&A deals where acquirer has low vis-a-vis high debt in its capital structure, prior to 
acquisition. It could be an interesting area to search the impact of capital structure of 
bidders on acquisition performance. 
2.7 Impact of promoter's stake and group/non-group mergers & acquisition on 
the post merger performance 
Lane, Alberta and VIichaellt (I 99S) mentioned that Amihud and I.ev (1981) are 
widely cited as providing evidence that managers, unless closely monitored by large 
block shareholders, will attempt to reduce their employment risk through unrelated 
mergers and diversification. These corporate strategies, however, may not be in 
shareholders' interests. Reconsidering the agency assumptions underlying Amiltud 
and Lev's study and the methodology they used, the researchers developed hypotheses 
regarding the association between ownership structure, hoard vigilance, corporate 
strategy, and corporate performance from management theory and tested them using 
Amihud and Le%'s data from the I960s and ne%% data from the I 980s. Neither study 
supported the conclusions of Amihud and Le%. nor the agency theory beliefthat 
monitoring efforts h% principals affect the strategic behaviors of agents or the 
performance of firms that the\ manage. 
Yen and Andre (2007) provided empirical evidence on the relation between 
concentrated ownership and the long term operating performance of acquiring firms. 
The investigated the performance around 287 takeovers in English-origin countries 
other than the US by following the classification of' La Porta et al. Their principal 
finding as that the relationship het\\een concentrated o\~nership and the level and 
change in operating cash flog\ returns after takco\ers is non-linear. Value creating 
deals ere associated \pith higher Ic\cls of concentration consistent 	ith decreasing 
agency costs as the dominant shareholder's \\calth in\csted in the acquiring firm 
increases. 
Fe\ s and Manigart (201 1) anal \ zed the post-acquisition performance of 184 unquoted 
o\\ner-managed firms that have been acquired between 2000 and 2004, and compare 
it with 875 comparable, but independent o%cner-managed firms. It was shown in the 
paper that target firms in domestic acquisitions were less profitable and grow less than 
independent firms, both before and after the acquisition. Target firms in cross-border 
acquisitions were comparable to independent firms in growth and profitability, but 
the have higher margins and higher returns after the acquisition. Hence, findings 
indicated that especially cross-border acquisitions created operational synergies. 
Pawwaskar (2001) studied 36 mergers that had taken place in India bet\\een 1992 and 
1995. using accrual measures of accounting spread over three sears before and after 
the merger. The stud\ found that the profitability of the merged firms was impacted 
negativel due to the merger. i.e., corporate performance did not impro\e 
significantly post-merger. A majority of the mergers studied in this paper were 
beteen companies belonging to the same business group, carried out as part of 
corporate restructuring. This might make the result quite specific and not 
generalizable. In addition, the study used matched companies as controls for both the 
acquiring and acquired companies. But. \k hen a majority of the mergers studied are 
\\ ithin-business group mergers. it is imperative that even the control pairs be from 
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similar groups. This %%ould ensure similarit% in terms of their situation 	ithin the 
industrial and economic context, as also a modicum of o%erlap in the merger 
moti\ations. Since, this had not been considered in the paper. along \\ith the tact that 
getting such control companies ma\ be \\ell-nigh impossible. the stud had serious 
limitations in terms of %alidit> and iLeneralizabilit\ of the results. 
Mann and Kohli (2009) explored the tbllovv ing aspects of group mergers and 
acquisitions To discern the probable reasons for the positive value being created in 
within-group stock offers especially for the acquiring companies shareholders, the 
second section analyzed the interaction beteen the announcement returns of the 
acquiring and the target companies engaged in stock offers and insiders'/promoters' 
o\~nership level. 
The anal\ sis revealed that the \\ ithin-group stock offers ha \ e created value % ith 
increase in level of o\\ nership ith maximum value being created when controlling 
shareholders' ownership reaches the highest level (the category OWN> 49%). 
Likewise, not only acquiring companies' but the target companies' shareholders have 
gained positive returns. It means the stock market has reacted positively to the ne\\s 
of stock offers when these are undertaken b\ companies belonging to the same group 
as %ell as when the o~ nership is concentrated in the hands of promoters. Therefore 
they deduced that in India. within-group stock offers were not aimed at tunneling of 
resources by the acquiring companies, rather these were aimed at creating value by 
providing an internal market where the group companies can pool their resources and 
hence can create various kinds of svnergies in the post-acquisition period. I lence, the 
results were in consonance ith the \aloe added view. 
Mongla and Singh (201 1) analyzed a sample of 170 companies merged in India 
during the period 1993-2003. Total sample has been classified into t\\o sub-sanmples, 
that is. group mergers (125) and non-group mergers (45). Operating performance of 
three pre-merger years as compared \\ith three post-merger years and thereby the 
outcomes of the mergers were discussed. The result shoed that profitability has 
declined in the post-merger period in both group and non-group companies. However 
non-group mergers have shown much greater decline in return on net worth and 
negative net profit margin in the post-merger period. Group mergers have attained 
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operating efficiencies in terms of reduced cost of production to net sales in post-
merger period, whereas non-group mergeN have lost their edge over operational 
s\ner«ies. Significant decline has been obser\ed in FPS during the post-merger period 
in the sub-sample of non-group mergers. I'he reason for this decline' as operational 
inefficienc\ and poor asset utilization b) non-group merged companies. The study 
provided evidence that group mergers are a better choice than non-group mergers. 
Pre\ious research \Mork has also touched the impact of ov nership concentration and 
group vs. non group mergers on merger performance. 'I hough few studies have been 
done in this area but they have supported the view that the owner controlled firm 
exhibit superior post-acquisition performance. Similarly group mergers were also 
found to he beneficial. However limited literature available on this subject compels 
us to probe this issue on our sample. 
2.8 Performance of multiple mergers & acquisitions 
Fo ler & Schmidt ( 1989) extended prey ions research efforts and examined 
relationships between commonly discussed strategic acquisition factors and long-term 
financial performance measures of acquiring firms. The financial performance 
measures included both accounting and capital market data for the 4-year period 
preceding acquisition activit\ and the 4-year period following such activity. The study 
presented bivariate and multivariate analyses for 42 industrial manufacturing firms 
that engaged in the tender offer form of acquisition. The findings indicated that, on 
the average, post-acquisition financial performance improved significantly for 
organizations that had previous acquisition experience, acquired a higher percentage 
of target, or were older. Post-acquisition performance decreased signiticantl\ for 
acquiring firms when target firms contested an acquisition. 
Ialehlian and Finkelstein( 1999) examined the influence of prior organizational 
acquisition experience on the performance of acquisitions. The behavioural learning 
theory, which examines both the conditions preceding organization events and 
organizational responses. predicts that experience eticcts ma) range from positive to 
negative. To test the hypothesis the) applied event study analysis on a sample of 449 
acquisitions. lo explore the study's hypotheses further, and to enhance the robustness 
of the results, they conducted three diftcrent supplementary analyses (I) one using an 
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accounting-based acquisition performance measure, (2) a second that examined the 
effects of recent acquisition experience, and (3) an investigation of experience effects 
at the individual level of analysis. Consistent with this theory, data from 449 
acquisitions showed an overall U-shaped relationship between organization 
acquisition experience and acquisition performance. In addition. the more similar a 
firm's acquisition targets are to its prior targets. the better they performed. These 
findings suggested that relatively inexperienced acquirers. after making their first 
acquisition. inappropriatel\ generalize acquisition experience to subsequent dissimilar 
acquisitions. while more experienced acquirers appropriately discriminate between 
their acquisitions. Behavioral learning theory, then. may enhance understanding of 
organization experience effects." 
f-lavvward (2002) used an organizational learning perspective to examine how the 
nature, performance and timing of a firm's acquisition experience helps it to learn 
how to select the right acquisition. He predicted the performance of 214 acquisitions 
made h\ 120 firms in 6 industries between 1990 and 1995. Results revealed that a 
firm's focal acquisition performance positively relates to prior acquisitions that are a) 
not highly similar or dissimilar to the focal acquisition, b) associated with small losses 
and c) not too temporall\ close to or distant from the focal acquisition. Taken 
together. these results identify the broad conditions in which firms generate adaptive 
and timely infcrcnces from acquisition experience. findings here suggested that such 
experience is a necessan but not sufficient condition for acquirer learning. Learning 
also requires attention to the nature, performance and timing of experience (March, 
1991: Penrose, 1959). This contrasts with advice that firms should 'stick to their 
knitting' by undertaking a series of highly related acquisitions (Porter, 1987, 1996; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer. 1987). This latter strategy may work for a while, but tends 
to fail when market conditions change. Instead. here results are closer to evolutionary 
thinking that firms benefit from a varict of experience. experimenting and temporal 
rhythms (e.g.. Brown and V.isenhardt, 1997). In this vie\ , acquirers develop specialist 
skills to exploit their existing opportunities and generalist skills to explore new ones. 
Finkelstein and I laleblian (2002) examined posits e and negative transfer effects in 
organization acquisitions. Data from 96 organizations revealed that, consistent with 
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theories on positive transfer of industry knowledge, similar acquisitions are positively 
related to acquisition performance. In addition, consistent with theory on negative 
transfer of past acquisition knowledge, second acquisitions underperform first 
acquisitions, particularly when first and second targets are from different industries, 
Haleblian. Kim & Rajagopalan (2006) drew upon theories of organizational learning 
to examine acquisition likelihood in a sample of banking industry acquisitions from 
1988 through 2001. Their findings are consistent with their theoretical predictions (I) 
prior acquisition experience, (2) recent acquisition performance, and (3) the 
interaction between acquisition experience and recent acquisition performance are all 
positively related to the likelihood of subsequent acquisition In conclusion, their study 
provides useful insights into the effects of learning from experience and performance 
in the context of corporate acquisitions. 
Laamanen and Keil (2008) analyzed the most active acquirers in seven industry 
sectors in the United States in the 1990s, they found that both a high rate of 
acquisitions and a high variability of the rate are negatively related to performance. 
An acquirer's size, the scope of its acquisition program, and acquisition experience 
moderate the relationship by weakening the negative effects. 
It is the timing of acquisitions that determines whether experience or indigestion 
effects end up dominating (Hayward, 2002). Research findings suggest that over time, 
active acquirers develop such program level capabilities for managing their 
acquisition programs as they learn what is the optimal number of firms to acquire, 
how to time individual acquisitions, and what types of firms to acquire. 
Ng (2009) stated that, although the effects of multiple acquisitions are studied with 
daily abnormal returns, none examine long term cilects. Growth maximization 
(Mueller. 1972) is uniquely suitable as a managerial motivation for frequent 
acquisition activity. This motivation was examined through the operating and market 
performance @1 138 frequent acquirers during 1996-2000 in Canada. Results showed 
that frequent acquirers experienced significant deterioration in operating performance. 
Buckley. Elia and Kafouros, (2011) dealt with acquisitions from emerging to 
advanced countries and the performances of the target tirrns. The results showed that 
EMNCs did not aI%\a\s acquire firms with a high pre acquisition performance and that 
the did not significantly increase the post-acquisition profitability of the target firms. 
They also showed the importance of the acquisition experience of the acquiring firms. 
Experienced I,M\Cs not only acquire firms with a higher pre acquisition 
performance. but also contributed to increase more significantly the productivity and 
sales of the target firms. 
Kumar and Rajib (2007) anal'zed a sample of 53 firms involved in multiple mergers 
during the period 1993-2002. This study aimed to analyse the financial characteristics 
of firms that engaged in multiple mergers. (In this context multiple mergers are 
mergers in \\hich acquiring firms ha\e engaged in three or more mergers.) The stud\ 
attempted to determine the characteristics of the acquiring firms and observe whether 
multiple merger firms showed superior corporate performance compared to a matched 
control group. 
A total of 53 firms involved in multiple mergers (the minimum number of mergers 
was taken as three) based on industr\ sectors 'sere selected for the study and the data 
as collected for roughl\ a ten-\ear period. 1993-20112, \on-parametric tests like the 
Mann Whitney test and the Kolmogorov Smirnov test were used to stud} the 
comparative differences bet~reen the average of the two groups. Finally a logit model 
as applied to measure the probabilit\ of acquisition as a function of the financial 
characteristics of the multiple merger acquirer firms. 
Their results indicated that lo\\ financial leverage and unused debt capacity would be 
a motive for firms to use multiple mergers as a strategic business tool. Thus a firm's 
capital structure appears as an especially important variable in the decision to go in 
for multiple mergers. Larger firms halving large resources in terms of financial 
strength are likely to undertake multiple mergers. The results suggested that mergers 
were used to maximise the size of' firms and to revitalise the bidding companies. 
Firms \\ ith low debt le\ els and free cash flows may incur agenc\ costs by investing in 
multiple merger activity. Multiple mergers could also become a tool to increase the 
managements efficiency in producing sales per value of assets. Firms where the 
power of the main shareholder is low are more likely to involve in multiple mergers.A 
limitation of the study was that it included only those companies that survived after 
mergers_ Hence there is the possibility of survivorship bias in the sample. 
Whatever research work has been done in the area of impact of multiple mergers on 
the success of subsequent merger favours the argument that multiple mergers lead to 
learning by the management of acquirer firm. Though largely the research work 
favours the learning by active acquirers, there are many underlying issues which may 
of ect the conversion of learning into acquisition success. for example the multiple 
mergers were of same type or there was diversity among the previous deals. Was 
there consistency or there were alternate episodes of active acquisitions and silence. 
However scanty research work is found in this area in Indian context and that dues not 
support the argument that multiple mergers positively impacts the acquisition 
performance. One of such concluded that firms with low debt levels and free cash 
flows may incur agency costs by investing in multipie merger activity. Multiple 
mergers could also become a too] to increase the management's efficiency in 
producing sales per value of assets. Firms where the power of the main shareholder is 
low are more likely to involve in multiple mergers. Thus again this phenomenon has 
to be tested for the emerging economy like India. 
The review of literature has provided great insights into the phenomenon of 
evaluation of performance evaluation of M&A. This has helped us to identify the gaps 
in existing literature and formulate the objectives for this study. The identified 
research gaps are provided in the next chapter. 
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Chapter-3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology adopted for conducting the study has been presented in this chapter. 
After review of literature, research gaps are identified and research objectives are set. 
We formulated hypothesis. Hypothesis have been developed based on the research 
objectives 
We explained the sources of data and sample characteristics, The basis of creating 
subsample is explained. After that calculation of financial measures and statistical 
tools applied for analysis are explained 
For the purpose of this study the terms 'mergers and 'acquisitions have been used 
interchangeably. 
3.1 Research Gaps 
The foregoing review of literature has provided great insight into the phenomenon of 
performance analysis of mergers and acquisitions. However, by meticulously 
reviewing the research work done in this area following research gaps were found: 
I. Very few studies are found which have applied all the three types of financial 
perfonnanec measures namely profitability ratios, cash flow based parameters 
and economic value added on the same sample for the comparison of pre and 
post- acquisition performance. Application of several measures on the same 
sample will enable to to determine whether choice of' performance measure 
can lead to different results. 
2. Very small n urn hers of studies in India are found which have analyzed the 
impact of various merger characteristics on post merger performance 
measures. Therefore, it is important to analyse the impact of merger 
characteristics on M&A performance in Indian context. 
3. Majority of the studies, which have analyzed long term financial performance 
of M&A have compared the pre and post-acquisition performance of the entire 
sample. Scarcity of literature is there which have divided the sample based on 
various merger characteristics and studied each one of them separately. Such 
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division will help us to deduce the underlying factors which make some 
particular types of acquisitions suecessluI in comparison to others. 
4. In Indian context very few studies have evaluated the performance of M&A on 
select industries. Therelore, it is important to investigate whether the success 
of M&A is also influenced by industry specific factors, 
5. Very few studies have analyzed the impact of learning of acquirer on merger 
performance, when acquirer firm is indulged into multiple mergers. Therefore 
it is important to analyse that whether the acquirer experience results into 
better performance. 
3.2 Research Objectives 
Based on the research gaps identified, following research objectives have been 
framed: 
1. To examine the long term financial performance of select domestic mergers & 
acquisitions in India b applying profitability ratios, cash flow based ratios 
and Economic Value Added performance measures. 
2. To analyze the impact of various merger characteristics on the post merger 
performance measures. 
3. To analyze the performance of various subsamples created on the basis of 
several merger characteristics. 
4. To analyze the performance of M&A for select industries, in order to find out 
whether M&A are more successful in few industries as compared to others. 
n. lb analyze the impact of acquirer's learning on VI&A performance in case of 
multiple mergers and acquisitions by an acquirer. 
3.3 Hypothesis to be tested 
Hypotheses have been developed based on the objectives stated above. The 
hypotheses are categorized in three categories based on the statistical evaluation 
applied. These categories are given as follows: 
I. M&A performance using five year mean values of performance measures 
in pre & post merger period by applying paired t-test. 
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2. \1&A performance using each \ear cross-sectional median values of 
performance measures in pre & post merger period h\ appl\ ing paired t-
test. 
3. Impact of'se\era! merger characteristics on post-merger performance using 
the regression anal~sk. 
Hypothesis for each of these categories are stated as follows: 
Category I- M&A performance based on mean value of' measures 
HO r There is no significant variation in the value of combined ROA (weighted 
average ROA) between pre and post merger scenario. 
I10 , There is no si,-,nificant \ariation in the \alue of ra\+ ROA for combined firm, 
bet\\ een pre and post merger scenario. 
H0 1 There is no significant variation in the value of industr\ adjusted ROA for 
combined firm. het~%een pre and post merger scenario. 
HO, There is no significant variation in the value of combined ROE (weighted 
average ROA) between pre and post merger scenario. 
1102.1 '[here is no significant variation in the value of raN\ ROE for combined firm. 
betvveen pre and post merger scenario. 
I10, There is no significant variation in the value of' industr\ adjusted ROE for 
combined firm. het een pre and post merger scenario. 
H0, There is no significant variation in the value of' combined Net ProfitMargin 
(weighted average NP Margin) between pre and post merger scenario. 
H0'. There is no signiticant variation in the 'alue of' ravv \I' Margin for combined 
firm. bet cen pre and post merger scenario. 
H0 ; _ There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted NP Margin for 
combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
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HOa There is no significant variation in the Nalue of combined FPS (weighted 
average EPS) between pre and post merger scenario. 
HO., l here is no significant variation in the 'aloe of ra 	kI'S for combined firm. 
beteen pre and post merger scenario. 
I-10., _ There is no significant %ariation in the value ol industry adjusted FPS for 
combined firm. beteen pre and post merger scenario 
HO., There is no significant variation in the value of combined Cash Flows 
(weighted average Cash Flows) scaled by various parameters, between pre and 
post merger scenario. 
H05, There is no significant variation in the value of raw "Cash Flows/Total Assets" 
for combined firm. heteen pre and post merger scenario. 
HO; , There is no significant \ariation in the value of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flo sTotal Assets" for combined firni, bet~\een pre and post merger scenario 
110; : There is no significant sariation in the value of ra\\ "Cash Flows/Operating 
Assets' for combined firm, bet~+een pre and post merger scenario. 
H0;. There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flo\\s-Operating Assets" for combined firm. beteen pre and post merger scenario 
HO;,; There is no significant variation in the value of raw "Cash Flows/Market Value 
of Assets' for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
F-10:r, There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flo\\s'Market Value of Assets' for combined firm, between pre and post merger 
scenario 
H0r- There is no significant variation in the value of ra\p "Cash Flows/Sales" for 
combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
HO: Q There is no significant variation in the \aloe of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flo\\s,Sales" for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
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1106 There is no significant variation in the value of combined Economic Value 
Added (weighted average EVA) scaled by various parameters, between pre and 
post merger scenario. 
H06,y There is no significant variation in the value of raw "EVA based on book value 
data' for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
HO62 There is no significant variation in the value of raw -EVA based oil market 
value data for combined firm_ between pre and post merger scenario. 
H063 There is no significant variation in the value of raw "EVA based on Gorden 
Growth Ke & market value data" for the combined firm, between pre and post 
merger scenario. 
Category 2- M&A performance based on median value of measures: 
HQ There is no significant variation in the value or combined ROA (weighted 
average ROA) between pre and post merger scenario. 
HO,,i  There is no significant variation in the value of raw ROA for combined firm, 
between pre and post merger scenario. 
HO,,2 There is no significant variation in the value of industn adjusted ROA for 
combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
Hoe There is no significant variation in the value of combined ROE (weighted 
average ROA) between pre and post merger scenario. 
HOill There is no significant variation in the value of raw ROE for combined firm, 
between pre and post merger scenario. 
HOs.2 There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted ROE for 
combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
R09 There is no significant variation in the value of combined Net Profit Margin 
(weighted average NP Margin) between pre and post merger scenario. 
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IlOk,, There is no significant variation in the value of raw NP Margin for combined 
firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
11092 There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted NP Margin for 
combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
110 There is no significant variation in the value of combined EPS (weighted 
average EPS) between pre and post merger scenario. 
Hllui There is no slgnlhcant variation in the value of raw EPS for combined firm, 
between pre and post merger scenario. 
HOioa There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted EPS for 
combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
H011 There is no significant variation in the value of combined Cash Flows 
(weighted average Cash Flows) scaled by various parameters, between pre and 
post merger scenario. 
H0i i,i There is no significant variation in the value of raw "Cash Flows,Total Assets' 
for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
H011+ There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flows/Total Assets" for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
HOii There is no significant variation in the value of raw "Cash Flows/Operating 
Assets" for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
HO1. 4  There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flows/Operating Assets" for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
H0i„there is no significant variation in the value of raw "Cash Flows/Market Value 
of Assets” for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
HOn a There is no significant variation ht the value of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flows/Market Value of Assets" for combined firm, between pre and post merger 
scenario 
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HOii   There is no significant variation in the value of raw "Cash FlowWSa{es for 
combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
HOi i,g There is no significant variation in the value of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flows/Sales" for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario 
HO12 There is no significant variation in the value of combined Economic Value 
Added (weighted average EVA) scaled by various parameters. between pre and 
post merger scenario. 
HOi„i There is no significant variation in the value of raw EVA based on book value 
data' for combined brut. between pre and post merger scenario. 
11011.2 There is no significant variation in the value of raw EVA based on market 
value data” for combined firm, between pre and post merger scenario. 
H0123 There is no significant variation in the value of raw "EVA based on Gorden 
Growth Ke & market value data' for the combined frm, between pre and post 
merger scenario. 
Category 3- Impact of various merger characteristics on post merger performance 
measures: 
11013 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined ROA (weighted average ROA of acquirer and target), 
11013.1 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw ROA of combined firm. 
HO132 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted ROA of combined firm. 
H014 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined ROE(weightcd average ROE. of acquirer and target). 
110141 There is no signilicant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw ROE. of combined tire. 
HO142 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted ROE of combined firm. 
HO t; There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined NP Margin (weighted average NP Margin of acquirer and 
target). 
1101ST There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw NP margin ofcomhined firm. 
HOisz There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted NP margin of combined firm. 
H01 6 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined EPS (weighted average EPS of acquirer and target). 
H0161 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw EPS of combined firm. 
HOie,z There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted tips of combined firm. 
H017 I here is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined Cash Flows (weighted average Cash Flows of acquirer and 
target) scaled by various parameters. 
H017' There is no significant Impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw "Cash Flows/Total Assets 	of combined firm. 
HO17,2 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted "Cash Flows/Total Assets" of combined firm. 
H017; There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw "Cash Flows/Operating Assets" of combined firm. 
110]v4 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted "Cash Flows/Operating Assets" of comhined firm. 
H0,, 	There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw "Cash Flows/Market Value of Assets" of combined firm. 
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H0,76 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted "Cash Flows/ Market Value of Assets" of combined firm. 
HOnr There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger raw "Cash Flows/Sales" of combined firm.  
H0r7R There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger industry adjusted "Cash Flows'Sales" of combined firm. 
II0is There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger conrhined Economic Value Added (weighted average EVA of acquirer 
and target). 
H01 ,1 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined raw "EVA based on book value data lot combined firm. 
HOrg2 There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined raw 'EVA based on market value data" for combined firm. 
H0ix.; There is no significant impact of various merger characteristics on the post 
merger combined raw"'EVA based on Gorden Growth Kc and market value data" for 
combined f nn. 
3.4 Type of Research 
This is a descriptive research work wherein the objective is to find out whether the 
Mergers & Acquisition deals entered in past have led to any significant difference in 
the financial performance of the combined firms. This will help us to deduce whether 
M&A is a successful strategy for the corporate growth or not. 
3.5 Period of Study 
For the purpose of this study. the mergers and acquisitions done during the period 
1999 to 2007 are considered for evaluation. The reason for limiting the period for 
study up to 31 81 March, 2007 is that the 5 year post-acquisition financial data will be 
required for each firm and for the deals beyond 207, the complete 5 year results are 
not available, till date. The period of study has been started since 1999 because the 
comprehensive list of domestic M&A is available only from this period onwards. 
3.6 Period of performance measurement 	 Univ~v~' 
The performance of these deals is anal zed for the period 5 \ears prior to acquisition 
and S .ears after the acquisition. This pre and post-acquisition performance III be 
compared to check the success of the M&A. In consistenc\ with the previous research 
work, five year period has been selected to ensure that all the outcomes related to 
mergers are covered in such sufficiently long period. The period longer than five year 
is not opted for comparison of pre and post merger analysis to avoid the impact of any 
other confounding events on the post-acquisition performance. 
3.7 Details of Sample 
Only domestic mergers taking place in India are selected. Cross-border mergers. i.e.. 
in which either the bidder or the target is based outside India. were dropped. This is 
done to ensure homogeneity of the economic and industrial environment so that 
eeneralizabilit\ of the results could be achieved for Indian M&As. Further, it is 
difficult to get data of the foreign counter-part of cross-border deals. Therefore this 
stud\ is focused on the performance evaluation of domestic M&A. 
For the purpose of this study list of domestic mergers and acquisitions is received 
from Economic Times Intelligence Group. As per their data. during the 1999-2007 
period approximately 965 domestic M&A deals were completed. 
Out of this many deals were related to banking and finance companies. Such deals are 
excluded from the sample because of different accounting methods applicable to such 
companies. 
Further, man\ deals were mentioned b> shareholders, private investors, consortiums 
and joint-ventures. Details of them were not available. Therefore such deals arc also 
excluded from the sample. 
In the remaining.; sample. for many companies financial results were not available for 
5 \ears, pre and post-acquisition period completely. The reason was either the 
target/acquirer being private ltd. company or they were pvt. Ltd. Company in the 
beginning and later on they converted into public ltd. Companies. In such cases either 
data is not available at all or it is available partially. For many acquirer/target 
companies data is not available because the\ \%ere delisted during the period of stud\. 
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Therefore. it is not possible to include such deals in the final sample in which either 
target or acquirer were Private Ltd,ldelisted companies . 
Further, many acquirer companies were acquired by some other company. prior to 
completion of 5 years after acquisition. Therefore, their data are not available for 
complete 5 years post-acquisition. Few target companies were acquired prior to 
completion of 5 years of their establishment. Therefore their data doesn't exist for 5 
year pre-acquisition period. Therefore it is not possible to include the M&A deals in 
which such companies are there as acquirevtarget. in the final sample. 
Thus after excluding all such above mentioned deals from the initial sample. the final 
sample size obtained is b7 domestic M&A deals comprising of 67 pairs of acquirer 
and targets. Separately number of acquirer companies are 57, as in 10 cases a single 
acquirer acquired multiple targets. The numbers of target companies are 73 because 
six deals include the merger of three companies. I herefnre. the number of targets is 
73 (67 plus 6 ), These 57 acquirer companies belong to 16 industries. The 73 target 
companies belong to these 16 industries and 4 additional industries. 
Details ofsample are summarized below 
Table 3.1 Year-wise number of acquisitions 
f- 	Year Number of pairs of 
acquirer-target firms 
%age of pairs of 
ac 	uirer-tar el firms 
999 NA* 
2000 NA* 
2001 9 13.43% 	_ _ 
2002 12 17.91"/ 
2003 6 
8   
8.96% 
 11.94% -  2004 
2005 7 	 0.45% 
2006 14 20.90% 
2007 11 16.42% 
fetal fi7 too 	% 
`Complete data are not available for deals belonging to this period. 
3.8 Classification of Entire sample based on various merger characteristics 
Entire sample is categorized into seven sets of two-two subsamples on the basis of Ist 
seven characteristics mentioned in table 3.2. Thus total 14 subsamples are created 
based on these merger characteristics. 
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Table 3.2 Details of subsamples classified based on seven merger characteristics 
S.NO. Merger 
Characteristics 
Subsample-1 No- 	of 
M&A 	in 
Sobsantple-II No.of Total 
M&A 	in No. 
subsample- subsample- of 
1 II M&A 
1- Size 	(based 	on Target Size<IO% 17 Target Si2e>l9% 50 67 
Total Assets) of Acquirer Size  of Acquirer Size 
36 67 2- Mode 	of Equity Cash 31 
Payment 
3- Relatedness Related Mergers 62 Unrelated 5 67 
Mergers _ 
Debt 	in 	the more than 40% 15 	Less 	than 	40% 67 4- 52 
Capital Structure debt debt 
of acquirer 
5- Acquirer's 	More than 	500%  
promoter stake 	stake 
30 Less 	than 	50% 
stake 
37 	67 
6- Group vs. 	non- 	Group mergers 29 Non-group 38 	67 
group mergers 
7- Structure _Mergers 43 Acquisitions 24 67 
Single 	vs. 	Singe mergers 49 Multiple mergers IS 67 8- 
multiple Amhuja 2. 
acquirers Glaxo-2, 	IOC-3, 
ITC-3, M&M-2- 
Punjab Chem 2. 
RIL-2, Sterlite-2 
These characteristics may have a bearing upon the performance of combined firm 
after merger/acquisition. ]lie probable effects of these characteristics on the merged 
firm's performance are explained as follows 
3,5.1 Size of Target Company 
One of the important factor which may impact the performance of combined firm is 
size of target. It is argued that small mergers/acquisitions are too small to bring any 
significant difference to the acquirer profitability and serve merely the purpose of 
expansion. An opposite argument in favour of small targets may be that because of 
the small size of target the post-merger integration is easy and synergies can be 
experienced at a faster pace, without posing much problems of effective integration of 
two companies. Therefore. it is important to filter the impact of size on the post-
merger performance of combined firm. The objective is to find out whether the 
relative size of targets in comparison to acquirer size, influences the 11&A 
performance or target size doesn't has a bearing on merger performance. 
T 
Here subsample-I include the mergers in which targel size is less than 10% of acquirer 
size based on total assets while subsample-li include the mergers in which target size 
is more than lO% ofaequircr size based on total assets 
3.8.2 Level of promoters' stake in acquirer company 
Another important factor which ma' influence the performance of combined firm is 
the promoter's stake in acquirer company just before the acquisition. It is important to 
know that whether the companies in which promoters have controlling stake. indulge 
into strategic acquisitions which leads to better post-merger performance in 
comparison to other companies in which promoters have lesser stake and merger 
decision is influenced by agency problem. 
Here level of promoters stake in acquirer company is measured in the year prior to 
acquisition year because extent of promoter's control prior to acquisition can 
influence the problem of agency effect in M&A. Subsamplc-I includes the mergers in 
which promoter's stake is less than 50% and sut sample-II includes the mergers in 
which promoter's stake is more than 50%. 
3.8.3 Relatedness of the merger 
The sample includes related as well as unrelated 'Yi&A. It is argued that related 
mergers are more successful in comparison to unrelated one because of the acquirer 
experience in the same industry and better economies of scale and scope. Therefore, 
the impact of relatedness on merger performance needs to be analyzed. 
Here subsample-I include unrelated mergers and subsample-Il includes unrelated 
mergers. 
3.8.4 Mode of Payment 
While entering into M&A deal the acquirer firm may pay the target by cash, by stock 
or by combination of two. II is argued that when the acquirer company's stock is 
being traded at a high valuation then payment is generally made by stock as it will 
lead to a favourable exchange ratio for acquirer company. Such decisions are more 
influenced by stock valuation rather than strategic fit. Another argument against the 
stock payment is that in such an arrangement the target shareholders share the risk of 
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the combined firm failure/success hile in cash payment only the acquirer 
shareholders hear the risk. I herefore the companies take more cautious decisions 
%N hen payment is made b\ cash. Further majority of cash pa\ment are partially 
financed h\ debt. The mandator\ interest and principle repayment on the debt poses a 
discipline on the combining firms and therefore such deals are expected to perform 
better in comparison to stock financed deals. l'herefi~re. it is important to see hether 
there is an difference in the performance of combined firm \ hen payment is made 
h., cash \ i. a v is stock. 
Here subsample-I include the mergers in which node of payment is non-cash and 
subsample-Il includes the mergers in which cash is used as mode of payment. 
3.8.5 Nature of merger whether group or non-group merger 
Resie\N of literature highlights two vie\ss regarding value creation in within-group 
stock offers. One ie" relates to the tunneling effect whereas the other relates to the 
value added effect. 
The tunneling effect states that \\ ithin group acquisitions by the acquiring companies 
with controlling shareholders are aimed at shifting the resources from one group 
company \\here the acquiring, company has lo\'er cash tlo\\ rights to another group 
company where it has higher cash flow rights or to itself for maximizing the benefits 
of the controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. 
The value added vie\\ states that within-group acquisitions by the acquiring 
companies \\ith controlling shareholders are aimed at creating various financial and 
economic synergies by pooling the resources of both the companies in the post-
acquisition period. 
The sample includes the \1&A deals bet\\ecn the group companies as well as non-
group deals. As per the above stated points. It can he argued that management has 
complete control in group mergers further these deals \\ill be result of well thought 
strategy therefore the performance of group \1&A deals ill he better in comparison 
to non-group deals. Many a times non-group deals may be influenced by empire 
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building attitude rather than factors leading to synergy. Therefore, the difference 
between the performances of group vs. non group M&A deals should be analyzed. 
Here subsample-I include the non-group mergers and subsample-I I includes the group 
mergers. 
3.8.6 Level of debt in the acquirer company 
Another important factor is existence and proportion of debt in the capital structure of 
acquirer in the pre-acquisition sear. As per capital structure hypothesis. M&A can be 
an effective method to adjust the capital structure of a firm. Myers and Majlut' (1984) 
propose the theory that slack rich firms pair v ith slack poor firms to create value. The 
sum of cash in hand and unused debt capacit\ is referred to as financial slack. In other 
words, value is created \%hen firms with lo\\ financial leverage acquire firms with 
high financial leverage. Firms %.ith unused debt capacity may be able to create value 
by using financial slack to acquire other firms. A lo g\ debt-to-equity or a low interest-
expense to earnings ratio indicates the ability to service more debt. Value is created 
because slack rich bidders can pursue the profitable but unfunded investment 
opportunities of' the pre\ iousl\ slack poor targets. One of' the contrary views is that 
the underleveraged bidders pa\ higher premium. Their negative stock performance is 
consistent \\ ith free cash tlo\% h\pothesis. High cash levels of acquirers have also lead 
to underperiOrmance of such bidders. 41 hile the aggressive acquirers with higher debt 
levels are found to he compensating liar this risk b\ higher operating performance. It 
is therefore important to see whether there is a difference in the performance of M&A 
deals \\here acquirer has low vis-a-vis high debt in its capital structure, prior to 
acquisition. 
Here level of debt in acquirer company is measured in the year prior to acquisition 
year because level of leverage prior to acquisition can influence the problem of Free 
cash flows and financial slack effect in M&A. Subsample-I includes the mergers in 
which debt is less than 40% in the capital structure of acquirer and subsample-II 
includes the mergers in \%hich debt in acquirer company is more than 400%0. 
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3.8. Structure of combination as merger or acquisition 
Here the combinations are divided on the basis of'their structure. As a specific case in 
this work here only we differentiate between two terms mergers and acquisitions. 
Here merger means %%here the business of target company is completely merged into 
acquirer company and they become one company. While the acquisitions mean the 
combination of firms \\here Target Compan% is run as a subsidiarn of' acquirer 
company and doesn't lose its identit'. l herefOre. it ma) be argued that in case of 
mergers, economics of scope \\ ill he available as two entities have merged their 
operations. While in acquisitions the two entities are managed separately therefore 
expenses may he high which \%ill lead to reduced profits. Therefore, attempt has to be 
made to e\aluate the performance of the each of t\\o such subsamples separately. 
Subsample-I includes the combinations in the Corm of acquisition while subsample-II 
includes mergers. 
3.9 Classification of entire sample into nine subsamples based on select industries 
Entire sample was subdivided into nine subsamples on the basis of first nine select 
industries as mentioned in table 3.3, in order to check that whether M&A performance 
differs across industries. 
S. No. 
1 _ 
3 
Table 3.3 ln(lustr~-wise classification of 67 deals 
Industry 	 No. 	of 	pairs 	of 
merged firms 
1)rugs 	. Pharmaceuticals 	 7 
Retinel\ 6 
;Automobile 	 5 
4 Chemicals 9 
5 Textiles 4 
6 Construction & Equipments 
Construction Building Material 
8 
7 10 
8 Electrical & Electronic_ Appliances 
Plastic & Packaging 
4 
9 4 
10 Tobacco 3 
	
11 	 Gems &- Jewellery 
12 	In\ cstment Services 
1 13 	I ransport logistics 
14 	Computer Soft\\are 
15 	Beer K Alcohols 
1 	16 	C'osnietics 
Total 
1 
  2 
67 
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3.10 Subsample based on multiple mergers 
Out of the entire sample one subsample is created including the mergers done by 
acquirer who are involved into multiple mergers. The details of multiple mergers 
entered by acquirers in our sample are provided in table 3.2 ( S. No. 8). This is done 
to analyse the phenomenon of acquirer learning as a result of multiple mergers. 
3.11 Type of Data requirement and Data Collection Source 
3.11.1 Data Requirement of merging companies 
For this stud\ the tollo\\ing data vas required for 5 sears pre and post-acquisition, for 
both target and acquirer company for each deal 
• Income Statement 
• Balance Sheet 
• ('ash Flow Statement 
• EPS 
• Market capitalization 
The above mentioned data is collected for each acquirer and target. from CMIE-
PROWESS data base for the financial sear 1993 to 2012, in order to cover sample 
period 1999-2007 and 5 \ears prior to and after this period. This is done because 
M&A deals hich v ere included in the final sample are scattered over the financial 
ears 1999 to 2007. 
3.11.2 Industry data requirement 
For the industry belonging to all the acquirers and targets in the final sample 
follo%\ ing data as required 
• Industry median Cash Flows from Operation (CFFO) 
• Industry median EPS 
• lndustry median ROA. ROE and Net Profit Margin 
The industr\ medians are not available in Indian data base. For this purpose CFFO. 
EPS and inputs to RO:\. ROE and Net Profit margin are collected from the 
PROWESS data base for all the companies in each of the industry group belonging to 
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acquirerrrarget in the final sample. Thereafter industr% median CFFO. industry 
median FPS. Industry median ROA. ROE. \P margin are calculated with the help of 
collected data of all the incumbents of a~.ti%en industry. This is done for each of the 
56 predefined industries groups belonging.; to final sample for each of the year from 
financial Near 1993 to 2012. 
When industry median is calculated, following Ilealy et al., (1992) the figures 
belonging to acquirer target for which industry medians is to be calculated are 
excluded From the industr\ data and onl\ thereafter the industry medians are 
calculated. 
3.12 Calculation of Financial Measures 
For the c\aluation of financial performance nineteen financial performance measures 
are calculated. These measures include the ra%\ firm measures as well as industry 
adjusted measures. 
3.12.1 Reason for calculation of Industry Adjusted Measures 
Raw firm measures do not adjust for the impact of concurrent events on the merged 
firms' returns that are unrelated to the merger, and are therefore difficult to interpret. 
For example, since we deflate cash tlo\\s by the market value of assets, changes in 
equit\ values due to overall market movements \ ill affect the measured returns over 
time. Another example of such industr\ influence could be that industry in general is 
doing good and in its growth phase. Therefore, during that time period every firm in 
that particular industry \gill depict good performance. \\hick may not he caused by 
merger. here the focus is on industr\-adjusted performance measures because they 
eliminate the impact of any contemporaneous changes in the overall profitability, cash 
flox\ performance and equity values of the industr\ . 
Every firm operates in a particular industry and is affected by the rules and 
regulations applicable, as also the economic factors impinging on that specific 
industry. It is thus necessary to take into account the effects of the economy and 
industry in which each firm operates. in order to make the comparison possible across 
firms (Cornett and 'lehranian. 1992: Ghosh. 2001: Ilealk. Palepu and Ruback. 1992: 
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Rahman and l.immack, 2004). This factoring out of the external environmental 
impact makes the comparisons across firms and industries meaningful. 
lndustr\ median is calculated for each of the accounting ratio and cash flow from 
operation. While calculating the industry median for each measure, the parameter of 
merged firm was excluded follo\\ ing the heal) et.al. After that industry adjusted 
ratios and cash flows from operations are calculated by subtracting the industry 
median from the firm measure. 
Thus following financial measures are calculated for the combined firm for 5 years 
before and after the mer2er 
3.12.1 Profitahilit-N Measures 
i. Return on Assets (ROA) of the combined firm 
ii. Industr\ Adjusted RO;\ for the combined firm 
iii. Return on Equit,- (ROE.) of the combined firm 
iv. lndustrn Adjusted ROE tier the combined firm 
v. Net Profit Margin of the combined firm 
vi. Industry Adjusted Net Profit Margin for the combined firm 
vii. Earnings per Share (EPS) of the combined firm 
viii. Industry Adjusted EPS for the combined firm 
3.12.2 ('ash Flow Measures 
Cash flo\\s from Operations are taken from CMIE Pro\%ess data base which is 
calculated as per accounting standard AS-3. These CFFO are deflated/scale in 4 
ways. b) Net Sales. Total Assets. Operating Assets and Market Capitalization. 
The\ are deflated scaled in order to make them comparable across the size i.e. to 
eliminate the impact of size. This is done because CFFO are absolute figure which 
is not comparable across the firms. 13y scaling the CFFO by above said 
parameters, the\ become comparable across the firms. Thus following eight cash 
flow measures are calculated 
i. 'CFFO !Total Assets' of the combined firm 
ii. Industry Adjusted 'C'l:lvO -otal Assets' for the combined firm 
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iii. 'CFFO/Operating Assets of the combined Tian 
iv. Industry Adjusted ' CFFO/Operating Assets for the combined firm 
v. 'CFFOMarket Value of Assets' of the combined firm 
vi. Industry Adjusted CFFO/.Market Value of Assets for the combined firm 
vii. 'CFFO/Salcs' of the combined firm 
viii. Industry Adjusted 'CFFO/Sales' for the combined firm 
3.12.3 Economic Value Added 
Economic Value Added is calculated in three ways where method of calculation 
differed based on the method of calculation of cost of equity Kr, Weight of debt Wd 
and weight of equity W, in the capital structure of sample firm. Therefore three EVA 
values are calculated for each combined firm. The following formulae were used for 
the calculation of EVA 
• EVA= NOPAT - (WACC*Capital invested) 
Where. 
• NOPAT— F.BIT*(I=f) 
o EBIT = PBT + Interest — Other Income 
o T (Tax Rate) = Provision for tax /Profit Before Tax 
o Adjustments in the calculation of tar rate(T) Wherever T was 
—ve value because of —ve value of PET or very high value. it 
teas converted to zero. This was clone because the —ce or very 
high value of T will lead !a disturle / value of EkA which may 
be eriranrdinaril}' lair or high, respecrively. 
• Capital Invested — Net Fixed Assets — Current Assets - Current 
I.iab ii ties 
• WACC= Wd*  Ki*(l=1')+Wr*Ke 
o Kd = Interest expense/ Total Interest bearing liabilities 
o Ke. Wa & Wr are calculated in three ways 
➢ Method I K, = (Net Profit-Preference Dividend)/Net Worth 
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•:• \~l ; (\\"eight of' Debt) = Total Interest bearing borrowings/(Total 
Interest bearinc borros\ini s • Net Worth) 
•:• \\ ,. (\\'eight of' Equity) = Net Worth,'(Total Interest hearing borrowings 
• Net Worth) 
Method [I K. — i\ct Protit-Preference Di\idend)'Mlarket Capitalization 
•:• W; (\\eight of Deht) = l otal Interest bearing horrow ings'(Total 
Interest hearing borro\%ings • Market Capitalization) 
•3 W (Weight of Equity) = Net Worth/(Total Interest bearing borroN%ings 
Market ('apitalization) 
:- Method III K (gorden growth model) _ [D„*(l+g)/P(,] + g 
•:• Where D,> = Dividend paid for the current year 
•.• g (gro%%th rate) - h (retention rat io) *r (return on equity) 
•:• P, = Current Market Price per Share 
•:• \\ j (\\eight of' Debt) — I otal Interest bearing borros\ ings- (Total 
Interest bearing borrowings + Market Capitalization) 
•:• \V (Weight of Equity) = Net Worth/(Total Interest bearing borrowings 
i \larket Capitalization) 
Adjust►neirtc in the calculation of market capitalization, K,, and K4. 
• [t herever .1larket ('apitalization was not available. ,Vet Worth ►'as used in 
place of Market C'ap. 
• Wherever total borroirwing.s were equal to zero. K4, was taken as zero. 
• l)'herever Kt (or I ,,) was --i'e value because of —ye value of'PAT or —ve value 
of .\'et II'orih, ii rru.s taken a.s zero. 
Here cost ofequit\ K. has not been calculated using ('APM model. The reason is that 
for applying CAPM. beta Value has to be calculated for all the target and acquirer 
firms for each of the five pre and post merger \ears. For this purpose the daily closing 
value of these stock-scrips and index are needed fir ten-ten \ears. Such data is not 
available completely for all the acquirer and target companies. Therefore, for the 
calculation of Ke. Gorden-Gro th and other methods have been applied. 
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Thus we received three types of EVA by appl', ing above mentioned three methods of 
calculating K. \V and \\. E3\ appl\ in,, these three methods EVA is calculated for 
each year for each acquirer and target firm. After that the combined EVA for each 
pair of acquirer and target is calculated for each of the 5 %cars pre & post-acquisition. 
The EVA is aggregated h\ applying the total assets as weights. 
3.13 Statistical Analysis & application of statistical tools 
3.13.1 Calculation of Mean and Median performance measures and application 
of paired t-test After calculating all the performance measures for each pair of 
acquirer & target firth for 5 .cars in pre and post-acquisition period their mean and 
median values for firm measures and industry adjusted measures are calculated as 
foI loww s 
M&A performance based on mean of 5 year performance measures: mean 
performance measure for \ears -5 t -I is calculated for each of the 67 firms 
separatel\. Similarl\ mean performance measure for )ears I to 5 is calculated for each 
of the 67 firms. I hen on these 67 pre and post merger mean values, paired-t test is 
applied to see hether there is ally significant difference exists between pre and post 
merger performance. 
  
Firm/Year 	Year-S ..............Year-1 YearO lear..........Year5 
Firm1 
	
ROA I ,-5......... ROA I ,- 
	
ROA I,0 
	
ROA1,l.......ROAI,5 
Firm2 
	
ROA2.-5.......ROA2.-1 
	
ROA2.0 
	
ROA 2.1........ ROA 2.5 
Firm 67 
	
ROA67.-5....... ROA67.- I 	R0 A67.() 
	
ROA67. I ...... ROA67.5 
This can be understood b\ the above matrix for ROA parameter. Each row here 
represents combined financial parameter of each pair of sample firm (denoted by first 
subscript of each term in the matrix). Each column represents year with respect to 
89 
merger year where merger sear is represented by 0. (merger years are denoted by 
second subscript of each term) 
In this method, ro\~-\' ise mean for each combined firm is calculated for the period -5 
to -I sear and I to 5 \ear \pith respect to merger sear. After this calculation, 67 mean 
values for pre as \\ell as post merger period arc a\ailabfc for the combined firms in 
the final sample. On these two pairs of values paired t-test is applied to know any 
significant difference in pre and post merger performance. This test compares the 
means of to \ariables from the same group. It determines hether the difference 
between the means of the Two variables is significantly different from zero. Merger 
can be considered as an intervention that takes place in the set of sample firms. The 
paired-samples t-test thus determines \\hether there is a significant change in the 
"before/after merger" performance and allows the attribution of the result to the 
merger. This provides an idea of whether merger has led to better firm performance. 
Anal'.sis as done on ra\\ firm performance measure and industry adjusted 
performance measure hich collectively makes 19 parameters of evaluation. Thus 19 
results of paired t-test are recei\ ed after appl' ing method- I 
M&A performance based on cross-sectional median for each year: Median for 
each measure for each of the \car -5 to -I and sear I to 5 is calculated in a cross-
sectional manner. h-, applying the median formula over value of that particular 
measure for all the 07 firms for a given sear. This median calculation is done columns 
v ise in the given matrix. 
Firm/Year 	Year-5 ..............Year-1 
Firml 	a. ROA l .-5......... ROA I .- 
Firm2 	RO:A2.-5.......ROA2,-I 
YearO Yearl.........YearS 
ROAI,0 f ROA1,1.......ROAh5 
ROA2.0 i 	ROA2.I........ROA2.5 
M t 
Firm67 	ROA67.-5.......ROAo7,-1 	ROA67.0 	R0A67,1......ROA67,5 
90 
Thus there will be 5 median values for pre-merger period and rive median values will 
be there for post merger period. On these two set of values paired t-test is applied to 
find out if there is any significant dillerence in pre and post merger performance. This 
is done for all the 19 measures thus there will be 19 results of paired t-test after 
applying method-11. 
3.13.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
The performance in post-acquisition period may he resulted either by the impact of 
M&A or it may be the continuation of pre-acquisition performance; even if there 
wouldn't have been any merger. For example if the sample firm was already an out-
performer in the industry then it may continue to perform excellently in the post-
merger years as well, this performance may be the continuation of pre-merger 
performance rather than a result of merger event. Therefore, it is important to filter the 
impact of pre-merger performance while analysing the post-merger performance of 
the combined firm. 
Further post-merger performance may also he influenced by merger characteristics 
mentioned in table 3.2. In order to find out the effect of pre-merger performance and 
merger characteristics on the post merger performance measure multiple regressions 
is applied for each of the 19 financial performance measures, which resulted into 19 
regression results. 
The variables fcr regression analysis are defined as follows: 
a Dependent Variable: Mean of 5 year performance measure in post merger 
period is taken as dependent variable. 
The independent variables are dcfined as follows: 
Pre-merger value of performance measure and other merger characteristics as 
mentioned in table 3.3 arc taken as independent variables. The independent variables 
are defined as follows: 
Pre merger performance measure: Mean of 5 year performance measure in 
pre-merger period is used as independent variable. 
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• Relative Size of Target: Relati\e size oftarget in comparison to acquirer is 
measured as the percentage of total assets of target compan, in comparison to 
total assets of acquirer companies. 
• Promoter's Stake: Promoter's stake in acquirer company is taken for the year 
prior to acquisition year for the purpose of regression analysis. Because extent 
of control of promoters prior to acquisition year will have an impact on agency 
problems related to \1&A. 
• :\equirer Capital Structure: level of debt in acquirer company is taken for the 
.ear prior to acquisition sear for the purpose of regression ahalysis. Because 
the level of leverage prior to acquisition \ear \\ ill have an impact on the 
financial slack and free cash tlrn\ influences related to M&A. 
The tollo\%ing variables are taken as damn variables: 
• Mode of payment: Where node of payment is cash it is assigned the value 
equal to I and for non-cash mode of payment zero value is assigned. 
• Relatedness: Where merging firms are related it is assigned the value equal to 
I and for unrelated mergers zero value is assigned. 
(;roup!nott-group mergers: Where merging tines belong to same group it is 
assigned the value equal to I and for non-group mergers zero value is 
assigned. 
• Merger/Acquisition structure: Where the form of combination is merger it is 
assigned the value equal to I and for acquisitions zero value is assigned 
3.14 Analysis of subsamples based on merger characteristics 
For all the 1 1 subsamples classified on the basis of 1st seven merger characteristics as 
defined in table 3.2. paired t-test is applied for each of the 19 financial performance 
measures, in order to find out any significant difference between pre and post-merger 
values of these subsamples. 
3.15 :lnahsis of subsamples for select industries 
for this purpose sample contained nine subsamplcs from several industries namely 
Pharmaceutical industr\. Refiner\, Automobiles. ('heniicals. Textiles. Construction 
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Equipments. Construction Building Material. Electrical & Electronics Appliances and 
Plastic Packaging Goods industry comprising minimum 4 to maximum 10 pairs of 
merging firms. For rest of the industries there are onl\ one to or three mergers. 
Because of small sample size available from these industries it is not possible to 
evaluate the impact of M&A on performance. Therefore, the above stated 9 industries 
are evaluated to analyze the impact of NI&A on performance. 
For the select industries five \ears pre and post merger means are calculated for each 
compan\. Then on the pre and post mean \aloes paired t-test is applied to see any  
significant difference in performance caused h) M&A. This is done for all the above 
discussed 19 performance measures. The results are summarized in the next chapter. 
3.16 Analysis of subsample containing multiple mergers 
For this purpose sample contained to firms involved in three — three mergers 
respectivel'. Here firms involved in more than to M&A are classified as firms 
indulged in multiple mergers. follo\v ing Kumar and Rajib (2007). For rest of the 
acquirers, only one or two mergers have taken place and they cannot be classified as 
multiple merger. 
For both the fines five \ears pre and post merger means are calculated for each 
merger acquisition. "I hen on the pre and post mean values paired t-test is applied to 
see an significant difference in performance caused by M&A. This is done for all the 
above discussed 19 performance measures. I he results are summarized in the next 
chapter. 
3.1' Limitations of the Studs 
1. This stud\ has e\aluated the perfOrmance of only domestic mergers and 
acquisitions. The cross-border M&A are not evaluated here because of 
difficulty involved in finding the data of foreign companies. 
2. In this stud\ the profitability measures. cash flo measures and EVA have 
been used for financial analysis. All these measures help to measure the 
enhancement in the firm performance. Ho\~ever. the objective of a firm is the 
maximization of' shareholder's \\ealth. The measure 'Market Value Added 
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helps to identif\ that hether the market \alue of' tirm's share has increased or 
riot. Because of una~ailahilit\ of market capitalization data for all the sample 
firms for all the \cars. this measure has not been applied here. Therefore. 
M&A performance in terms of increase in shareholder's wealth is not 
measured here. 
3. The subsamples identified for select industries contain the small number of 
firms. Therefore, results given on the basis of these subsample need to be 
confirmed by using large sample size for each industry. 
4. The subsamples identified for the M&A doe by firms indulged in the multiple 
merger contain only the multiple \1&\ done by two acquirers. Therefore, 
results given on the basis of' these subsample need to be confirmed b) using 
large sample size for each industry. 
Chapter-4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
In this chapter. ++e present the result's of paired t-tr'.t and multiple regression anaI%sis 
applied on the overall sample for 19 performance measures. The results of paired t-
test applied for the several subsamples are also presented here. The interpretations 
based on the results of h\pothesis testing for each measure are stated here. These 
interpretations have helped its to reach to the conclusion of our findings. 
Table 4.1 - Comparison of aggregate mean values for 5 years pre and post 
merger period 
S. Parameters combined on the basis of M11ean values for pre To tailed 
No. 'total Assets and post merger period paired t-test 
Years ++. r. to at alpha = 
merger/acquisition _5% 
Egression -5 	to - I 	0 I to 5 palue 
weighted ROA= ++ ghtd N I' w htd TA 0.06 0.07 0.04 
2 Industr+ A4ted RO.\_ 	- 0.01 0.05 0.30 
3 Weighted ROL 	++,ehtdNP'++ghtd NW 0.11 0.12 0.68 
4 Industry Adjusted RO)f: -0.0. -0.03 0.93 
Weighted NP margin - wghtd NP Wghtd 
5 Sales 0.05 0.22 0.22 
6 Industry adjusted NP margin 0.02 0.18 0.25 
7 weie,hted EPS 15.22 19.18 0.15 
8 Industry adjusted EPS 13.0- 13.54 0.91 
9 weighted CFFO. wghtd. Total Assets 0.09 0.09 0.76 
10 industry adjusted CFFO w ghtd. Assets 0.08 0.09 0.26 
weighted CFFO +vghtd. Operating ;assets 0.11 0.08 0.73 
Industry adjusted CFFO wghtd. Operating 
12 Assets 0.09 0.06 0.76 
13 wghtd. CFFO ++ghtd Market value of assets 0.10 0.09 0.08 
Industry adjusted CFFO wghtd. Market 
14 value of Assets 0.09 0.08 0.33 
I5 wghtd. CFFO wghtd. Sales 0.10 0.19 0.37 
16 Industry adjusted CFFO wghtd. Sales 0.09 0.18 ! 	0.33 
weighted l\'A( Ke-\P NW. book value - 
17 wghts for WACC) 27.23 197.39 0.00 
weighted EVA (Ke=NP'Mkt cap. mkt 
18 value wuhts for WACC) 38.60 242.35 0.00 
++eighted EVA (Ke-gorden gro++th. rnkt 
19 value wghts for WACC) 20.35 182.80 0.00 
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Performance parameters of domestic mergers & acquisitions 
4.1 M&A performance based on mean of cite year performance measures 
The aggregate mean values of 5 pre-merger years and 5 post- merger years for total 
67 firms are compared. This is done for each measure for tirm values and industry 
adjusted values by applying two tailed paired t-test- The comparison is summarized in 
the above table. 
4.1.1 Interpretation of the results based on hypothesis testing 
I. Raw ROA between the pre merger and post merger scenario This has 
been found that there exists a significant variation in the mean value of raw 
ROA for combined firm between the pre merger and post merger scenario. 
The result of paired sample t-test indicates that p value is equal to 0.04 which 
is less than 0.05 (95% level of significance, which is an indication of the 
existence of significant difference of ra" firm ROA between pre and post-
merger scenario. 
2. Industry Adjusted ROA between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario No significant variation is found in the mean value of industry 
adjusted ROA for combined firm between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario. The result of paired sample t-test indicates that p value is equal to 
0.30 which is more than 0.05 (95% level of significance), which indicates no 
significant difference in the industry adjusted ROA. 
3, Raw ROE between the pre merger and post merger scenario There is no 
significant difference in the mean value of pre merger and post merger raw 
ROE for combined firm. The result of paired sample t-test indicates that p 
value is equal to 0.68 which is more than 0.05 (95% level of significance), 
which indicates no significant difference in raw firm ROE. 
4. Industry Adjusted ROE between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario No significant variation is found in the mean value of industry 
adjusted ROE for combined firm between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario. The result of paired sample t-test indicates that p value is equal to 
0.93 which is more than 0.05 (95% level of significance), which indicates no 
significant difference in the industry adjusted ROE. 
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>. Ras Net Profit Margin between the pre merger and post merger scenario 
W1 hen the mean \et Profit margin is tested statisticall\. for combined firm, no 
significant diBference is found het een pre and post merger NP Margin. This 
is indicated bv the p value Of 0.22 1p--.0s). 
6. IndustrN Adjusted Net Profit Margin between the pre merger and post 
merger scenario \\ hen the mean industr\ adjusted Net Profit margin is tested 
statistically. tur combined firm. no signiticant ditfcrence is found bct een pre 
and post merger industr\ adjusted \I' Margin. This is indicated by a p \alue of 
0.22 (95% Ie~el ot'significance). 
7. Raw EPS between the pre merger and post merger scenario There is no 
significant difference in pre and post merger EPS of combined firm, indicated 
b\ p value of 0.15(95% level of significance). 
8. Industry Adjusted EPS between the pre merger and post merger scenario 
I here is no significant difference in pre and post merger FPS of combined 
firm. indicated b p 'sal uc of' 0.9I 1 5°o le\cl of significance). 
9. Raw `Cash Ploy/"I'otal Assets' between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario There is no significant impact. caused b\ mergers in the Cash 
flo's's s`Iota! assets parameter for the combined firm. This is indicated by the p 
value of 0.76 (95% level of significance). \\hen paired t-test is applied on pre 
and post merger values of sample firms. 
10. Industry Adjusted `Cash Flo%s/Total Assets' between the pre merger and 
post merger scenario There is no significant impact, caused by mergers in the 
industry adjusted Cash tlo's'ss/Total assets parameter for the combined firm. 
This is indicated b' the p 'salue of 0.26 (95% level of significance), when 
paired t-test is applied on pre and post merger values of sample firms. 
I. Raw `Cash Flow/Operating Assets' between the pre merger and post 
merger scenario For "Cash Flo\\ Operating Assets" parameter p \clue is 
0.73 (95% level ot'significance). which indicates no difference in pre and post 
merger 
12. Industry Adjusted 'Cash Flow/Operating Assets' between the we merger 
and post merger scenario for industry adjusted "Cash Flow/ Operating 
Assets" parameter p value is 0.76 (95°0 level of significance). \'shich indicates 
no difference in pre and post merger value. 
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13. Raw 'Cash Flow/ Market Value of Assets' between the pre merger and 
post merger scenario In case ofCash Flows/Market value of Assets" for 
combined firm, paired t-test resulted in the p vale of 0.08 (95% level of 
significance). This indicates no difference between pre and post merger 
performance. 
14. Industry Adjusted 'Cash Flow/Market Value of Assets' between the pre 
merger and post merger scenario In case of industry adjusted "Cash 
flows/Market value of Assets' for combined firm. paired 1-test resulted in the 
p vale of 0.33 (95% level of significance). This indicates no difference 
between pre and post merger performance. 
15. Raw 'Cash FlowlSales' between the pre merger and post merger scenario 
The paired t-lest resulted in the p value of 0.37(95% level of significance) for 
the Cash flow/Sales measure of combined firm. This indicates no significant 
variation in pre and post merger value of this measure. 
16. Industry Adjusted 'Cash Flow/Sales' between the pre merger and post 
merger scenario The paired t-fist resulted In the p value of 0.33 (95% level of 
significance) for the Cash flow/Sales measure of combined firm. This 
indicates no significant variation in pre and post merger value of this measure. 
17. Raw EVA based on book values between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario I his has been found that there exists a significant variation in the 
mean value of raw EVA for combined firm between the pre merger and post 
merger scenario, when calculated on the basis of book value data. The result 
of paired sample t-test indicates that p value is equal to 0.00 which is less than 
0.01 (99% level of significance) and 0.05(95% level of significance), which is 
an indication of the existence of significant difference in the EVA. 
I8. Raw EVA based on market values When the paired t-test is applied on the 
pre and post merger values of EVA of combined firms, calculated based on 
market value data, the significant variation is found. It is reflected by the p 
value of 0.00 (99% level of significance) 
19. Raw EVA based on Gorden Growth model For the EVA calculated on the 
basis of market value data and Gorden Growth Ke. significant difference is 
found in the value of this measure between the pre and post merger period. 
This is reflected by the p value of 0.00(99% level of significance). 
98 
4.2 MIS.A performance based on cross-sectional median for each year 
The aggregate median \alues of 67 sample firms for each of the 5 pre-acquisition 
years are compared with aggregate median tatues for each of the 5 post-acquisition 
years respectively. This is done for each measure for firm values and industry 
adjusted talues h\ appl\ in paired two tailed t-test. The comparison is summarized in 
the follo\\ in +t table. 
Table 4.2 - Comparison of cross-sectional median values for each of the 5 Fears 
pre and post merger period 
S. 	Parameters p values 
No 	combined on the 	 l early Cross-sectional Medians at 
basis of Total alpha= 
Assets 	 1 ears w. r. to mer er/acc uisition 0.05 
Expression -5 
0.05 
-4 
0.04 
-3 
00.05 
-2 	-I 	 1 	2 
0.06 	0.05 	0.07 	0.06 
3 	4 5 
0.05 0.035591 I eighted ROA = 0.07 	0.07 
ww ghtd \ P X% ehtd 
TA 
2 Industry Adjusted 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 	11.05 	0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.601864 
ROA 
3 	Weighted RU}: = 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.13 	0.13 	0.18 	0.19 	0.18 0.19 0.17 	0.001089 
wghtd\P \sghtd 
N\1 
0.04 11.04 0.07 	0.1)5 	0.08 	0.07 	0.07 4 	Industrn Adjusted 0.07 	f 0.08 0.08 0.037036 
ROE, 
0.05 	11.15 	0.07 	0.06 	0.05 5 Wghtd NP margin 0.05 	0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 	0.035768 
_ %%ghtd 
P, W% ghtd Sales 
0.04 	II.1)4 	0.(14 	11.04 	0.03 6 Industr 	adjusted 0.03 	0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 	0.746054 
NP margin 
7 weighted EPS 11.55 10.31 9.80 10.19 	13.29 	13.43 	11.18 11.13 13.18 10.7 0.392843 
G 
8 Industr. adjusted 9.01 7.26 9.15 9.37 	13.29 	14.24 	10.58 10.37 11.41 8.64 0.437997 
EPS 
0.08 	1).09 	0.12 	0.08 9 weighted 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.800832 
CFFO wghtd. 
Total Assets 
10 Industr 	adjusted 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 	0.09 	0.10 	0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.36863 
CFFO"%%uhtd. 
-  Assets 
11 weighted 	 0.11 	0.10 	(1.14 	(1.11 	 0.12 	0.15 	0.12 	0.14 0.12 0.12 0.168634 
CFFO: %%ghtd.  
Operatine Assets 	 ! 	_ 
Industrn adjusted 0.09 	11.08 	((II 	n.119 	ii I I 	U. 13 	11.09 	(1.12 12 (1.10 0.1(1 	0.202958 
Cl 1O %%ghtd.  
Operating Asset   
- 8 	(I.I I 	((.1)8 	0.08 wghtd. 	 0.0(1.08 	0.1 1 	0.08 	u.n7 13 0A5 0.06 0.484122 
CFFO`N%s!htd 
Market %alue of 
assets 
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S. Parameters p values 
No combined on the l earls ('ross-sectional Medians at 
basis of total 	I alpha= 
Assets l ears %%. r. to mer er/acquisition 0.05 
Expression -5 -43 -2 	-1 	1 	2 3 3 5 
14 Ittdustr% adjusted 0.06 0.06 	0.09 0.06 	11.u6 	0.08 	n.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.573333 
CFFO' sghtd. 
Market %alue of 
Assets 
0.10 0.09 	0.11 0.01 	u.1 	0.11 	0.07 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.798913 I5 	w%ghtd. 
('FR) 	e:htd. 
Sales 
0.07 0.06 	0.1)9 0.07 	u.o)9 	n.uY) 	0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 . 0.354557 16 	tndustrn adjusted 
CFFOehtd. 
17 
Sales 
weighted FVA( -2.44 -2.77 	-183 -I.5)) _. -I 	1- 	-0.06 	0.54 5.22 -0.04 -0.55 0.055196 
Ke-N P \W. tarok 
value 	chts for 
WW A('(  
18 	weighted L% :\ 	- 	- 	-0.15 	-0.19 	0.39 	15.98 	16.10 	25.99 	7.29 	4.43 	0.021615 
(Ke=NP %1kt cap. 	0.68 	1.06 	 I 	 I 
mkt value %v ehts 
for \VACC)  
19 	weighted EVA 	-2.32 	-2.73 	-2.78 	-1.05 	-0.95 	ii 'J-0.4 9 	4.61 	0.13 	1.15 	0.054)05 
(Ke-gorden 
growth. mkt \ aluc 
wghts for WACC) 
4.2.1 Interpretation of the results based on hypothesis testing 
1. Raw ROA between the pre merger and post merger scenario This has been 
found that there exists a siwliticant \ariation in the median value of raw ROA 
for combined firm between the pre merger and post merger scenario. The 
result of paired sample t-test indicates that p value is equal to 0.03 which is 
less than 0.05 (95"o level of significance), which is an indication of the 
existence of sienificant difference of ravv firm ROA. 
2. Industry Adjusted ROA between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario do significant variation is found in the median value of industry 
adjusted ROA for combined firm het\\een the pre merger and post merger 
scenario. The result of paired sample 1-test indicates that p value is equal to 
0.60 which is more than 0.05 (95°o le\el of significance), which indicates no 
sjgnilicant difference in the industry adjusted RO,\. 
>. Raw ROE between the pre merger and post merger scenario 'there is 
significant difference in the median 'aloe of pre merger and post merger raw 
1(10 
ROE for combined firm. The result of paired sample t-test indicates that p 
value is equal to 0.001 \`hick is less than 0.05 (95% level of significance). 
which indicates significant difference in ri\\ firm ROE. 
4. lndustr Adjusted ROE between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario Significant variation is found in the median value of industry 
adjusted ROE for combined firm between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario. The result of paired sample t-test indicates that p value is equal to 
0.037 %\hich is less than 0.05 (95° u level of significance), which indicates 
significant difference in the industr\ adjusted ROE. 
5. Raw Net Profit Margin between the pre merger and post merger scenario 
When the median Net Profit rnaruin is tested statisticall\. for combined firm, 
significant difference is found bet%\een pre and post merger NP Margin. This 
is indicated by a p \aloe of 0.035 (95°%% le el of significance). 
6. Industry. Adjusted Net Profit 'Margin between the pre merger and post 
merger scenario When the median industr\ adjusted Net Profit margin is 
tested statistically. for combined firm, no significant difference is found 
bet\\een pre and post merger industry adjusted NP Margin. This is indicated 
by a p \aloe of 0.74 (95% Ie\el of'significance). 
7. Raw EPS between the pre merger and post merger scenario I here is no 
significant difference in pre and post merger l.PS of combined firm, indicated 
by p value of 0.39 195% le\el ot'significance). 
S. Industry' Adjusted EPS bet seen the we merger and post merger scenario 
There is no significant difference in pre and post merger EPS of combined 
firm. indicated b\ p value ot'0.43 (95°u lc\el of significance). 
9. Raw Cash Flo/1'otal Assets' between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario There is no significant impact, caused by mergers in the Cash 
tlo\\s Total assets parameter for the combined firm. This is indicated by the p 
value of 0.80 (95% level of significance), when paired t-test is applied on pre 
and post merger values of sample firms. 
10. Industry Adjusted 'Cash flow/Total Assets' betN%een the pre merger and 
post merger scenario There is no significant impact, caused by mergers in the 
industr\ adjusted Cash t10 s Total assets parameter for the combined firm. 
lot 
This is indicated by the p value of 0.36 (95% level of significance). when 
paired t-test is applied on pre and post merger values of sample firms. 
1 I. Raw 'Cash Flow/Operating Assets' between the pre merger and post 
merger scenario For "Cash Flow,/ Operating Assets'' parameter p value is 
016(95% level of significance), which indicates no difference in pre and post 
merger value. 
12. Industry Adjusted 'Cash Flow/Operating Assets' between the pre merger 
and post merger scenario For industry adjusted "Cash Flow/ Operating 
Assets" parameter In value is 0.20 (95% level of significance), which indicates 
no difference in pre and post merger value. 
13. Raw `Cash Flow/ Markel Value of Assets' between the pre merger and 
post merger scenario In case of "Cash Flows/Market value of Assets" for 
combined firm. paired I-test resulted in the IF value of 0.48 (95% level of 
significance). 'Ibis indicates no difference between pre and post merger 
performance. 
14. Industry Adjusted `Cash Flow/Market Value of Assets' between the pre 
merger and post merger scenario In case of industry adjusted "Cash 
Flows/Market value of Assets" for combined firm, paired t-test resulted in the 
p value of 0.57 (95% level of significance). This indicates no difference 
between pre and post merger performance. 
15. Raw 'Cash Flow/Sales' between the pre merger and post merger scenario 
The paired t-test resulted in the p value of 0.79 (95% level of significance) for 
the Cash flow/Sales measure of combined firm. This indicates no significant 
variation in pre and post merger value of this measure, 
16. Industry Adjusted 'Cash Flow/Sales' between the pre merger and post 
merger scenario The paired t-test resulted in the p value of 0.35 (95% level of 
significance) for the Cash flow/Sales measure of combined firm_ This 
indicates no significant variation in pre and post merger value of this measure. 
17. Raw EVA based on book values between the pre merger and post merger 
scenario This has been Ibund that there does not exists any significant 
variation in the median value of raw F.VA for combined firm between the pre 
merger and post merger scenario, when calculated on the basis of book value 
data. The result of paired sample t-test indicates that p value is equal to 0.055 
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%%filch is more than 0.05 (95"o le%el l' significance). vvhich is an indication of 
the existence of no signiticant difference in the [VA. 
18. Raw EVA based on market values When the paired t-test is applied on the 
pre and post merger values of EVA of combined firms. calculated based on 
market value data, the significant variation is found. It is reflected by the p 
value of 0.021 (95% level of significance) 
19. Raw EVA based on Gorden Growth model For the EVA calculated on the 
basis of market value data and Gorden Growth Ke. no significant difference is 
found in the value of this measure between the pre and post merger period. 
This is reflected h\ the p value of 0.054 (95% level of significance). 
4.3 Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger performance 
parameters: Results of Regression Analysis 
In order to analysis the influence of eight independent variables like pre merger 
performance. size of target. mode of payment etc. on the post-merger performance 
(measured by different parameters like ROA.ROE etc.) of the sample firms. multiple 
regression analysis tool is applied. The results of regression analysis for each of the 
19 parameters are summarized in the following tables: 
Table 4.3.1 - Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger ROA 
Dependent \'ari~ible Post Merger RO:A, 
Variables 	Coefficients 	t 	p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
value 	value 	of F 	R2 	R2 
Intercept 	 0.00 	0.03 	0.98 
Pre Merger ROA 	 0.68 	3.48 	0.00 
Size of Target 0.00 	-0.44 0.66 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 	 0.00 	-0.74 	0.46 
Relatedness 	 0.00 	0.10 	0.92 
Mode of Pavnment 	 0.03 	1.08 1 	0.29 
0.00 0.35 	0.26 
Grou -Yvon-group 0.02 ,__0.94 	0.35 
Debt ratio of acquirer -0.02 ; 	-0.45 0.66 
acquisition/merger 0.04 	1.67 0.10 
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4.3.1 Interpretation of the results for post merger ROA 
In order to determine the impact of various independent variables (target size. 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies, multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of regression shows that the significance of F — 0.00, which concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of R' is 0.35, which indicates 35% 
variation in dependent variable is explained by the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression shows that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p=O.00) and (f= 0.68. However, rest of the independent variables 
(size of target, promoter's stake in acquirer, relatedness, mode of payment, group/non 
group companies, debt ratio of acquirer and structure as merger or acquisition) does 
not have any significant impact. 
Table 4.3.2- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger Industry 
Adjusted ROA 
Dependent Variable Post Merger Ind Ad'. ROA 
Variables Coefficients 
t 
value 
p 
value 
Significance 	Adjusted 
of F  
Intercept 0.10 2.55 0.01 
Pre Merger Ind 
Adj. ROA -0.02 -0.63 0.53 
Size of Target -0.01 -1.21 0.23 
Promoter's stake 
in acquirer 	_ 
Relatedness 
0.00 
TTh.oO 
-1.24 
-0.I2 0.91 
0.22  
0.08 0J2 0.19 
Mode of Payment 	-0.01 -0.47 0.64 
GroulvNon group____ -0.01-0.23 
Debt ratio of 	 - 
acquirer -0.12 	-2.45 
0 82 
~— 
0.02 
- - 	—. 
acquisition/merger 0.01 0.60 	0.55 
4.3.2 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted ROA 
For industry adjusted ROA, significance of F is found to be 0.12. From [his it can be 
concluded that the model is not fit for regression. 
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Table 4.3.3- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger ROE 
Dependent Variable Post Merger ROE 
- 	 t 	p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	Coefficients value 	value4 	of F 	RZ 	R' 
Intercept 	 11.35 	_ 1. f 3 	0.16 
Pre Merger R(A. 	 -0.08 	-0.31 	0.71 
Size of l arL.et - 	-0.01 	-0.22 	0.83  
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 0.00 0.02 	0.98 
Relatedness 
Mode of Payment 
-0.04 
-0.03 
-0.29 	0.77 0.82 0.07 -0.06 
-0.16 0.87 
Group/Non group 
Debt ratio ofacquirer 
-0.06 
	
-0.53 	0.60 
-1.85 	0.07 -0.48 
acquisition/merger -0.01 	-0.05 0.96 
4.3.3 Interpretation of the results for post merger ROE 
For ROE. significance of 1: is lLAInd to be 0.82. From this it can be concluded that 
model is not fit for regression. 
Table 4.3.4- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger industry 
adjusted ROE 
D_pendent Variable Post Merger Ind j. ROE 
Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	 1 Coefficients I value p value 	of F 	RZ 	RZ 
Intercept 	 -0.27 	-1.00 	0.32 
Pre Merger Ind Adi. 
ROE 	 I.05 	7.69 	0.00 
Size of Target 	0.03 0.90 ~~- 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 	 0.00 	-0.07 	0.95 
Relatedness 	_ 	-0.01 	I -0.06 	0.96 	0.00 	0.56 	0.50 
Mode ot, Payment 	0.24 	I.25 	0.22 
Group.'\on group 0.02 	0.12 	0.90 
Debt ratio of
acquirer 	 -0.08 	-0.24 	0.81 
acquisition/merger 	0.27 	1.76 _ 	0.08 
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4.3.4 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted ROE 
In order to determine the impact of carious independent variables (target size. 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies. multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of regression shows that the significance ofF — 0.00, which concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of R 2 is 0.56. which indicates 56% 
variation in dependent variable is explained b\ the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression sho\\s that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p=0.00) and (3— I.05. However, rest of the independent variables 
(size of target, promoter's stake in acquirer. relatedness, mode of payment, group/non 
group companies, debt ratio of acquirer and structure as acquisition/merger) does not 
have any significant impact. 
Table 4.3.5- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger Net 
Profit Margin 
De endent Variable Post Merger NP Margin _  
t 	p 	Significance 1 	Adjusted 
Variables 	('oefficients 	value 	value 	- of FRZ 	R2 • 4 
Intercept 	
0,-1i) ~►.2; 	0,82 
Pre Meroer NP Mar yin 	I.60 	I .55 	0. 13 
Size of "lar get 0.01 0.12 0.90 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer -0.02 -2.62 0.01 
Relatedness 0.60 1.08 0.28 0.22 0.16 0.04 
Mode of Payment 0.20 0.34 0.73 
Lroup p_____ 0.05 0.11 0.91 
Debt ratio of acquirer 0.90 0.99 0.33 
acc~iisition/merger  -0.26-0.58 0.57 
4.3.5 Interpretation of the results for post merger Net Profit Margin 
For Net Profit Margin, significance of F is found to be 0.22. From this it can be 
concluded that model is not tit for regression. 
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Table 4.3.6- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger industry 
adjusted Net Profit Margin 
Dependent Variable Post Merger Ind Adj. NP Margin 
p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	Coefficients value value 	of F 	R2 	R2 
Pre Merger Ind Adj. NP 
Margin 1.66 	1.77 	0.08 
Size of Target 	 0.01 	0.11 	0.91 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 	 -0.02 	-2.51 	0.01 
elatedness j 	0._56 	1.02 	0.31 	0.21 	0.16 0.05 LR
ode of Pavment 0.20 0.34 	0.73 
Group/Non group 0.05 	jO.i 1 1 	0.91 
Debt ratio of acquirer 0.91 1.02 	0.31 
acquisition/merger -0.27  -0.61 	0.S4 
4.3.6 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted Net Profit 
Margin 
For industrN adjusted Net Profit Margin. significance of F is found to he 0.21. From 
this it can be concluded that model is not fit for regression. 
Table 4.3.7- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger EPS 
Dependent Variable Post Merger EPS 
p 	Significance Adjusted 
Variables Coefficients t value value 	of F R'  R2  
intercept 13.74 0.91 0.36 
Pre Merger EPS 0.37 2.40 0.02 
Size of Target -1.14 -0.80 0.43 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 0.14 
Relatedness 	 l -6.25 
Mode of Pay ment -0.81 
Group-T on group 3.99 
Debt ratio of acquirer 14.35 
j -acquisition merger 	1 __ -8.34 
1.23 10.22 
-0.67 	0.51 	0.15 	0.18 ! 	0.07 
-0.08 	0.93 
0.5 - 	0.60 
0.88 	0.38 
1_? 	 1.0`) r 0.28 
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4.3.7 Interpretation of the results for post merger EPS 
For EPS. significance off is found to be 0.15. From this it can be concluded that 
model is not fit for regression. 
Table 4.3.8- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger industry 
adjusted EPS 
Dependent Variable Post Merger Inds. EPS 
t p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables Coefficients value Value 	of F 	R2 	R2 
Intercept -1 3.95 -0.6 0.  
Pre Merrier Ind Adj. EPS 0.56 2.36 0.02 
Size of farget -0.85 -0.39 0.70 
Promoter's stake in acquirer 0.36 22 0.05 - l 
0.17 Relatedness -16.67 	-1.13 0.26 0.17 	0.06 
Mode of Payment 3.93 0.26 0.80 
Grou !Dion group 9.93 0.84 0.41 
Debt ratio of acquirer 39.19 1.67 0.12 
acquisition/mer ier 4.27 0.36 0.72 
4.3.8 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted EPS 
For industr\ adjusted EPS. significance of I. is fi~und to he 0.17. From this it can be 
concluded that model is not fit fi)r regression. 
Table 4.3.9- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger `Cash 
Flows/Total Assets' 
Dependent VariablePost Merger CF/TA  
t 	p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	Coefficients value Value 	of F 	RZ 	R2 
intercept 	 0.02 	0.57 	0.57 L 
Pre Merger CF/TA 	 0.60 	4.48 	0.00 
Size of Target 	 0.00 	0.42 	0.68 
Promoter's stake 
acquirer 	- 
Relatedness 
Mode of Payment 
Group/Non group 
Debt ratio of acquirer 
acqu isit ion /merger 
in  
	
0.00 	1 -0.79 	0.43 
0.01 	0.43 	0.67  
0.00 	j 0.15089 
-0.01 	-0.67 	0.51 
0.04 	1.04 	0.30 I 
0.01 	0.67 	0.50 
0.30j 0.20 
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4.3.9 Interpretation of the results for post merger Caslr Flows/Total Assets' 
In order to determine the impact of various independent variables (target size. 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies, multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of regression shows that the significance of F =0.01, which concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of R' is 0.30. which indicates 30% 
variation in dependent variable is explained by the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression shows that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p=0.00) and j3= 0.60. However, rest of the independent variables 
(size of target, promoters stake in acquirer, relatedness, mode of payment, group/non 
group companies, debt ratio of acquirer and structure as acquisition/merger) does not 
have any significant impact. 
Table 4.3.10- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger 
industry adjusted 'Cash Flows/Total Assets' 
Dependent Variable Post Merger Ind Adi. CF/TA 
T 	t p 	Significance 
Variables 	Coefficients 	value 	value 	of F 	Rz 
Adjusted 
R2 
Intercept 
Pre Merger Ind Adj. 
CF/TA 
 0.00 0.12 	0.90 
i 
0.64 	' 	5.35 	i 	OAO 
Size of Target 0.00 038 0.71 
Promoter's stake in 
ac 	wirer 0.00 -0.75 0.46 
0.00 0.36 0.28 Relatedness 0.02 0.93 0.36 
Mode of Payment  0.01  
-0.01 
0.29 0.78 
Grow /Non group -0.52 0.60 
Debt ratio of ac wirer 0.05 .31 	0.20 
acquisition/merger 0.01 0.49 	0.62 - 
4.3.10 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted `Cash 
Flows/Total Assets' 
In order to determine the impact of various independent variables (target size, 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies, multiple regression technique has been used. 
W 
Results of regression shows that the significance of F— 0.00, which concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of R' Is 0.36, which indicates 36% 
variation in dependent variable is explained by the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression shows that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p=0.00) and J)— 0.64. However. rest of the independent variables 
(size of target, promoter's stake in acquirer, relatedness, anode of payment, group/non 
group companies. debt ratio of acquirer and structure as acquisition/merger) does not 
have any significant impact. 
Table 4.3.11- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger `Cash 
Flows/Operating Assets' 
Dependent Variable Post Merger CFIOA 
Variables 
t 	p 
Coefficients 	value 	valve 
Significance 
ofF R2 
Adjusted 
Rz 
Intercept -0.18 	-026 	0.80 
Pre Merger CF/OA 
Size of Target 
	
3.70 	1.98 	0.05 
0.03 	0.47 	0.64 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 0.00 	0.73 	0.47 
Relatedness 
Mode of Payment 
Group/Non group 
0.12 	0.29 	0.77 
-0.60 	-1.48 	0.14 
0.16 0.18 0.06 
-0.78 -2.45 0.02 
Debt ratio of acquirer 0.44 0.66 0.51 
acquisition merger 0.06 0.18 0.86 
4.3.11 Interpretation of the results for post merger 'Cash Flows/Operating 
Assets' 
Interpretation For CFFO/ Operating Assets, significance of F is found to be 0.16. 
From this it can be concluded that model is not fit for regression. 
Ito 
Table 4.3.12- Impact of %arious characteristics of merger on post merger `Cash 
Flows/Operating Assets' 
Dependent Variable Post Merger Ind Adj. ('F/OA 
t 	p Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	Coefficients value value 	of F 	R2 	R2 
Intercept 	 ).14 	0.23 	0.82 
Pre Merger Ind Adj. 
CF/OA 
	
2.62 
	1.61 	0.11 
Size of Target 
	 0.02 	0.29 	o -::- 
Pro►noter's stake in ac uirer 	0.00 	0.70 	0.49 
Relatedness 	 0.02 
	0.06 L 0.96 	0.22 	10.16 1 	0.04 
Mode of Payment 	 -0.62 	-1.54 0.13 
Group/Non group 0.79 
	2.46 0.02, 
Debt ratio otacquirer 	 0.30 
	0.46 	0.65 
acuuisition/mcrt!.er 1 	0.04 
	
0.14 1 0.89 
4.3.12 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted `Cash 
Flows/Operating Assets' 
For industr\ adjusted C FFOi Operating .Assets, significance of F is found to be 0.22. 
From this it can be concluded that model is not fit for regression. 
Table 4.3.13- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger `Cash 
Flows/Market Value of Assets' 
Dependent Variable Post Merger CF/MMVA - - 
t 	p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	. Coefficients %slue value 	of F 	R2 	R2 
 u.0 i 
0.28 
i►.~o 
2.76 
U. i.  
~ 0.01 
' tnte~et 
Pre 	 er CF/MVA 
Size of Tar get 0.00 0.00 jl.00 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 0.00 
0.01 
1.31 
0.56 
0.20 
0.58 	0.01 Relatedness 0.28 0.18 
Mode of Payment -0.01 
-0.02 
-0.52 
-0.87 
0.61 
0.39 Group/on roue 
Debt ratio of acquirer 0.09 2.05 0.04 
acquisition/merger 0.00 0.17 0.87 
4.3.13 Interpretation of the results for post merger `Cash Flows/Market Value of 
Assets' 
In order to determine the impact of \arious independent variables (target size. 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies. multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of regression shows that the significance of F = 0.01, which concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of' R,  is 0.28, which indicates 28% 
variation in dependent variable is explained b) the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression shows that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p-0.01) and [3-- 0.28. However, rest of the independent variables 
(size of target. promoter's stake in acquirer. relatedness, mode of payment. group/non 
group companies, debt ratio of acquirer and structure as acquisition/merger) does not 
have am significant impact. 
Table 4.3.14- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger 
industry adjusted `Cash Flows/1 1arket Value of Assets' 
Dependent Variable Post Merger Ind Adj. CFIMVA 
It p 	Significance I Adjusted 
Variables Coefficients value value 	of F R2 R2 
Intercept -0.01 -0.35 0.73 
Pre Merger Ind Adi. 
CF/MVA 0.39 3.85 0.00 
Size of "I'ar<uet 0.00 0.15 0.88 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer  0.00 1.10 0.28 
Relatedness 0.02 0.74 0.46 	0.00 0.35 0.26 
Mode of Pa\ merit 0.00 -0.05 0.96 
Grou2!von yrou _ -0.01 -0.40 0.69 
Debt ratio of acquirer 0.09 2.13 0.04 
acquisition merger 0.00 0.18 0.86 
4.3.14 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted `Cash 
Flows/Market Value of Assets' 
In order to determine the impact of' various independent variables (target size, 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
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performance of the ,elect companies. multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of re<,gres ion 	that the significance of F = 0.00. which concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of R` is 0.35. which indicates 35% 
variation in dependent \ariahle is explained hN the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression shoes that pre merger performance has a significant 
positi.e impact (p=0.00) and (i- 0.39. Uo\vee er. rest of the independent variables 
(size of target. promoter's stake in acquirer. relatedness, mode of pa\ ment, group/non 
group companies. debt ratio of acquirer and structure as acquisition/merger) does not 
have any significant impact. 
Table 4.3.15- Impact of \arious characteristics of merger on post merger `Cash 
Flows/Sales' 
	
Dependent Variable Post Merger CF/Sales 	_ 	_ - 
t 	p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
a! 	° 	 cr 	--- 	 I---- 	 r t 	 n2 	1)2 .a. IavJL3 	 -ULui•uI., 	•auu 	.aia.~ .•i • AS  
Intercept t 0.69 I.21 0.23 
Pre Merger C1= Sales -0.71 -0.52 0.60 
Size of Target   -0.01 -0.12 	1 0.91 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer -0.01 -2.43 1 	0.02 
Relatedness 0.32 0.87 0.39 0.46 0.12 0.00 
Mode of Payment -0.23 -0.61 0.55 
Group/Non group -0.29 -1.00 0.32 
Debt ratio of acquirer 0.54 0.92 0.36 
-acquisition/merger -0.21  -0.73 0.47 
4.3.15 Interpretation of the results for post merger `Cash Flows/Sales' 
For CFFO Sales, significance oft= is fount to he 0.46. From this it can be concluded 
that model is not fit for regression. 
Table 4.3.16- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger `Cash 
Flow s/Sales' 
Dependent Variable Post Merger Ind Adj. CF/Sales 
t 	p 	Significance 	Adjusted i 
Variables 	Coefficients 'alue Value 	of F 	R` 	R2 
Intercept 	 ri.58 	I.n5 	0.30 
Pre Merger Ind .Adj. 
CF'Sales 
Size of Target  
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer 
-0. • 
 0.00 
-0.01 
-0.26 
- 	+ -0.09 
 -2.35 
0.80 
0.93 
0.02 , 
Relatedness 0.36 0.97. 0.34 	0.49 0.11 -0.01 
Mode of Payment -0.21 -0.57 0.57 
Group,Non group -0.28 -0.96 0.34 
Debt ratio ofacquirer 0.53 0.89 0.38 
ac uisition!mergcr  -0.20 -0.70 0.48 
4.3.16 Interpretation of the results for post merger industry adjusted `Cash 
Flows/Sales' 
For industry adjusted CF1-U Sales. significance of F is found to be 0.49. From this it 
can he concluded that model is not fit for regression. 
Table 4.3.17- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger EVA 
based on book values 
Dependent Variable Post Merger EVA (Book Value) 
t 	' p ' Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	 Coefficients value value 	of F 	R2 	R2 
Intercept 	 448.71 	1.52 	0.13 
Pre Merger EVA (Book 
Value) 
0.44 1 	0.36 
2.57 4.90 0.00 
Srze of Target -12.91 -0.42 ! 0.68 
Promoter's stake in acquirer -0.56 -0.2 3 0.82 
Relatedness -182.79 -0.88 0.38 	0.04 
Mode of Pa N merit 12.31 0.06 	1 0.95 
Group/'Non group -3429 -0.21 0.83 
Debt ratio oti acquirer - 	-22.61 -0.07 0.95 
acqwsitionimerger -1X9.78 -0.95 _0.34 , 
114 
4.3.17 Interpretation of the results for post merger EVA based on book values 
In order to determine the impact of' various independent variables (target size, 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies. multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of regression sho%%s that the significance of F = 0.00. %Nhich concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of R- is 0.44. hich indicates 44% 
variation in dependent variable is explained h) the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression sho\%s that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p=0.00) and (3= 2.57. Ho\\ever. rest of' the independent variables 
(size of target, promoter's stake in acquirer. relatedness, mode of payment. group/non 
group companies, debt ratio of acquirer and structure as acquisition/merger) does not 
have any significant impact. 
Table 4.3.18- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger EVA 
based on market values 
Dependent Variable Post Merger EVA (Market Value) 	 - - 
t 	p 	Significance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	Coefficients %aloe value 	of F 	R 2 	R2 
Intercept 	 664.46 2.l0 0.04 -~ 
t re .~1crgcr Ev 
(Market Value) 1.78 4.86 0.00 
Size ofTarget -18.35 -0.59 0.56 	; 
Promoter's stake in 
acquirer -4.99 -1.89 0.06 
Relatedness -206.71 -0.96 0.34 0.00 0.51 0.44 
Mode of Payment 8.25 0.04 0.97 
Grou /Non ygroup 37.36 	0.23 0.82 
Debt ratio of ac uirer -143.89 -0.41 0.68 
a cquisitionimerger -59.68 -0.36 0.72 
4.3.18 Interpretation of the results for post merger EVA based on market values 
In order to determine the impact of various independent variables (target size. 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies. multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of regression shows that the significance of F = 0.00, %%hick concludes that the 
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model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value of R- is 0.51. which indicates 51% 
variation in dependent variable is explained by the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression shows that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p=0.00) and 13= 1.78. It is also observed that the intercept has a 
significant positi\e impact (p-0.03) and 13=664.46. Ho\\ever. rest of' the independent 
variables (size of target. promoter's stake in acquirer, relatedness, mode of payment, 
group/non group companies. debt ratio of' acquirer and structure as 
acquisition/merger) does not ha\e any significant impact. 
Table 4.3.19- Impact of various characteristics of merger on post merger EVA 
based on Gorden Gro%%th model 
Dependent Variable Post Merger EVA (Gorden Growth Ke, Market Value)  
t 	pSignificance 	Adjusted 
Variables 	Coefficients ._value 	value 	of F 	RZ 	RZ 
Intercept ;9O.99_'.40 0.02 
Pre Merger EVA (Gorden 
Growth Ke. Market Value) 2.28 5.08 0.00 
Size of Tar,et - 15,58 -0.61 0.54 
0.42 Promoter's stake in acquirer 	-I.72 	-0.82 
0.21 Relatednes' -217.84 -1.26 0.00 	0.50 0.43 
0.97 Mode of Payment 7.29 0.04 
0.94 Group/Non group 	 -10.32 	-0.08 
Debt ratio of acquirer -237.54 -0.85. 0.40 
acquisition merger - 15? 20 -1.11 0.27 !   
4.3.19 Interpretation of the results for post merger `EVA based on Gorden 
Growth model' 
In order to determine the impact of various independent variables (target size. 
promoter's stake etc.) including pre-merger performance on post-merger financial 
performance of the select companies. multiple regression technique has been used. 
Results of repression shows that the significance of F = 0.00. \%hick concludes that the 
model is fit for multiple regression. Also the value Of' R2 is 0.50. N%hich indicates 43% 
variation in dependent variable is explained h> the set of independent variables. 
The results of multiple regression sho~\s that pre merger performance has a significant 
positive impact (p=0.00) and P= 2.28. For the intercept p value is 0.02 and the O= 
590.99. Ilo\\ever. rest of the independent \ariables (size of target. promoters stake 
in acquirer. relatedness. mode of payment. group/non group companies, debt ratio of 
acquirer and structure as acquisition merger) does not have any significant impact. 
4.4 Su Lisa mpies 
Performance anal\sis as done by dividing entire sample into to sub-samples based 
on each of the seen merger characteristics as mentioned in the given table 3.2. For 
this purpose t(>r each parameter paired t-test was applied in each sub-sample values to 
check \\hether the results for subsamples are statisticall\ different between pre and 
post-merger period. This helped us to examine the performance of each set of two 
sub-samples created on the basis of specitic merger characteristics. 
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4.5 Performance measurement of 11&.1 on the basis of relati%e size of Target Company 
[attire uuple is bided on the basis of size of target is a ►js acquirer size measured b► dividing the Total Assets of target h►, I old 
Assets cal acquirer. Subsample I comprise of pair of merging firms ►here target size is less than 10°0 of' acquirer size and subsample I 
includes the pair of merging firms. here target size is greater than 10% of acquirer size, 
Table 4.4 — Results of paired T-test applied on the two subsamples classified on the basis of relative target size 
Sub 	\lean and p %slue 	1 car %. r. to 	to 	Subsam 	Sub 	%lean 	and 	p 	1 ear 	s. 	r. 	to 	flsu tailed 
sample 	 mcrger'aequisition 	tailed 	pies 	sample 	saluc 	mcrgerlacquisition 	paired t• 
paired t- 	'i based on 	- II 	 test 
Target< 	 test 	target 	"target 
10" 	 relatise 	>10% 
size   
S. \o. 	F. pression 	.5 to- 	1105 	p %alue 	S. .N o. 	Expression 	-5 to • I 	Ito 5 	p same
-h I 	hied ROA- wghtd 	I' i)' 	0.09 	0.10 	 1 	►cighted 	RO l 	I o 	(.Ob 	u.l 
N P.ss¢hId TA 	 \ f'a'gfd 
2 	Industry Adjusted ROA 	-i!.' 	0.116 	033 	 2 	InJust 	AJjustcJ 	0.1W 	1104 	039 
3 	1leighted 	ROE 	= 	(l' 	n.18 	0.65 	 3 	Weighted Rot. 	0.11!' 	0.11 	(1.75 
nghldNPssghtd NW 	 I 	 ,ghtJNl!i1khlJ 
4 	Industn Adjusted R01; 	(( uti 	o.08 	0.89 	 4 	Industr 	Adjusted 	 1L91 
Rut 	 L 
1l ghtd 	NP 	margin 	= 	ft ')O 	(l GG 	0.32 	 5 	N' htJ NP marlin 	((.O 	(1 ,07 	0.20 
gsghtdNI`1rghtdSates 	 = 	s+chtd 
NP Il chtd Sales 
jindun 	adjusted 	\P 	0.o 	11.61 	J 	0.32 	 6 	Induars 	adjusted 	(III 	IlJ4 	0.37 
margin 	 NP margin 
~►eighted EPS 	18 db 	19.98 	0.18 	 7 	sveiehted EPS 	14.1 	1591 	0.14 
Sub Mean and p salve l ear n. r. to tw'o Subsam Sub \lean 	and 	p Year 	H, 	r, to 	IHo lailed 
sample - merger'acquisition tailed pies sample value merger'acquisition paired t• 
I paired I- based on 	- II test 
I arget< test target I argel 
10°lo relative >IO°„ 
size 
8 Industry adjusted I;PS 12.11 	8.89  0.76 8 Industry 13.411 I 	I 0.67 
IL 	I 	I l 0,36 
adjusted EPS 
((.0)  9 neighted (TFO'svghtd. 9 s Bighted 
I otal Assets j ('Fi'O! sghtd. 
Total Assets 
10 Industry 	adjusted (I 	I'► 11.11) 0.25 10 Industry 0.07 1108 iI 	I 
(TFO.'\v hid. Assets adjusted 
C'FFO. 	ghtd. 
Assets 
}  ceighted CFF() 1►~h13. I , 	I.32 0.29 I1 uei;hted IL.I 	I u.(I ((.37  
Operating Assets (FFO,'ghtd. 
— Operating Islets 
12 Industry 	adjusted 'ii 	'1 0.29 I2 Indoor (US -1)01 ((.40 
(Ff()'ssehtd. adjusted 
Operating Assets ( FF01,110htd. 
Operating Assets 
13 ►+ghtd. 	CEP0/wghtJ  Ui 	i.I(I 0.92 13 s ghtd. OH Ii.I 	R u.li 
Market value of assets 	I CFFOI►+hhtd 
Market value of 
assets 
14 Industry 	adjusted 10)9 o$) 0.71 14 Industrs  11.111 (III' 01 11 
('I F0asghtd. 	Market adjusted 
alit of Assets (FP)iNgMd. 
Market value of 
Assets  _ 
IS ~~ghtd. 	CFFO;ccghrd. (I,II 	~1.45 0.33 IS Aghtd. 0.10 0.OU 0.36 
Sales (Th) s+ghtd, 
Sales  
16 Industry 	adjusted (I II 	n.1" 0.32 16 Industry 	adjusted 0.08 0051 U.Ri 
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CFFO.'isghtd. Sales 
540.37 	I 0.01 
0.00 	1 	1 54I.3 
Cl I () uehlJ.  
Sales 
17 	 chled 	f-.l' li 	4 	7' ni 	1)1 
Inc NP NN. 
brook ialue kh 
1411 X1(1 
IS %%mhtcJ I:S,1 ,.14 	Ill1'1 	0.01 
IKe NPSIkt car. 
mkt %aloe 
for 11.1(Ci 	 ____ 
I't uciehlcJ 1:11 -I0.(M) 	(a'.')! 	0.11 
Ke•e irJen 
gro th. mkt %aluc 
%% ghts for X1'.1('( 
I7 	weighted 	I' Ai 	I" I 
KORNl , b<x)k 
caluc 	«ghts 	for 
11',\CC) 
IS nciehtcJ L1'A 	142 )1 
Ikc=NP'Mkt cap. At 
Ialue a¢hts for 
11'ACC)  
19 s eighlcd E A iKc• 1119.611 
gorden gro«th. nikt 
value aghls for 
1~ AC I 
Sub 	Slean and p value 
sample • 
I'arget< 
10% 	 i 
car%.r.to 	two 
coerger ,acqulotion 	tailed 
paired I-
test 
Subsarr 1 	Sot) 	lcan 	and 	p 1 car 	H. 	r, 	to 	to tailed 
pies 	sample 	Calue 	mergergyacquisition 	paired t• 
based on 	- II test 
target 	Target 
relatise 	>10% 
size 
I 2 
4.5.1 Interpretations for subsample -,%here target size is less than 10% of acquirer 
size measured on the basis of total assets 
1. When f :VA is calculated b\ applying the book values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equit\ and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is fund in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. this is reflected by p-value of 0.01 (95% 
significance level) 
2. When EVA is calculated by applying the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms. significant improvement is thund in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reelected by p-value of 0.02 (95% 
significance level) 
3. When [VA is calculated h\ appl\ ing the market value weights of debt & 
equith and cost of equity as per Gorden Bgro\\ th model and paired t-test is 
applied on the EVA of combined firms. signiticant improvement is found in 
EVA in post-merger period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is 
reflected b) p-value of 0.00 (99% significance level) 
4. No other performance measure has shown significant difference between pre 
and post-merger period 
4.5.2 Interpretations for subsample i%here target size is more than 10% of 
acquirer size measured on the basis of total assets 
1. When EVA is calculated h\ ,rppl\ ing the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms. significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected h\ p-value of 0.01 (95% 
significance level) 
2. No other performance measure has shown significant difference between pre 
and post-merger period 
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4.6 Performance meaoremcnt of M&A on the basis of Icvel of promoter's stake in Acquirer Company 
Er.dre sample is sub divided into two subsamples based an the promoter's sake in ecquircr campam. prior to acquisitirvl Year 
Subsample I comprise of pairof meeting finis where promoter's stake's less than 50°%a in Acquirer Company and subsimple II includes 
the pair of merging firms, where promoters stake is more than 50°/a in Acquirer Company. 
Table 4.5- Results of paired T-test epplied on the two subsamples which are created on the basis of promoter's stake in acquirer 
company 
Sub NeanA  nil pvalut Year w. r. to 	two Subsampk Sub Mean and 	alot Rarw.r.lo rwo 
Sample- mergen'aequbrtion 	tailed created an the Snmpk- mtrgerlaequisirion tailed 
I paired I. basis of II pairedI- 
prmnne test promoter's make promotr rml 
r50% P50% 
Eprevsion S. No. Erpresslon Sto,l ItoS 	pe'alue S. 	o. 
I 
-Stu•I 	It0S 
(14' 	0M6 
pvalue 
022 weigh'nd 	RUA= 9.,0 weighted ROA% wghtd 
«Phut N 	I':ugiiJ NNiihtdTA 
IA 
Industry 	Adjusted  0.35 2 1 Industry 	Adjusted O.h$ 	0.04 0.39 
ROA ROA 
3 WJI,dreJ ROE = O.65 3 tiVeighred 	ROE 	= h06 	01a irm 
ughtdNPkeghtd 
t 
wghtd'I'Iwghrd NW 
NW 
4 Induslr 	Adjusted  099 4 Industry 	Adjusl¢d -0II 	41]] 0A9 
ROE 
S 
= wghld NN'WyhtJ 
 
ROE: 
5 Wgbtd NP Harem  0.26 wood NP margin =' ox 	995 P09
word NPIWgItd Sales 
Sales 
22 
Sub 	11ean and p salve 	sear w, r. to 	two 	Subsamples 	Sub 	1lean and p salve 	1 ear ss. r. to 	to 
Sample • merger~acquisition 	tailed 	created on the 	Sample - merger~acquisition 	tailed 
paired t- 	basis of 	II 	 paired t- 
promote 	 test 	promoter's stake 	promote test 
r<50% r>50% 
6 	Industr adjusted 	U.iiS 	0.31 	0.311 	 6 	Industr adjusted SP 	-1101 	01.1)2 	0.05 
\I' margin 	 1 	 mar in 
- Y 
7 	~+eightcd ITS 	' 	138 	I').90 	0.07 	 1 	+►eicihted F 	 (8,28 	0.76 
8 	Industr 	adjusted 	I 4 	ft88 	 8 	Industry adjusted FIN 	I5.o8 	17.23 	11.65 
'I 	+cichted 	.0 	(0) 	(.89 	 9 	seighted (FFO Nghtd, 	ft'is 	1).119 	0.16 
1110 +rghtd. I t,►I 	 Total Assets 
_ 1+kls 
10 	InJubtrr adjusted fl) 	(!.y9 	0.51 	 10 Industry 	adjusted '111 	I)8 	ft:'_ 
(110.+sgh', 	 (FFO+s►ghtd. Is+et+ 
Assets  
II 	++eighted 	1).I" 	0(W 	0,11 	 I 	II 	►+eighted ('FFO'►+ghtd. 	I).ln 	I), I I 	0.56 
(1 hO o+ghtd. Operating •Ict~ 
Ijeratin Assct' 
I2 	InJustr+ adjusted I).11 	0.04 	(1.72 	 12 Industr► 	,idju+ted N),u8 	1I0 	0.16 
(FFO'%ghtd. 
I)pxratinse 	 Operating Assets 
13 	+►ghtJ. 	 0,1(1 	(LOS 	0.03 	 I) 	s ghtd. 	CFFO,s ghtd 	n.0 	'.II, 	0.68 
CI I Oi'++ghtJ 	 1larket +aloe of assets 
Market +aloe III 
assets 
14 	Industr 	adjusted 	0.0( 	iuul 	0.10 	 I4 	Industr} 	adjusted 	1).118 	1 1.14 	0.16 
(FFO;wghtd. 	(FFO,'Hghtd. 1larkct 
Market salue of I 	 %aloe of Assets 
Assets  
15 	sghtd. 	1).13 	1)28 	037 	 15 wghtd. (FF01HQhtd. II.l)R 	0.08 	0.87 
(TFOlw htd. Sales 	 Sales 
16 	Industry adjusted 1).11 	0.21 	0.35 	 16 Industry 	adjusted U.))0 	)1.07 	0.30 
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Sub 	Meanandpoaluo 	Yearx,r,to  
Sample - mergerlarquisitioa 	toiled
I paired 4 
promote 	 test 
Cfl O wphht Sales 
17 	tceighted 	EVA( 	36.89 
Ke-NPINW. hrwk 
'clue wghls IN 
WACCI 
Subsamples 	I Suh 	Man and p value 	Year w. r. to 	two 
crated on the 	Sample. vie rger,'ocpaisirimi 	toiled 
basis ef 	II 	 paired I. 
promoter's slake 	promote test 
r>59% 
CFFOlxghld. Saks 
30329 	'291 	 ❑ 	weighted 	4;4'0.1 	IS.31 	66.'a 	0J.6 
Ke=.NP)N\ , 	book 
value 	wghis 	for 
Is 	veiphlpi 	[VA 	66.82 
	
41442 	iii 	 IS 	aaighted 	EVA 	1. XI 	30.13 11 	037 
iKOPihlki euw KeNl'Mkr a p, mkt 
ii  vale uphls 	 value 	xgbb 	for 
uei hiiel 	LVp 	35.50 	7W72 	0.00 	 19 	weighted EVA IKr I 1.66 	37.87 
(he6~xien gorden growth, mkt 
am tFi, mki setae 	 value 	wghts 	for 
w~hls I'rr WACC} WACCI 
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4.6.1 Interpretations for subsarnple where promoter's stake is less than 50% in 
Acquirer Company 
I. The p-value for CEFO/Market value of Assets comes out to he 0.03 (95% 
level of significance) for the combined firms. This confirms the significant 
decline in performance. Here the pre-merger mean value is 0.10 vis-a-vis post 
merer alue of 0.0f. 
2. A hen EVA is calculated h) apply ins the book valoes for eights of debt & 
equity and cost of equit\ and paired i-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected h\ p-value of 0.01 (95% 
significance level) 
3. When EVA is calculated by appl} ing the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.00 (99% 
significance level) 
4. When EVA is calculated h\ applying the market value weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity as per Gorden growth model and paired t-test is 
applied on the EVA of combined firms. significant improvement is found in 
EVA in post-merger period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is 
reflected b\ p-value of 0.00 (Qt9% significance level) 
5. No other performance measure has shown significant difference betk~ecn pre 
and post-merger period 
4.6.2 Interpretations for subsample where promoter's stake is more than 
50% in Acquirer Company 
I. None of the performance measure has depicted the significant difference 
between pre and post-merger period. 
125 
Subsample 	\lean and p +aloe 
unrelated 
S. No. 	; Expression 	I .510 -1 
1 ear H, r. to 	INo 	Subsam 	Subsa 	\Ie.ro and p %;due 	l ear ►+. r. to 
merger acquisition 	tailed 	pies 	mple - 	 mercer acquisition 
Paired 	created 	II 
t•test 	on the 	related 
basis of 
relatedn 
ess 
I to S 	p+alue 	S. No. 	E+pression 	-S to -I I to S I p ►aloe 
to o
tailed 
paired 1- 
tc~t 
I 	mighted RU.A — ++ghld T< (1.111 
P ++ehtd 'IA 
2 	InJustn Adjusted ROA ►I 	I iN 
3 	11'eighted 	ROE; ~ 1211 
uhtdNP++ htJ \11 _ 
Industn Adjusted ROE  o 
S 	11'ghtd 	NP 	margin= 
ehtd NP' W htd Sales 
0.111 
(i.6 6 	Industn 	adjusted 	NP 
7 	weighted ITS 	20.55 
8 	Industry adjusted EPS 	8.I4 
4.7 Performance measurement of ll&A on the basis of relatedness between merged companies 
Entire sample is soh di aided into ti%o uhsamplcs based un's hcther merger j, hett%ccil the companies belonging to unrelated business 
or belonging to related business. Sukample I comprise of unrelated mergers chile subwmple II includes the related mergers & 
acquisitions. 
Table 4.6 — Results of paired T-test applied on the hro subsamples divided on the basis of relatedness in the business of target 
and acquirer companies 
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4.7.1 Interpretations for subsample i%here merger/acquisition is unrelated in 
nature 
None of the performance measure has depicted the significant difference betN%een pre 
and post-merger period. 
4.7.2 Interpretations for subsample where merger/acquisition is related in nature 
i . The mean ROA of combined firm has increased from 0.05 to 0.07 and the 
difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.04 when paired 
t-test is applied. 
2. When EVA is calculated h\ appl\ ink; the book values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is fund in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected b,, p-value of 0.01 
3. When EVA is calculated b\ appf\ ing the market \ clues for "eights of debt & 
equit\ and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.00 
4. When EVA is calculated by applying the market value weights of debt & 
equit\ and cost of equity as per Gorden growth model and paired t-test is 
applied on the EVA of combined firms, significant improvement is found in 
EVA in post-merger period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is 
reflected b p-value of 0.01 
5. No other performance measure has sho\\n significant difference between pre 
and post merger period. 
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4.8 Performance measurement of 1&A on the basis of mode of payment used for merger/acquisition 
Entire sample is suhdi►ided into two subsaniples on the basis of mode of pabmenl used to pa% the shareholders of target company h~ 
Acquirer Company, Suhs mplc I comprise of pair of merging firms ►►here mule of pa\mcnt ►►as non cash and suhsample II includes 
the pair of merging firms ►+here mode of payment was cash. 
Tahlc 4.7 — Results of paired 1f-test applied on the t 	suhsantples created on the basis of mode of pal ment 
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4.8.1 Interpretations for subsample where mode of payment is non-cash for 
merger/acquisition 
1. The mean ROA of combined firm has increased from 0.06 to 0.08 and the 
difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.03 when paired 
t-test is applied. 
2. The mean net profit margin of combined firm has increased from 0.06 to 0.09 
and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.03 when 
paired t-test is applied. 
3. When EVA is calculated by applying the market values for weights of deht & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied an the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This Is reelected by p-value of 0.03 
4. Rest of the performance measure have not depicted any significant difference 
between pre and post-merger period. 
4.8.2 Interpretations for subsample where mode of payment is cash for 
merge r,'acqu isition 
1. When EVA is calculated by applying the hook values Ibr weights of debt & equity 
and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined firms, 
significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in comparison to 
pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.01 
2. When EVA is calculated by applying the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is Found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.01 
3. When EVA is calculated by applying the market value weights of debt & equity 
and cost of equity as per Gorden growth model and paired t-test is applied on the 
EVA of combined firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger 
period in comparison to pre-merger period. Phis is reflected by p-value of 0.01 
4. No other performance measure has shown significant difference between pre and 
post merger period. 
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4.9 Performance measurement of M&A on the basis of group versos non-group nature of mergeriaequisition 
Eolire sample is subdivided into two ;ubsamples on the basis of sshether merging firms are group companies or non group companies. 
Suosample I comprise of pair of ooa group mereinR firm and suhsamp!e II ine]uees the pairof group merging firms. 
Table 4,8- Results of paired T-lest applied on the two subsamples divided on the basis of group versus non-group mergers 
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4.9.1 Interpretations for subsample where merger is between non-group 
companies 
I. When EVA is calculated by applying the book values for weights of debt & equity 
and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined firms. 
significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in comparison to 
pre-merger period. {his is reflected by p-value of 0.01 
2. When EVA is calculated h,, applying the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired [-test is applied on the EVA of' combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in [VA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected b) p-value of 0.00 
3. When EVA is calculated by appl\ ing the market value weights of debt & equity 
and cost of equity as per Gorden gro\\th model and paired t-test is applied on the 
EVA of combined firms. significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger 
period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.00 
4. No other performance measure has shown significant difference between pre and 
post merger period. 
4.9.2 Interpretations for subsample %here merger is bethseen group companies 
1. The mean ROA of combined firm has increased from 0.05 to 0.07 and the 
difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.00 when paired 
t-test is applied. 
2. Rest of the performance measure have not depicted any significant difference 
bet\%een pre and post-merger period. 
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4.10 Performance measurement of M&A on the basis of Ie%el of debt in acquirer company prior to acquisition 
Entire sample k subdivided into two subsamples on the basis of level of debt in Acquirer Company. Suhsantple I comprise of pair of 
merging firms where debt is less than 40% in Acquirer capital structure and subsample II includes the pair of merging fines, where debt is 
more than 40% in Acquirer capital structure. This percentage of debt in capital structure is calculated at the beginning of merger dear. 
Table 4.9 - Results of paired T-test applied on the to subsamples created on the basis of debt level in acquirer company 
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4.10.1 Interpretations for subsample where debt leveI in acquirer company is less 
than 40% 
I. When EVA is calculated by applying the book values Ihr weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired blest is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvcmen, is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.00 
2. When EVA is calculated by applying the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-lest is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant lmprovemen- is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.00 
3. When EVA is calctdated by applving the market value weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity as per Gorden growth model and paired t-test is 
applied on the EVA of combined firms, significant improvement is found in 
EVA in post-merger period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is 
reflected by p-value of 0.00 
4. No other performance measure has shown signifrcard difference between pre 
and post merger period. 
4.10.2 Interpretations for subsample where debt level in acquirer company 
is more than 411% 
I. None of the performance measure has depicted the significant difference 
between pre and post-merger period. 
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4.11 Performance measurement of 1IS.A on the basis of structure of combination of Po firms as merger or acquisition 
Entire suhsamplk k divided into to suh>amplcs on the basis of structure of combination of two firms as acquisition or merger. 
Subsample I comprise of pair ofcombined firm~ through acquisition mode and suhsample II includes the pair of combined firms 
where it is a merger. 
V 
Table 4.10 - Results of paired T-test applied on the subsamples created based on the structure 
Subsample - 11ean and p clue fear %. r. In too Subcamples 	Suhca Mean and p value l ear N. r. to too 
I Acquisition mergerlacquibition tailed on the basis 	mple • mergeriacquisili tailed 
paired of structure 	II on paired I- 
t-test llerge test 
S. No. Expression -5 to - 1105 p s slue 
r 
S. No. Expression .5 to 
-I 
I to S p %,slue 
I scighted RO l 	hld Il.1)7 ('i.06 0.71 I seighted ROA 	i%ihlJ (1 u1 	'~ 0.01 
N P'«ghtd 1,1 N P'uehIJ 'IA 
1 I Industry Adjusted ROR 0.05 Il.Oi 0.09 2 Industn Adjusted ROA •0.01 1I,0 O 2 
3 	Weighted 	RUf: U. I6 0) 4  11.54 3 Weighted 	ROE: i Lo7 0.12 
1% htdNI ochtd Nll' M%ehtdNP,'ssghtd N1V 
4 Industn Adjusted RUI. -0.07 -(l.I4 ti.?; a Industry Adjusted ROC u.nu 04 0.60 
S Wghtd 	VP margin 	- 0,05 1) 47 0.29 S Wghtd 	NP 	margin Il.l I8 0.01 
ghtd NP:1\ ghtd Sales oghtd \P. Vghtd Sales 
6 Industn 	adjusted 	NP 0.01 0.42 0.30 6 Industry 	adjusted 	NP I1.I!2 0.05 (1.13 
margin margin 
7 s eighleJ EPS  D).4l 24.48 0.18 7 ghted EPS 12.88 16.22 0i8 
8 Industn adjusted FPS 15.86 11) 78 0.57 8 Indusin adjusted FPS 11.52 15.38 0.'4 
9 weighted 	CFFOIwghld. 0.11 9 weighted 	CFFOnghtd. 0.08 	1.09 0.71 X1.10 0.89 
Total Assets Total .Assets 
138 
0.11 	0.89 
0.10 	(.q8 
1 
33S . 	0.21 
	
182.5 	0.02
._. 
1 
60,35 	0.10 
0.08 	0 24 T 	 10 	Industn 	adjusted 11.08 
• fear x. r. to 	t 	two 
mergerracquisiti 	tailed 
on 	paired t- 
test 
10 	Induun 	adjusted 	0.0' 
('FFO. tt 2htd. Assets 
Ii 	rteighted ('FFO.s ithld. 	0.11 	-0.01 	0.69 
Operating Assets 
12 Indusu 	adjusted 0.0( •0.0; 0.10 
CFI O+ttiehtd. 
0peratine Assets 
13 ' 	thtJ. 	(F l0.s ghtd 0.)9 1'.08 0.35  
Market 	alue of assets 
14 Industn 	adjusted 0,1.1 0.07  94 
CFFOhtd. 	Mark" 
tafueofAssets _ } 
IS hid. 	(' 	o.ghld. 0 I0 033 .38 
Sales 
16 Industn 	adjusted u.n? (I1l 
('FF(htd. Sales - 
17 stie 	htcd 	1:%',AI 85.41 473.39 	l 0.(I1 
Ke=sPM . 	hook 
saluc 	ssghts 	for 
\\ ACCt 
18 ocighied 	IVA 75 91 49.47 0.1)1 
ihc=\p'llst 	cap. 	mkt 
saltie ojits bor 11'ACCl 	I 
19 tteighted 	IVA 	(fie• 66.81 402.211 not 
gorDen 	groulh, 	mkt 
saluc 	ughts 	I'Or 
WACCI 
CFFOc;htd. Assets 
II weighted CF FOhtd. 	0.12 
O 	ratine. 	is 
12 Induslrs 	adjusted 	0,10  
('FFO.aehtd. 
Upxratin 	assts 
13 uehtd. 	CFI() ttithtd 
Market talue of assets 
14 Industn 	adjusted ; 	0.09 
CI V 0m;htd. 	Market 
ue of ,lssets 
IS s litd. 	(F10hid. 	u.11 
Salley 
16 Industn 	adjusted 	Iii') 
CFFO!tt,ghtd. Sales 
17 
-- 
s eiahted 	F:\:1( 	-5 18 
Ke=NPN\V. 	hook 
talue 	mhos 	liar 
` ~i,ACCI 
18 tui heed 	11'A 	17.76 
lf,f'\Ikl 	Lip. 	mkt 
aluc's 	Isfor11ICC 
19 t+ei~hted 	E1';1 	Ike• 	-5.58 
eorfen 	gro►tith. 	mkI 
value 	s1ghts 	for 
WACCI 
Subsamplc - 	Mean and p value 	Year w. r. to 	two 	Subsamples 	Subsa i Mean and p %slue 
I Acquisition mergerlacquisition 	tailed 	on the basis 	mple - 
paired 	of structure 	II 
-lest Ilerge 
r 
1 39 
4.11.1 Interpretations for subsample where structure of combination is 
acquisition 
1. When EVA is calculated by applying the book values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired 1-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.01 
2. When EVA is calculated by applying the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 001 
3. When EVA is calculated by applying the market value weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity as per Gorden growth model and paired t-test is 
applied on the EVA of combined firms. significant improvement is found in 
EVA in post-merger period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is 
reflected by p-value of 0.01 
4. No other performance measure has shown signilicant difference between pre 
and post merger period. 
4.11.2 Interpretations for subsample where structure of combination is merger 
I. The mean ROA of combined firm has increased from 0.05 to 0.07 and the 
difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.01 when paired 
t-test is applied. 
2. The mean net profit margin of combined firm has increased from 0.05 to 0.08 
and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.01 when 
paired t-test is applied. 
I. When EVA is calculated by applying the market values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.02 
2. Rest of the perl'ormance measure have not depicted any significant difference 
between pre and post-merger period. 
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4.12 M&A performance for select industries 
The entire sample is subdivided into nine subsamples on the basis of industries. For 
select industries five Nears pre and post merger means are calculated for each 
compan\ belonging to that industr\. Then on the pre and post mean values paired t-
test is applied to see an significant ditlerence in performance caused by M&A. This 
is done for all the abo\e discussed 19 performance measures. The results are 
summarized in the follovcing tables. 
4.13 M&A performance for Pharmaceutical industry 
4.13.1 For the e aluation of M&A perh)rmance in Pharmaceutical industry, 
companies belonging to this industr\ are segregated as a subsample. For this purpose 
the industry of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. After that each of' the 
financial parameter is compared between pre and post-merger scenario by applying 
paired t-test. 
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Table 4.11 - Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of M&.a in Pharmaceutical industry 
Financial parameters for Pharmaceutical Industry Mean Value Two 
tailed 
Year ww. r. to paired t- 
merger/acquisition test 
Expression -5 to -1 1 to 5 p 	alue 
++ei,htcd KOA 	++,_htd N P v+ghtd TA 	 i 0.09 0.13  0.05 
0.10 Industr+ Adjusted RO:\ 	 0.07 	0.10 
Weighted ROE 	htd\P ++ghtd NW  0.16 0.26 0.06 
Industry Adjusted ROE 0.07 0.16 j 	0.09 
Wghtd NP margin 	\%ghtd NP Wghtd Sales 0.07 0.16 0.02 
Industn adjusted NP margin 0.05 0.13 0.03 
weighted EPS 25.38 26.15 0.96 
Industry adjusted EPS 24.81 25.79 0.95 
0.18 weighted CFFO;'wghtd. Total Assets 0.08 	0.11 
Industry adjusted CFFO/wghtd. Assets 0.08 0.11 0.18 
weighted C FFO wghtd. Operating Assets 0.10 0.14 0.10 
Industr\ adjusted CFFO wghtd. Operating Assets 0.09 
0.03 
0.14 
0.05 
0.10 
0.29 
0.29 
wghtd. CFFOwghtd Market value of assets 
lndustr,, adjusted CEFO wghtd. Market value of Assets ` 	0.03 	0.05 
wghtd. CFFOhvghtd. Sales 0.05 0.12 0.02 
Industry adjusted CFFO \%ghtd. Sales 0.06 0.14 0.01 
weighted 	EVA( 	Ke=NP \W1. 	hook 	value 	wghts 	for -0.02 41.19 0.31 
WACC) 
weighted EVA (Ke=NP Mkt cap. mkt value \+ghts for 20.08 111.82 0.07 
WACC)  
weighted EVA (Ke-gorden gro++th. mkt value wghts t r 6.11 56.69 0.29 
4.13.2 Interpretations for subsample belonging to pharmaceutical industry M&A 
1. [he mean net profit margin of combined firm has increased from 0.07 to 0.16 
and the ditlterence is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.02 when 
paired t-test is applied. 
2. The mean industry adjusted net profit margin of combined firm has increased 
from 0.05 to 0.13 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p 
value of'0.03 ++hen paired t-test is applied. 
3. 'I he mean 'CFI() Sales' measure of combined firm ha increased from 0.05 to 
0.12 and the ditlerence is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.02 
+hen paired t-test is applied. 
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1 to 5 p value 
!.08 0.06 
x.22 0.05 
x.08 0.79 
0.06 0.69 
0.03 0.97 
52.89 	0.04 
48.32 0.04 
0.11 0.25 
uu.09 0.12 
0.14 0.40 
0.12 0.20 
0.11 0.53 
0.10 0.12 
0.20 
0.07 0.49 
	
35.6 	0.04 
7 
477.99 	0.10 
884.70 , 0.03 
4. The mean industr' adjusted -CFFO'Sales' measure of combined firm has 
increased from 0.06 to 0.14 and the difference is found significant as reflected 
bk the p value of 0.01 when paired t-test is applied. 
5. Other performance measures have not depicted any significant difference 
between pre and post-merger period. 
4.14 M&A performance for Refinery industry 
4.14.1 For the evaluation of M&A performance in Refiner-\ industry, companies 
bclonging to this industr\ are segregated as a subsample. For this purpose the industry 
of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. After that each of the financial parameter 
is compared between pre and post-merger scenario by applying paired t-test. 
Table 4.12-Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of M&A in Refinery industry 
Financial parameters for Refiner,. IndustrN 	 Mean Values 	Two 
tailed 
Year w. r. to 	paired 
merger/acquisition 	t-test 
Expression 
weighted ROA = wghtd N P wghtd TA 
Industr' Adjusted ROA 	 - 
Weighted ROE _ \\ghtdNP w gghtd NW 
Industry Adjusted ROE 
Wghtd NP margin = wghtd NP'Wghtd Sales 
Industry adjusted NP margin 
weighted EPS 
Industry adjusted EPS 
weighted CFFO!wghtd. Total Assets 
Industry adjusted CFFO wghtd. Assets 
weighted CFFOiwghtd. Operating Assets 
Industry adjusted CFFO'wghtd. Operating Assets 
wghtd. CFFO. wghtd Market value of assets 
Industry adjusted CFFO wghtd. Market value of Assets 
wghtd. CFFO/wghtd. Sales 
Industry adjusted CFFO wghtd. Sales 
weighted EVA( Ke=NP N\1'. book value wghts for WACC) 
-5 to - t 
0.06 
0.04 
0.18 
0.09 
0.06 
0.03 
30.90 
20.81 
0.09 
0.06 
0.1> 
0.09 
0.10 
0.07 
0.10 
0.0 
257.6' 
weighted EVA (Ke NP \lkt cap, inkt value wghts for WACC) 	114.48 
weighted EVA (Ke-gorden growth. mkt value wghts for 	172.95 
WACC)  
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4.14.2 Interpretations for subsample belonging to Refinery industry M&A 
I. 1 he mean FPS of combined firm has increased from 30.9 to 52.89 and the 
difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.04 when paired 
t-test is applied. 
2. The mean industry adjusted FPS of combined firm has increased from 20.81 
to 48.32 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 
0.04 when paired t-test is applied. 
3. When EVA is calculated by applying the book values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-lest is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant irnproucmcnf is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.04 
4. When EVA is calculated by applying the market value weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity as per Gorden growth model and paired t-test is 
applied on the EVA of combined firms. significant improvement is found in 
EVA in post-merger period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is 
reflected by p-value of 0.03 
5. No other performance measure has shown significant difference between pre 
and post merger period. 
4.15 M&A performance for Automobile industry 
4.15.1 For the evaluaton of M&A performance in Automobile industry, companies 
belonging to this industry are segregated as a subsample. For this purpose the industry 
of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. The subsample includes the diversified 
automobile manufacturers. two wheeler manufacturers and auto ancillary units, After 
Chet each of the financial parameter is compared between pre and post-merger 
scenario by applying paired t-test. 
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Table 4.13 - Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of \1&A in Automobile industry 
'dean Value 	Two 
tailed 
Financial parameters for Automobile 	 Year w. r. to 	paired 
Expression 	 -5 to -1 	1 to 5_ 
weighted ROA= wghtd N P%w htd TA 	 0.09 	 0.08 
value 
0.53 
industry Adjusted ROA 0.06 0.02 0.05 
Weighted ROE = wghtdNP%wghtd NW 0.21 	 0.19 0.53 
Industry Adjusted ROE 0.l I 0.06 
0.06 	0.06 
0.12 
Wghtd NP margin = wghtd NP W ghtd Sales 0.87 
Industry adjusted NP margin 0A3 0.00 0.16 
weighted EPS  21.90 	13.39 0.37 
Industry adjusted EPS 	 19.30 	-44.14 
weighted C1 FO \N 'htd. Total Assets 	 0.14 0.10 
0.08 
0.28 
Industry adjusted C'FFO %%ghtd. Assets 0.12 	 0.10 0.50 
weighted CFFO-\Nghtd. Operating Assets 0.17 0.16 0.95 
lndustn adjusted CFFO 	Lhtd. U eratiiig Assets 0.1 	 0.11 0.76 
0.14 
0.26 
wghtd. CFFO/wghtd Market value of assets 
Industry adjusted CFFO'wghtd. Market value of 
Assets 
	
0.12 0.07 
0.09 	 0.06 
wghtd. CFFO/wghtd Sales 
Industry adjusted CFFO!wghtd. Sales 
0.09 0.07 0.38 
0.07 	 0.05 0.37 
weighted EVA( Ke=NP'N~V. book value wghts 
for WACC)    10.99 	507.78 0.19 
weighted EVA (Ke- NP~Mkt cap. mkt value 
wghts for WACC) 	 13.23 	508.67 
Weighted EVA (Ke-_gorden growth. mkt value 
wghts for WACC) 	 5.27 	499.5J 
0.18 
0.19 
4.15.2 Interpretations for suhsample belonging to Automobile industry M&A 
I. None of the pertornance measure has depicted the significant difference in 
performance bet' een pre and post-merger period. 
145 
4.16 1.1&A performance for Chemical industry 
4.16.1 For the evaluation of M&A performance in Chemical industry, companies 
belonging to this industn are segregated as a subsample. For this purpose the industry 
of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. The subsample includes the organic 
chemical manufacturers. other chemicals manufacturers and fertilizer companies. 
After that each of the financial parameter is compared between pre and post-merger 
scenario by applying paired t-test. 
Table 4.14- Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of M&A in Chemical industry 
glean Values 	Two 
tailed 
Financial parameters for Chemical 	 Year %r. r. to 	paired t- 
lndustr% 	 merger/ac uisition----{ 	test 
Exaression -5 to-I 	I to 5 	n value 
weighted ROA= wghtd N P %%ghtd TA 0.0 0.06 0.56 
0.62 Industry Adjusted ROA 	 0.04 	0.03 
Weighted ROE - %\ghid\P \+*ghtd NW - _ 0.12 0.12 	, 0.97 
Industry Adjusted ROE  0.06  0.0; 1 0.63 
\lghtd NP margin = v.gghtd Nil W,ghtd 
Sales  0.06 0.05 0.82 
Industry adjusted NP margin 0.04 0.03 0.36 
weighted EPS  10.45 14.37 0.36 
0.48 Industry adjusted EPS 	 10.2 	13.32 
weighted CFFO!w htd. Total Assets 0.4 0.08 0.13 
0.21 Industry adjusted CFFO w% ghtd. Assets 0. i 0.08 
0.45 weighted CFFOi'wghtd. Operating Assets 0.13 0.11 
Industry adjusted CFFO v. ghtd. Operating 
Assets  0.12 0.10 0.60 
0.00 
wghtd. CFFO; wghtcl \larket 	aloe of 
assets  	0.16 	0.09 
Industry adjusted CFFO'%ghtd. Market 
value of Assets 0.15 0.09 0.00 
wghtd. CFFO'w ghtd. Sales 0.13 0.08 0.04 
Indust r\ adjusted CF. \. ,thtd. Sales 0.13 0.08 0.05 
weighted EVA( Ke-NP N\1. book value 
wghts for WACC) -13.86 19.17 0.21 
weighted EVA (Ke=NP Mkt cap. mkt 
value wghts for WACC) -27.19 _ 
weighted EVA (Ke-gorden growth, mkt 
value wghts for WACC) -23.34 14.67 0.23 
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4,16.2 Interpretations for snbsaniple belonging to Chemical industry M&A 
I. Ihie mean 'C FFO/Market Value of Assets' measure of comhined firm has 
declined from 0.16 to 0.09 and the difference is found significant as reflected 
by the p value of II.00 when paired t-test is applied. 
2. The mean industry adjusted 'CFFO!Mgrkgit Value of Assets measure of' 
combined firm has declined from 0.15 to 0.09 and the difference is found 
significant as reflected by the p value of 0.00 when paired t-test is applied. 
3. The mean 'CFFO!Sales' measure of combined firm has declined from 0.13 to 
0.08 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.04 
when paired t-test is applied. 
4. Other performance measures have not depicted any significant difference 
between pre and post-merger period. 
4.17 M&A performance for Textile industry 
4.17.1 For the evaluation of M&A performance in Textile industry, companies 
belonging to this industry are segregated as a subsainple. For this purpose the industry 
of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. The subsample includes the diversified 
cotton textiles manufacturers, other textile manuFacturels and cotton & blended yarn 
companies. After that each of the financial parameter is compared between pre and 
post-merger scenario by applying paired t-test. 
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Table 4.15 - Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of NI&A in Textiles industry 
Mean Values  
tailed 
Financial parameters for Textile \ ear w'. r. to paired 
jndust_ry  merger/ac uisition t-test 
Expression  	- -5 	to -1 	1 to 5 p value 
weis;hted ROA= wehtd \ P \zhtd TA 	_1 ti.tl~ 	-0.04~ 0.09 _! 
Industry Adjusted ROA 	- 0.01 -0.05 0.10 
Weighted ROE = wghtdNP \vghtd NW 0.14 0.04 0.05 
Industr 	Adjusted ROE  -0.80 -1.08 	I 0.42 
W ghtd NP margin = wghtd NP. W Pubd Sales 0.02 -0.02 	i 0.22 
Industry adjusted NP margin -0.10 -0.08 0.81 
weighted EPS 4.3(1 2.83 	i 0.29 
Industry adjusted EPS 3.96 1.80 0.08 
weighted CFFO/w htd. Total Assets 0.06 0.06 0.96 
Industry adjusted CFFO wghtd. Assets 0.05 0.05 4 0.84 
weighted CFFO'wghtd. Orating Assets 0.08 0.07 0.80 
Industry adjusted C'FFO wghtd. Operating 
Assets 0.06 0.07 0.97 
wghtd. CFFO w htd Market %alueofassets 0.10 0.08 0.33 
Industry adjusted CFFO ,.\ uhtd. Market 
value of Assets 0.08 0.07 0.63 
wahtd. CFFO'wkhtd. Sales  0.07 0.06 0.39 
' Industry adjusted C FFO wghtd. Sales 0.06 0.05 0.77 
weighted EVA( Ke- \P \1\ . book value 
wohts for WACC) -27.01 -35.95 0.27 
weighted EVA (Ke =NP'Mkt cap. rnkt value  
wghts for WACC)     -31.27 -35.66 0.73 
weighted EVA (Ke-gorden growth, rnkt 
value wghts for WACC I -30.13 -44.55 0.08 
4.17.2 Interpretations for subsatnhle belonging to Textile industry M&A 
I. None of the performance measure has depicted the significant difference in 
performance between pre and post-merger period. 
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4.18 M&A performance for Construction & Equipment industry 
4.18.1 For the evaluation of M&A performance in Construction & Equipment 
industry. companies belonging to this industry are segregated as a subsample. For this 
purpose the industry of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. The subsample 
includes the industrial construction companies. infrastructural & other construction 
companies, general purpose machinery and generator mail It fact U rers. After that each 
of the financial parameter is compared bet\\een pre and post-merger scenario by 
apply ing paired t-test. 
Table 4.16 - Results of paired t-test applied to eN aluate the long term 
performance of M&A in Construction & Equipments industry 
Financial parameters for Construction & Equipment 
industrN 
Mean Values 
Year w. r. to 
merger/acquisition 
Two tailed 
paired t-test 
Expression -5 to -1 	1 to 5 p value 
weighted ROA= \%ghtd N 1''v.ghtd TA 
	
0.06 	0.03 
0.04 	0.01 
0.27 
Industr\ Adjusted ROA 0.18 
Weighted ROF _ 	ehtdNP.'\%ghtd N\ 0.13 	0.03 0.37 
Industr\ Adjusted ROE. 0.06 	-0.04 0.36 
W'ghtd NP margin = \\ghtd NP Wghtd Sales 0.O8 	0.01 
0.05 	-0.03 
0.29 
Industry adjusted N1' margin 0.24 
weighted FPS 13.95 	13.51 0.93 
lndustr} adjusted 1:1'S 13.09 	12.81 
0.07 	0.06 
0.06 	0.05 
0.95 
\%eiehted Cl Fl) ssehtd. total Assets 
Industr 	adjusted (Fl-() %\ghtd. Assets 
0.40 
0.55 
%%eighted CFFO!wghtd. Operating Assets 0.08 	0.07 0.45 
Industry adjusted CFFO!\+ghtd. Operating Assets 0.06 	0.05 0.68 
%%ghtd. CFEO ww ghtd Market value of assets 0.12 	0.06 0.08 
Industry adjusted CFFUfs\ghtd. Market value of Assets 0.09 	0.04 0.07 
w%ghtd. CFFO;wghtd. Sales 0.09 	0.11 0.55 
Industr\ adjusted C:I:lo/ %ghtd. Sales 0.06 	0.09 0.38 
weighted F\'A( Ke-NP;\\\. hook %aloe wwghts tier \\'ACC) 
weighted E\A (Ke=\P'\Ikt cap. mkt value \\ghts for WACC) 
-4.19 	19.29 
-1.43 	41.82 
0.66 
0.55 
\ccighted 	E\A 	(Kc-gorden 	gro\%th. 	mkt 	\alue 	\\ghts 	tier 
WACC) 
-5.11 	11.57 0.76 
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4.18.2 Interpretations for subsample belonging to Construction & Equipment 
industry M&A 
1. None of the performance measure has depicted the significant difference in 
performance bet~~ een pre and post-merger period. 
4.19 M&A performance for Construction Building Materials industry 
4.19.1 For the evaluation of \1&.A performance in ('onstruetion Building Materials 
industry. companies belonging to this industr% are segregated as a subsample. For this 
purpose the industry of acquirer funned the basis of segregation. The subsample 
includes the cement, steel, copper and other non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturers. After that each of' the financial parameter is compared between pre 
and post-merger scenario b\ appl\ lug paired t-test. 
Table 4.17 - Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of M&A in Construction Building Materials industry' 
Financial parameters for Construction Building .Material 	Mean Values 	Two tailed 
lndustr> 	 Year w. r. to paired t- 
Expression 	 d 
merger/ac uisition 	+ 
-5 	to -t 	I to 5 
test 
I 	p value 
eiehted ROA 	htd \ P 	uht.i I \ 0.i); 0.0k) 
industr\ Adjusted RO:\  	 -0.1') 	U.08 
0.03 
U.28 
\~'eiahted ROE = 	ehtd\P %%Phtd NW' -0.07 	0.00 0.79 
0.83 
0.16 
Industry Adjusted ROE -0.14 	-0.07 
Wghtd NP margin = \%ghtd NP \l ghtd Sales 0.04 	0.11 
Industry adjusted \P margin 0.05 	0.09 0.44 
s%cighted EPS 12.81 	28.33 0.08 
Industry adjusted EN 13.2! 	28.31 0.08 
%%righted Cl l O ~cghtd. Total Assets 0.08 	0.13 0.00 
Industr. adjusted CFFU/wghtd. Assets 0.08 	0.13 0.00 
weighted CFFO/wghtd. Operating Assets 0.10 	0.18 0.00 
lndustr\ adjusted CFFOiwghtd. Operating Assets 0.10 	0.17 0.00 
wghtd. CFFO/%.ghtd Market value of assets 0.09 	0.12 0.21 
Industry adjusted CFFO. \wghtd. Market value of Assets 0.09 	0.12 0.21 
wghtd. CFFO'%%ghtd. Sales 0.16 	0.17 0.59 
Industry adjusted CFFOghtd. Sales 0.15 	0.16 0.58 
weighted EVA ( Ke=NP NW. b~wk \atuc \sghts fir \\ A('C1 -23.70 	88.68 0.52 
%scighted l;\'.\ (f<c=NP,'tilkt cap. mkt value 	+ghts liar \\A('(') -23.52 	330.39 0.19 
weighted EVA (Ke-gorden gro\%th. mkt value \\ghts tiIr \\ ACC) -27.02 	64.16 0.55 
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4.19.2 Interpretations for subsample belonging to Construction Building 
Materials industry M&A 
I. Fhe mean ROA measure of combined firm has increased from 0.03 to 0.09 
and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.03 when 
paired I-test is applied. 
2. The mean CFFO/Total Assets' measure of combined firm has increased from 
0.08 to 0.13 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value 
of 0.00 when paired t-test is applied. 
3. The mean industry adjusted 'CFFO.7otal .Assets measure of combined firm 
has increased from 0.08 to 0.13 and the difference is found significant as 
reflected by the p value of 0.00 when paired t-test is applied. 
4. The mean 'CEFo%0perating Assets measure of combined firm has declined 
from 0.10 to 0.18 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p 
value of 0.00 when paired t-test is applied. 
5. The mean industry adjusted ' CFFO/Operating Assets' measure of combined 
firm has increased from 0.10 to 0.17 and the difference is found significant as 
reflected by the p value of0.00 when paired t-test is applied. 
6. Othcr performance measures have not depicted any significant difference 
between pre and post-merger period. 
4.20 M&A performance for Electric &Electronic Appliances industry 
4.20.1 For the evaluation of M&A performance in Electric &Electronic Appliances 
industry, companies belonging to this industry are segregated as a subsample. For this 
purpose the industry of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. the subsample 
includes the other electronics, electrical appliances and dry cell manufacturers. After 
that each of the financial parameter is compared between pre and post-merger 
scenario by applying paired t-test. 
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Table 4.18 - Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of Vl&. in Electric &EIcctronic Appliances industrN 
Financial parameters for Electric 	 Mean Values 	 Two 
&Electronic Appliances Industry Year w. r. to tailed 
merger/acquisition 	paired t- 
test 
Expression 	 ! 	-5 to -1 1 to 5 p value 
weighted ROA 	\rghtd N P wwwghtd TA 	 0.02 	 0.05 
Industry Adjusted ROA 	 0.00 0.02 
Weighted ROE - wghtdNP wghtd NW 	 0.03 	 0.11 
Industry Adjusted ROE 	 -rt 	-0.04 0.03 
11 _ghtd NP margin 	\\ ghtd \ P \Vghtd Sales 	0.04 	 0.04 
Industr> adjusted NP margin 	 0.00 0.01 
weighted FPS 	 8.60 	 4.63 
Industr\ adjusted EPS 	 3.00 3.05 
weighted CFFO: wghtd. Total Assets 	 0.09 	 0.07 
Industr\ adjusted CFFO wghtd. Assets 0.06 0.05 
weighted CFFO/wghtd. Operating Assets 	 0.1) 	1 	0.08 
Industry 	adjusted 	CFFO wghtd. 	Operating 	0.07 0.06 
Assets  
wghtd. CFFO/ wghtd Market value of assets 	0.12 	 0.15 
Industry adjusted CFFO-wghtd. Market value 	0.07 	T 	0.12 
of Assets 
wghtd. CFFO.-wghtd. Sales 	 0.09 	 0.05 
Industry adjusted CFFO%wghtd. Sales 	 0.04 0.03 
weighted EVA( Ke=NP NW, book value wghts 	32.17 	 -19.45 
for WAC(') 
0.45 
0.48 
0.39 
0.39 
0.85 
0.69 
0.68 
1.00 
0.37 
0.63 
0.35 
0.69 
0.51 
0.08 
0.34 
0.66 
0.54 
weighted EVA (Ke NP Mkt rap, mkt value 	30.10 
wghts for W.\CC) 
weighted EVA (Ke-gorden growth. inkt value 	-35.13 
29.3; 
24.60 
0.98 
{ 	0.67 
wghts for WAC(') 
4.20.2 Interpretations for subsample belonging to Electric &Electronic 
Appliances industry Y1&A 
I. None of' the performance measure has depicted the significant difference in 
performance between pre and post-merger period. 
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4.21 M&A performance for Plastic & Packaging industry 
4.21.1 For the evaluation of M&A pertrmance in Plastic & Packaging industry. 
companies belonging to this industr. are segregated as a subsample. For this purpose 
the industry of acquirer formed the basis of segregation. The subsample includes the 
Plastic films & packaging manufacturers. Plastic packaging goods and plastic tube 
manufacturers. After that each of the financial parameter is compared between pre 
and post-merger scenario by applying paired t-test. 
Table 4.19 - Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of M&.A in Plastic & Packaging industry 
Financial parameters for Plastic & Packaging 	Mean Values 	Two 
Industry 	 tailed 
Year w. r. to 	paired 
	
merger/acquisition 	t-test 
Expression 	 -5 to -1 ■ 1 to 5 p value 
weighted ROA v+ghtd N l \%ghtd TA j 	0.02 	0.06 	0.03 
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.00 0.04 0.2  
Weighted ROE = +vghtdNP-'++ghtd NW 0.08 0.19 0.06 
Industry Adjusted ROE -0.04 0.12 0.03 
Wghtd NP margin = wghtd NP/Wghtd Sales 0.02 0.05 0.06 
Industry adjusted NP margin 0.00 0.03 0.32 
weighted EPS 
Industry adjusted t:I'S 
weighted CFFO w ghtd. Total Assets 
Industry adjusted CFFO ~i.ghtd. Assets 
weighted CFFO'wghtcl. Operating Assets 
5.96 
3.00 
0.14 
0.06 
0.16 
15.18 
14.28 
0.13 
0.12 
0.15 
0.02 
0.01 
0.30 
0.44 
0.4; 
Industry adjusted CFFO: wghtd. Operating Assets 0.07 0.15 0.55 
Industry adjusted GS_'1Q.\+ghtd. Market value o1Assets 	0.07 	0.14 	0.03 
wghtd. CFFO %vghtd. Sales 	 0.14 0.10 	0.10 
lndustn adjusted CFFO wghtd. Sales 	 0.04 	0.10 	0.12 
weighted EVA( Ke NPNW, book value wghts for 	0.99 1.03 	0.75 
WACC'1  
weighted EVA (Ke°NP Mkt cap, mkt value wghts for 	-0.77 	4.78 1 0.22 
WACC)  
weighted EVA (Ke-gorden growth, mkt value wghts 	-0.90 	0.89 	0.55 
for \\'ACC) 
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4.21.2 Interpretations for subsample belonging to Plastic & Packaging industry 
M&.A 
I. ROA measure has sho n the significant improvement in performance between 
pre and post merger period as reflected h) the p value of 0.03 (p<0.05) 
2. Industry Adjusted ROE measure has shown the significant improvement in 
performance between pre and post merger period as reflected h\ the p value of 
0.03 (p<0.05) 
3. In order to assess any significant difference in pre and post-merger EPS, 
paired t-test is applied on EIS values of sample firms. It is found that there is 
significant improvement in FPS in post-merger period vis-a-vis pre-merger 
period as depicted hy p valoe of 0.02 
4. In order to assess an significant difterence in pre and post-merger industry 
adjusted EPS, paired t-test is applied on industry adjusted EPS values of 
sample firms. It is found that there is significant improvement in industr\ 
adjusted EN in post-merger period \ is-a-vi, pre-merger period as depicted b~ 
p value of 0.02 (p<0.05) 
5. CFFO/Market Value of Assets measure has shown the significant 
improvement in performance between pre and post merger period as reflected 
by the p value of 0.03 (p<0.05) 
6. Industry Adjusted 'CFFO,,Market Value of Assets' measure has shown the 
significant improvement in performance between pre and post merger period 
as reflected bv the p value of 0.03 (p<0.05) 
7. No other performance measure has depicted the significant difference in 
performance bet\%een pre and post-merger period. 
4.22 Performance of multiple mergers & acquisitions 
4.22.1 here the objecti\e is to check that 	hether the firms \\hich are involved in 
multiple mergers over a period of time are able to learn from their experience. If the 
acquirer learn out of their M&A experience over a period of time then this learning 
should be reflected in terms of better performance by the subsample of such firms. In 
our sample we identified two acquirers (ITC and IOC) who were involved in three- 
three mergers over a period of time. For both the firms ITC and IOC, five years pre 
and post merger means are calculated for each merger/acquisition. Then on the pre 
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and post mean values paired t-test is applied to see any significant difference in 
performance caused b\ \1&A. This is done for all the above discussed 19 
performance measures. The results are summarized in the follo\\ ing table- 
Table 4.20- Results of paired t-test applied to evaluate the long term 
performance of multiple mergers & acquisitions 
- 	- 
Parameters combined on the basis of "Total Assets 
ROA 
Post 	Pre- 
Merger 	merger 	p 
S. No. 	I Acquisition 	ROA 	ROA 	value 
IndustrN Adjusted ROA 
Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
ROA 	ROA 	p value 
ITC-ITC 
Bhadrachlm~ 	0.17 0.13 0.00 0.11 	0.11 0.01 
ITC-t"IC Hotel 	0.17 	0.16 
fTC-WIMCO 	0.18 	0.16 
IOC-Borlgal 	0.08 	0.05 
IOC-Chennai 	0.08 	0.05 
0.13 0.10 
0.12 0.10 
- 0.05 0.03 
0.02 0.05 
IOC-1131) 	 0.08 
Mean 0.12 
Post 
Merger 
S. No. 	Ac uisition 	ROA 
Bhadrachlm 	0.26 
0.05 
0.10 
ROE 
	
 0.03 	0.03 1 
0.08 	0.07 
Industry Adjusted ROE 
Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
ROA 	ROA 	p value 
0.14 	0.10 	0.004304 
Pre-
merger 
ROA 
0.27 
p 
value 
0.11 
ITC-ITC Hotel 0.26 0.27 0.13 0.10 
ITC-WIMCO 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.13 
IOC-Bon ai 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.06 
IOC-Chennai 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.07 
IOC-IBP _ 	0.24 	0.17 
Mean 	 0.2 	11." 
NP Margin --- -- 	 Post 	Pre- 
Merger 	merger 	p 
S. No. 	Acquisition 	ROA 	ROA 	value 
0.09 0.08 
_ 	0.12 	0.09 
 Industry Adjusted NP 
-^ 	--r 
Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
ROA 	ROA 
Margin 
p value 
ITC-ITC 
Bhadrachlnl 	0.14 	0.08 	0.03 0.09 0.06 0.031914 
ITC-ITC Hotel 	0.14 ! 	0.12 
ITC-W I MCO 	0.15 	0.13 
0.01 -0.05 
0.08 0.07 
IOC-Bon al 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
IOC-Chennai 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01 
IOC-IBP 
Mean 
0.04 0.03 
0.07 
0.00 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.01 0.09 
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_- 	E I'S 	- 	1 Industry Adjusted [PS 
Post 	Pre- 
\lerger 	mercer 	p 	Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
S. No. 	Acquisition 	R(l:1 	ROA 	value 	ROA 	ROA 	pvalue 
"fC-ITC  
Bhadrachlm 	38.63 	21.04 	0.81 	 28.27 	13.58 	0.982334 
ITC-ITC Hotel 8.10 	45.60 0.47  31.62 
ITC-WIMCO_4  8.09 	51.41 0.46 39.46 
47.61 32.04 IOC_Bongai 443 	38.31 
48.86  35.49 IOC-Chennai 	j 47.08 30.68 
IOC-IBP 59.52 4 38.89 57.21 35.27 
Mean 	 35.44 	38.46 30.18 	30.44 
Industry Adjusted CFFO/Total 
CFFO/Total Assets Assets 
Post 	Pre- 
Merger 
 
	merger 	p Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
S. No. I Acquisition 	ROA 	_ROA 	value ROA 	ROA pvalue 
ITC-IT.0 
L 	13hadrachlm 	0.16 	0.17 ' 	0.50 0.00 0.00 0.657911 
ITC-ITC Hotel 	0.15 0.20 0.15 0.20 
0.19 0.16 0.19 ITC-WIMCO 	0.16 
IOC-Bon>ai 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.06 
IOC-Chennai 	0.10 ! 	0.07 0.10 0.07 
IOC-IBP 0.05 
0.12 
0.08 
0.13 
	
0.04 	0.07 
0.09 	0.10 Mean 
Industry Adjusted 
CFFO/O eratin 	Assets CFF0/erating Assets 
Post 	Pre- 	i  
Merger 	merger 	p Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
S. No. 	Ac uisition 	ROA 	ROA 	 value ROA 	ROA pvalue 
ITC-ITC  
Bhadrachlm 0.24 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.318991 
ITC-ITC Hotel 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.27 
ITC-WIMCO 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.27 
IOC-Bongai 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.10 
IOC-Chennai 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.10 
IOC-IBP 0.06 0.12 0.05 	0.10 
0.12 	0.14  Mean 	 i 	0.16 0.18 
CFFO/Market Value of Industry Adjusted CFFO/Market 
Assets _ Value of Assets 
Post 	Pre- 
Merger 	merger 	p Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
S. No. 	 Acquisition 	ROA 	L ROA_lj ROA 	ROA 	pvalue 
ITC-I IC 
Bhadrachlm 	0.06 	0.05 	0.97 0.00 	0.00 0.999444 
IT'C-ITC Hotel 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 
ITC-WIMCO 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 
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IOC-Qon gai 0.14 	0.09 0.14 0.08 
IOC-Chennai 0.14 	0.09 0.14 0.08 
IOC-IBP 	 0.06 	0.10 0.05 0.09 
0.07 	0.07 Mean 	 0.08 	0.08 
CFFO/Sales _Industr,. Adjusted CFFO/Sales 
Post 	Pre- 
Merger 	merger 	p Post Merger 	Pre-merger 
S. No. 	Acquisition 	- 	- ROA 	ROA 	value ROA_ 	ROA 	p value 
ITC'-ITC 
Bhadrachlm 	 0.114 	0.11 	0.79 0.00 	0.00 	0.432771 
0.13 
0.13 
0.15 
0.15 
IT(' _ITC Hotel 	0.13 	0.15 
ITC-WIMCO 0.14 	0.15 
IOC-Bonaai 0.05k 0.04 0.05 0.03 
IOC-Chennai 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
IOC-1BP 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Mean 0.09 L 	0.09 0.06 0.07 
EVA Book Value 
Post 	Pre- -_ 
Merger 	merger 	p 
S. No. 	Acquisition 	ROA 	ROA 	value 
ITC-ITC 
Qhadrac4it 	i 	:,41.7011 	78.97 	0.00 
ITC-I ft' Hotel 	49 3.71 	268.06 
ITC-W I MCO 	768.51 	230.28 
IOC-Bongai 	1136.26 	3.7.32 
IOC-Chkennai 	1077.35 	343.83  
IO(•-1131) 	 870.94 	41-1.55 
Mean 	 781.41 	280.50 
EVA Market Value 
Post 	Pre- 
Merger 	merger p 
S. No. 	Ac uisition 	ROA 	ROA_ value 
ITC-ITC 
Rhadrachlrn 	1322_6 	44 3.8 3 0.05 
ITC-ITC Hotel 	2351.81 837.30 
I"I'C-WIMCO 	2295.31, 870.20 
IOC-Bongai 	 1.18 	0.14 
IOC-Chennai 	646.3 	227.03 
IOC-113P______ 	341.81 	353.24 _--~ 
Mean 	 1159.79 } 455.29 
EVA Gorden Gro t  
Post 	Pre- 
Merger 	merger 	p 
S. No. 	Acquisition 	ROA 	ROA 	value 
ITC-IT'C 
L 	Bhadrachlm 	617.90 11 	74.53 0.00 
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ITC-ITC Hotel 
ITC-WIb1C0 
1146.47 
133345 
350.1 I 
340.01 
IOC-Bongai 1103.28 239.82 
t0C-Chennai 046.33 227.03 
IOC-IBP 
Mean _ 	_ 
811.65 
_943.1R 263.231 	_. 	I 
347.91 	i 
L I 
4.22.2 Interpretations for subsample belonging to M&A of firms who are 
indulged in multiple mergers 
1. The mean ROA of comhined Firm has increased from 0.10 to 0.12 and the 
difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.00 when paired 
t-test is applied. 
2. 'fhc mean industry adjusted ROA of combined firm has increased from 0.07 to 
0.08 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.01 
when paired t-test is applied. 
3. The mean industry adjusted ROE ofeombined fret has increased from 0.09 to 
0.12 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.00 
when paired t-test is applied. 
4. The mean net profit margin of combined firm has increased from 0.07 to 0.09 
and the differer.ce is found significant as reflected by the p value of 0.03 when 
paired t-test is applied. 
5. The mean industry adjusted net profit margin of combined firm has increased 
from 0.01 to 0.03 and the difference is found significant as reflected by the p 
value of 0.03 when paired t-test is applied. 
6. When EVA is calculated by applying the book values for weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity and paired t-test is applied on the EVA of combined 
firms, significant improvement is found in EVA in post-merger period in 
comparison to pre-merger period. This is reflected by p-value of 0.00 
7. When EVA is calculated by applying the market value weights of debt & 
equity and cost of equity as per Gorden growth model and paired t-test is 
applied on the EVA of combined firms. significant improvement is found in 
EVA in post-merger period in comparison to pre-merger period. This is 
reflected by p-value of0.00 
8. No other performance measure has shown significant difference between pre 
and post merger period. 
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Chapter-5 
DISCUSSIONS &CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter the interpretations of financial and statistical analysis are discussed 
from the perspective of evaluation of financial pertormanee of merged entities. With 
the help of this qualitative analysis conclusions are drawn. The conclusions of this 
research study are presented in this chapter. 
Discussions based on the findings of the results of hypothesis testing for the overall 
sample pertaining to perfbrmancc parameters of domestic mergers & acquisitions are 
given as follows: 
5.1 M&A performance based on mean of five years performance measures: 
From Table 4.1, it can be observed that for majority of performance measures the post 
merger performance is greater than pre merger performance. However the 
improvement is not significant except in case of raw ROA and I-;VA measures. When 
Industry adjusted ROA is calculated then the difference in pre and post merger ROA 
diminished and found as insignificant. The EVA is calculated in three ways and for all 
three EVA measures: the results are depicting the significant improvement in 
performance. 
The Economic Value Added measure may show the improvement because of three 
reasons which are i)improvement in NOPAT, ii) Decline in WACC or iii) Decline in 
capital invested. 	 _ 
For all the three methods of EVA calculation the NOPAT and Capital invested is 
same and the difference is only in the calculation of WACC. If the results of all the 
three method are showing the improvement in EVA then it can be inferred that this 
improvement in EVA is caused by either increase in NOPAT or decrease in capital 
invested. For the merged entity the probability of reduction of capital invested is quite 
less which is measured as fixed assets plus current assets less current liabilities. 
Therefore, it seems likely that increase in EVA of merged entity is driven by the 
increase in operating profits. It implies that mergers have contributed to the economic 
profits and in turn in the ntacimizatlon of shareholder's wealth. 
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llo e er. the EVA calculation included several adjustments. hich ha\e been stated 
in the research methodology. In the light of no improvement depicted by any other 
performance measure, it ma\ he suspected that EVA results are influenced by the 
adjustments made in the calculation of the measure for sample firms. Further in the 
light of no improvement in performance depicted by the accounting and cash flow 
measures it may also be suspected that the results of EVA improvement are 
influenced h\ extraordinary values for fe\k sample firms as the mean results may be 
influenced h\ outlier values. Therefore, evaluation of performance also has to be done 
by using the cross-sectional median values. 
5.2 \1&A performance based on cross-sectional median for each year 
From table 4.2 it can he concluded that \\hen pre and post merger performance is 
compared on the basis of median values then ra\\ measures ROA, ROE, NP margin 
and EVA based on market cap have shown significant improvement. Industry 
adjusted ROE has also shown significant improvement. Because all the profitability 
measures are depicting the improvements therefore it can he inferred that profit 
margins of combined entities have increased 	hich may be a manifestation of 
increased price determining power of merged entities caused h\ increased market 
share after the mereer. 
It is observed that all these gains are \\iped Out once the are calculated after industry 
adjustments. It implies that increased profitability of the merged entities was industry 
performance related phenomenon and not the result of \1&\ activ itv 
Here Industry adjusted ROE: is sho\\ ing the improvement. "I he increase in ROE may 
be caused by three reasons i) increase in profit margin ii) increase in asset turnover 
ratio(or sales volume) and iii) increased leverage. If the increase in ROE would have 
been because of 1st two reasons then other profitability measures would have also 
depicted improvement. But only industry adjusted ROE measure is showing 
improvement then it can be inferred that it is caused by increased leverage in merged 
entities. 
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All the cash flow measures. all the industr\ adjusted accounting measures and two 
EVA measures have sho\\n that there is no significant difference in pre and post 
merger performance. 
Onl\ the EVA measure based on market value based WACC has depicted the 
improvement therefore it can be concluded the increase in EVA is not caused by 
improvement in operating profit (NOPAT) or decline in capital invested as they are 
same for all three methods of EVA calculation, rather the WACC is less when 
calculated using market value of' equity f heretbre. only one EVA measure where 
Ke- Net profit/market capitalization is sho\\ ing significant improvement. It implies 
that merger has actuall\ not resulted into improvement of' economic profits rather 
result is influenced b\ the method of calculation of' Ke. This is also confirmed from 
the no improvement sho\%n by all cash flo\\ measures and industry adjusted 
profitabilit y measures. 
5.3 Impact of various characteristics on merger characteristics: 
Discussions based on the results of Regression Analysis in order to assess the impact 
of merger characteristics on post merger performance parameters are given as 
follo\rs: 
5.3.1 Post merger ROA 
From the results of' regression analysis done for post merger ROA as dependent 
variable, it can be concluded that pre-merger performance as measured by pre-merger 
ROA has the significant influence on post-merger ROA. Several other merger 
characteristics do not have a significant impact on Post merger ROA. The intercept 
term is also not significant. It implies that an) improvement/decline in post-merger 
ROA is the continuation of' pre-merger performance. Merger and any other merger 
characteristics does not contribute to success/failure of the merged firm performance. 
5.3.2 Post merger industry adjusted ROE 
From the results of' regression analysis done for post merger industry adjusted ROE as 
dependent variable, it can be concluded that pre-merger performance as measured by 
pre-merger industr\ adjusted ROF has the significant influence On post-merger 
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industr\ adjusted ROE. Se\eral other merger characteristics do not have a significant 
impact on Post merger industr\ adjusted ROF. The intercept term is also not 
significant. It implies that an improvement decline in post-merger ROA is the 
continuation of pre-merger performance. \lerger and an other merger characteristics 
do not contribute to success failure of the merged firm performance. 
5.3.3 Post merger 'Cash Flows/Total Assets' 
In order to assess the impact of various merger characteristics on post-merger "Cash 
tlo\\sTotal Assets' measure, regression anal\sis is applied. From the results of 
regression analysis it can be interred that post merger performance is the continuation 
of the pre-merger performance of the firms and merger and an merger characteristics 
does not significantl: influence the post merger performance. 
5.3.4 Post merger industry adjusted 'Cash Flo%%s/'total Assets' 
In order to assess the impact of various merger characteristics on post-merger industry 
adjusted 'Cash tlo\\s/Total Assets' measure, regression analysis is applied. From the 
results of regression analysis it can be inferred that post merger performance is the 
continuation of the pre-merger performance of the firms and merger and any merger 
characteristics does not significantly influence the post merger performance. 
5.3.5 Post merger 'Cash Flows/N'larket Value of Assets' 
In order to assess the impact of \arious merger characteristics on post-merger 'Cash 
flows'Market Value of Assets' measure. regression analysis is applied. l rorn the 
results of regression analysis it can be interred that post merger performance is the 
continuation of the pre-merger performance of the firms and merger and any merger 
characteristics does not significantl influence the post merger performance. 
5.3.6 Post merger industrN adjusted 'Cash Flows/Market Value of Assets' 
In order to assess the impact of various merger characteristics on post-merger industry 
adjusted 'Cash flows/Market Value of Assets' measure, regression analysis is applied. 
From the results of regression analysis it can be inferred that post merger performance 
is the continuation of the pre-merger performance of the firms and merger and any 
merger characteristics does not significantly influence the post merger performance. 
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5.3.7 Post merger EVA based on hook values 
In order to assess the impact of various merger characteristics on post-merger EVA 
based on book values measure. regression analysis is applied. From the results of 
regression analysis it can be inferred that post merger performance is the continuation 
of the pre-merger performance of the firms and merger and an merger characteristics 
does not significantly influence the post merger performance. 
5.3.8 Post merger EVA based on market values 
In order to assess the impact of various merger characteristics on post-merger EVA 
based on market values measure. regression analysis is applied. Here intercept term 
also depicts a significant positive influence on post merger EVA. The intercept can be 
understood as the performance caused b\ merger irrespective of an` characteristics 
features of merger. From the results of regression analysis it can be inferred that post 
merger performance is the continuation of the pre-merger performance of the firms as 
well as merger has also contributed to the post merger l:V.\. However, any merger 
characteristics do not significantly influence the post merger performance. 
5.3.9 Post merger EVA based on Gorden Growth model 
In order to assess the impact of various merger characteristics on post-merger EVA 
based on gorden growth model, regression anal\sis is applied. Here intercept term 
also depicts a significant positive influence on post merger EVA. The intercept can be 
understood as the performance caused by merger irrespective of any characteristics 
features of merger. From the results of regression analysis it can be inferred that post 
merger performance is the continuation of the pre-merger performance of the firms as 
well as merger has also contributed to the post merger EVA. However. am merger 
characteristics do not signiticantl' influence the post merger performance. 
5.4 Conclusions for the subsamples categorized on the basis of various merger 
characteristics 
Performance analysis was done by dividing entire sample into two sub-samples based 
on each of the seven merger characteristics. For this purpose for each parameter 
paired t-test was applied in each sub-sample values to check whether the results for 
subsamples are statisticall\ different between pre and post-merger period. This helped 
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us to examine the performance of each set of twe sub-samples created on the basis of 
specific merger characteristics. 
5.4.1 Sub-samples based on relative size of Target Company 
From table 4.4 it can be concluded that when the whole sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on target size then it is found that for the subsample in which target 
size is less than 10% of acquirer size there is no significant difference in pre and post 
merger performance, across the parameters. Only the three EVA measures have 
shown the significant improvement. The EVA is calculated in three ways and for all 
three EVA measures; the results are depicting the significant improvement in 
performance. The Economic Value Added measure may show the improvement 
because of three reasons which are i)improvement in NOPAT, ii) Decline in WACC 
or iii) Decline in capital invested. For all the three methods of EVA calculation the 
NOPAT and Capital invested is same and the diferenee is onlc m the ealeukttion of 
WACC, If the results of all the three method are showing the improvement in EVA 
then it can be inferred that this improvement in EVA is caused by either Increase in 
NOPAT or decrease in capital invested. For the merged entity the probability of 
reduction of capital invested is quite less which is measured as fixed assets plus 
current assets less current liabilities. Therefore, it seems likely that increase in EVA 
of merged entity is driven by the increase in operating profits. It implies that for the 
subsample in which target size is less than 10% of the acquirer size, mergers have 
contributed to the economic profits and in turn in the maximisation of shareholder's 
wealth. However, the EVA calculation included several adjustments, which have been 
stated in the research methodology. In the light of no improvement depicted by any 
other performance measure- it may be suspected that EVA results are influenced by 
the adjustments made in the calculation of the measure for sample firms. Further in 
the light of no improvement in performance depicted by the accounting and cash flow 
measures it may be inferred that the results of [VA improvement are influenced by 
outlier values for few sample firms as the mean results may he influenced by outlier 
values. 
For the subsample in which target size is more than 10% of acquirer size there is no 
significant difference in pre and post merger performance, across the parameters. 
164 
Only one EVA measures have shown the significant improvement and two EVA 
measures have sho~\n that there is no significant difference in pre and post merger 
performance. Only the EVA measure based on market value based WACC has 
depicted the intpro%ement therefore it can be concluded the increase in I;VA is not 
caused h\ improvement in operating profit (NOPAT) or decline in capital invested as 
the are same for all three methods of EVA calculation. rather the \VACC is less 
when calculated using market value of equit\. Therefore. only one EVA measure 
where Ke = Net protitimarket capitalization is showing significant improvement. It 
implies that merger has actually not resulted into improvement of economic profits 
rather result is influenced by the method of calculation of Ke. This is also confirmed 
from the no improvement shown by all cash flow and profitabilit\ measures. 
Therefore. it can be inferred that whether the target size is small or large vis-a-vis 
acquirer size, mergers/acquisitions does not lead to significant improvement in 
profitabilit\ when measured b\ accounting ratios and cash tlo\\ parameters. However 
the Economic Value Added performance measure has sho%\n significant improvement 
in post-merger scenario in comparison to pre-merger scenario for the subsample in 
which target size is less than 10% of' acquirer size. This increase in EVA may be 
either the result of real economic gains or may be a manifestation of calculation 
methodology exceptional values of tcw sample firms. 
5.4.2 Sub-samples based on the level of promoter's stake in Acquirer Company 
From table 4.5 it can be concluded that when the whole sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on promoter's stake then it is found that for both the subsamples 
there is no significant difference in pre and post merger performance. across the 
parameters based on accounting ratios and cash flows. 
However, when performance is measured b\ EVA. significant improvement is found 
for the subsample in %\hick promoter's stake is less than 50 °%. The subsample in 
which promoter's stake is more than 50%. even the EVA parameter has also shown 
no significant difference between pre and post-merger performance. 
For the subsample in which promoter's stake is less than 50% in Acquirer Company 
all the EVA measures are depicting significant improvement. hich indicates the 
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increase in real economic gains caused b% the mergers. However in the light of no 
significant impro%ement depicted b> all the other cash flo and profitability measures 
for this subsample it may be suspected that results are influenced either by 
adjustments made in the EVA calculation or the outlier EVA values of the subsample 
firms. fheretore, it can he interred that whether the promoters' stake is large or small, 
mergers does not lead to significant difference in performance. 
5.4.3 Sub-samples based on the relatedness bet een merged companies 
From table 4.6 it can he concluded that \k hen the %\hole sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on relatedness then it is found that for the subsample in which 
unrelated mergers are included, there is no significant difference in pre and post 
merger performance. across the profitabilit\. cash flow and EVA parameters. 
The subsample in which related mergers are taken, none of the profitability and cash 
flo\N measure has depicted significant difference between pre and post-merger period 
except ra%\ ROA measure. Even the enhancement in the ROA performance is wiped 
out s hen industrs adjusted ROA is calculated. All the three EVE measures are 
showing significant improvement. This indicates the increase in real economic gains 
caused b\ the mergers. l{o%%e\er. in the light of no significant impro%ement depicted 
b\ all the other cash flo\\ and proiitabilith measures for this subsample it may be 
suspected that results are influenced either by adjustments made in the EVA 
calculation or the outlier EVA values of the subsample firms. Therefore it can be 
concluded that whether the merger is related or unrelated, it does not lead to any 
significant difference in the performance of merged entity. 
5.4.4 Sub-samples based on the mode of payment used for til&A 
From table 4.7 it can be concluded that \\hen the \\hole sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on cash vs. non cash mode of payment then it is found that there is 
no significant difference in pre and post merger performance, across the parameters 
except ra%% ROA & NP margin measure for the sub sample in \\hich mode of payment 
is non cash. This implies that for this subsample the gains were caused by increased 
price determining po\~er of' sample firm caused by increased market share after 
merger. Ho\%ever. when industry adjusted performance is measured then it is found 
that these gains disappeared. Therefore, it can be contemplated that increase in ROA 
and NP margin 'as the reflection of overall industry growth and not the result of 
mercer 
The subsample in which merged entities have used cash as mode of payment all the 
protitabilit\ and cash tlo\\ mca>urc, does not depict any significant difference in pre 
and post-merger performance. It is observed that all the three [VA measures have 
shoN\n significant improvement in performance. This indicates the increase in real 
economic gains caused h) the mergers for this subsample. Howe\er. in the light of no 
significant improvement depicted h\ all the other cash flow and profitability measures 
for this subsample it ma \ be suspected that results are influenced either by 
adjustments made in the EVA calculation or the outlier EVA values of the subsample 
firms. From this it can be concluded that \%hether mode of payment is cash or non-
cash. mergers does not lead to any significant difference in the performance of 
merged entity. 
5.4.5 Sub-samples based on the group versus non-group nature of 
merger/acquisition 
From table 4.8 it can he concluded that \%hen the \0 hole sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on group vs. non group mergers then it is found that for the 
subsample in which non-group mergers are studied no significant difference is 
observed across the protitabilitY and cash flo measures in pre and post-merger 
period. All the three EVA measures for this subsample have shown the significant 
improvement. This may indicate the increase in real economic gains caused by the 
mergers for this subsample. However. in the light of no significant improvement 
depicted by all the other cash flow and profitability measures for this subsample it 
may be suspected that results are influenced either by adjustments made in the EVA 
calculation or the outlier EVA values of the subsample firms. 
The subsample in 	hich merged firms ere the group companies. there is no 
significant difference in pre and post merger performance. across the parameters 
except ra\% ROA measure. E:\en this significant increase is diminished when industry 
adjusted ROA is measured. Therefore, it can he concluded that fir the sub sample in 
which group companies are considered. there is no significant difference in pre and 
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post-merger performance. From this discussion it can be concluded that the merger 
does not lead to significant difference in the performance of merged entity whether 
they are group or non-group mergers. 
5.4.6 Sub-samples based on the level of debt in acquirer company prior to 
acquisition 
From table 4.9 it can be concluded that when the whole sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on the proportion of debt in acquirer capital structure is less than 
40% or more, then iL is found that for the suhsample in which debt is less than 40% of 
total capital there is no significant difference in pre and post merger performance, 
across the accounting and cash Clow parameters. This sub sample depicts the 
significant improvement in all the three EVA measures. This may he the 
demonstration of real economic gains caused by merger. As all the other measures 
does not support this view therefore increase depicted by EVA measure may be 
originated from the adjustments made in EVA calculation or it may the impact of 
exceptionally high EVA value of few firms in this sub sample. 
The subsample in which debt is more than 40% of total capital structure of acquirer, 
there is no significant difference found in pre and post merger performance, across the 
accounting, cash flow and EVA parameters. Therefore, it can be concluded that for 
this subsample mergers does not lead to any considerable difference in performance. 
From this discussion. it can be concluded that mergers does not lead to any significant 
difference in the performance of merged firms whether the level of debt is high or low 
in the acquirer company. 	 - 
5.4.7 Sub-samples based on the structure of combination of two firms as merger 
or acquisition 
From table 4.10 it can be concluded that when the whole sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on the nature of combination whether it is acquisition or merger, 
then it is found that for the subsample in which structure of combination is acquisition 
there is no significant difference in pre and post merger performance, across the 
accounting and cash flow parameters. I his sub sample depicts the significant 
improvement in all the three EVA measures. This may be the demonstration of real 
economic gains caused by merger. As all the other measures does not support this 
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view therefore increase depicted by EVA measure may be originated from the 
adjustments made in EVA calculation or it may the impact of exceptionally high EVA 
value of few firms in this sub sample. 
For the subsample in which combination is in the form of merger there is no 
significant difference in pre and post merger performance, across the parameters 
except raw firm ROA and NP margin and EVA calculated based on market value of 
equity. Even this significant increase is diminished when industry adjusted ROA and 
NP margin is measured. Only the EVA measure based on market value based WACC 
has depicted the improvement therefore it can be concluded the increase in EVA is 
not caused by improvement in operating profit (NOPAT) or decline in capital invested 
as they are same for all three methods of EVA calculation, rather the WACC is less 
when calculated using market value of equity. Therefore. only one F.VA measure 	 _ 
where Ke= Net profit/market capitalization is showing significant improvement. It 
implies that merger has actually not resulted into improvement of economic profits 
rather result is influenced by the method of calculation of Kc. This is also confirmed 
from the no improvement shown by all cash flow measures and industry adjusted 
profitability measures. Therefore, it can he concluded that whether the combination is 
in the form of merger or acquisition. it does not lead to any significant difference in 
the performance of merged entity. 
5.5 M&A performance for select industries 
The entire sample is subdivided into nine subsamples on the basis of industries to 
which sample firms belong. Then performance of M&A for these select industries is 
separately evaluated. 
5.5.1 M&A performance for Pharmaceutical industry 
From Table 4.11 it can be concluded that for pharmaceutical industry the Net profit 
margin and CFFO deflated by sales have shown significant improvement for raw 
firms as well as industry adjusted measures. For rest of the measures no significant 
difference can be observed in pre and post-merger performance. From this it can be 
inferred that in pharmaceutical industry the merging fines are able to give better 
profit margins and cash flow margins on sales in comparison to their peers. 
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This better performance may be caused either by cost reduction because ofeconomies 
of scale. efficient utilization of assets etc, or the reason for such performance may be 
increase in monopoly power which could have helped them to charge higher margins 
in comparison to their peers. Because 'CFFO/Total Assets' measure does not shows 
improvement therefore performance does not seems to be caused by efficient asset 
utilisation. 
Finally it can be inferred that in pharmaceutical industry the merging firms are able 
to depict significant improvement on net profit and cash flow margins on sales caused 
by increase price determining power due to increased market share, which would have 
helped them to reap high margins. 
5.5.2 M&A performance for Refinery industry 
From Table 4.12 it can be concluded that for Refinery industr} only the EPS for raw 
firms as well as industry adjusted EPS, EVA(BV) and EVA (GO) have shown 
significant improvement measures. For rest of the measures no significant difference 
can be observed in pre and post-merger performance. From this it can be inferred that 
in refinery industry the merging firms are able to give better returns to their 
shareholders in comparison to their peers. 
This better performance reflected by improvement in EPS may be caused either by 
increased net profits or proportionately less number of shares. Because ROE measure 
does not shows improvement therefore performance does not seems to be caused by 
increased net profits. Therefore, it can be inferred That in refinery industry the 
merging firms are able to depict significant improvement in EPS caused by 
proportionately less Increase in no of shares after the merger (caused by low 
exchange ratios), in comparison to proportionately more increase in the combined 
EPS. 
In case of Refinery industry EVA based on book value and EVA based on Gorden 
growth model has shown significant improvement. In both the cases operating profit 
(NOPAT) and Capital Invested was same, only difference was of calculation of Ke. 
Because both measures have shown the significant improvement therefore it can be 
inferred that performance is improved either by increased NOPAT alter merger or 
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decreased capital invested calculated as fixed assets plus net current assets. After the 
merger there is very little probability of decrease in capital invested. Therefore it can 
be inferred that in case of refinery industry the performance is increased because of 
increased in operating profits (NOPA f) caused by mergers. 
This results also indicates that as per the conclusion given for overall sample, the 
outlier EVA value may have been generated by the firms belonging to refinery 
industry which are distorting the result of overall sample. 
5.5.3 N7&A performance for Automobile industry 
From Table 4.13 it is observed that for automobile industry there is no significant 
difference in any of the performance measure between pre and post-merger scenario. 
Thus merger does not seem to bring any considerable variation in the performance of 
merged firms in automobile industry. 
5.5,4 N1&A performance for Chemical industry 
From Table 4.14 it is observed that for the chemicals industry only the pure firm and 
industry adjusted 'cash flows to market value of assets' measure and pure firm 'cash 
flow to Sales measures have shown significant decline in the performance. This 
decline may have been caused by either decline in cash flows or increase in the 
respective denominator values (market value of assets and sales). As the other cash 
flow measures have not depicted the significant decline in post merger period, it can 
be inferred that the decline in cash flow to sales' is caused by proportionately more 
increase in sales value in comparison to increase in cash flows. This is also confirmed 
from reduced net profit margin though that is not significant. 
On the similar premise the measure 'cash flows to market value of assets' may has 
shown significant decline because of proportionately more increase in market value of 
assets as the cash flow measures deflated by hook value of assets are not showing 
significant decline, though insignificant decline exists for them too. 
From these results it can be inferred that in general the mergers have lead to 
deterioration in performance in chemical industry though for most of the measures 
decline is not significant. 
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5.5.5 \1&A performance for Tcvtilc industry 
Form table -l.I it can he seen that there is no significant difference in performance 
across the parameters hetx%een pre and post-merger scenario, for textile industry. 
Though most of the parameters ha%e sho%%n decline in post-merger period but that is 
not sienificant. 
5.5.6 \1&A performance for Construction & Equipment industry 
Form table 4.16 it can be seen that there is no significant difference in performance 
across the parameters between pre and post-merger scenario, for construction & 
equipments industry. Though different parameters have shown dif erent variation in 
post-merger period but that is not significant. 
5.5.7 %i&A performance for Construction Building \laterials industry 
From table 4.17 it can be observed that pure firm ROA measure and ra'\ as well as 
industry adjusted 'Cash tlo%%s to total assets' and 'cash tlo\'s to operating assets' have 
shon significant improvement in post-merger period \is-a-xis pre-merger period. 
The increase in these ratios may be caused either proportionatel\ more increase in net 
profits/cash flows or because of proportionately less increase in the asset value. This 
improvement seems to be caused by increased net profits/cash flows as ROE, NP 
margin and other cash floN\ measures also have depicted increase in post merger 
period, though it is not significant. Thus in construction & building material industry 
mergers seems to lead to better performance of sample firms. 
5.5.8 M1& performance for Electric & Electronic Appliances industry 
Form table 4.18 it can be seen that there is no significant difference in performance 
across the parameters between pre and post-merger scenario. for electric & electrical 
appliances industry. Though different parameters base sho%~n different variations in 
post-merger period but that is not significant. 
5.5.9 M&A performance for Plastic & Packaging industry 
From Table 4.19 it is observed that for the Plastic & Packaging industry the pure firm 
ROA. industry adjusted ROE. raw and industry adjusted [PS and raw and industry 
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adjusted 'cash flows to market value of assets measures have shown significant 
improvement in the performance. 
This increase may have been caused either by increase in profits/cash flows or less 
than proportionate increase in the respective denominator values (total assets, net 
worth, and number of shares or market value of assets). As almost all the industry 
adjusted measures have depicted the improvement in post merger period, it can be 
inferred that the increase in these ratios Is caused by increase in net profits or cash 
flows, 
It is observed here that the industry adjusted measures are showing more 
improvement in comparison to raw firm measures. It implies that merged firms in 
Plastic & Packaging industry have shown better performance in comparison to other 
industry mergers. 
3.6 Performance of multiple mergers & acqulsitinns 
Here the objective is to check that whether the firms which are involved in multiple 
mergers over a period of time are able to learn from their experience. If the acquirer 
learn out of their M&A experience over a period of time then this learning should be 
reflected in terms of better performance by the subsample of such firms. In our 
sample we identified two acquirers (ITC and IOC) who were involved in three-three 
mergers over a period of time. 
From Table 4.20 it can be concluded that for firms involved in multiple mergers the 
raw firm ROA & NP margin, industry adjusted ROA, ROE& NP margin, EVA(based 
on Book Value Ke) and EVA (based on Gorden Growth Ke) have shown significant 
improvement measures. From this it can be inferred that in firms involved in multiple 
mergers are able to give generate returns on their assets and for their shareholders in 
comparison to their peer. This better performance may he caused either by reduced 
cost caused by efficient use of assets or by increased prolit margin due to enhanced 
price determining power 
Finally it can be inferred that firms indulged in multiple mergers are able to learn 
from their previous acquisitions and depict significant improvement in ROA and ROE 
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caused by efficient usage of assets. This would have also helped them to generate 
high EVA caused by proportionate increase in combined prolits. after M&A. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Based on the above discussions following conclusions have been drawn: 
I. From the above discussion it can be concluded that for the overall sample no 
significant difference is found in the value of prntitahiIity and cash flow based 
performance measures between pre and post-merger scenario. For the 
Economic Value Added measure the significant improvement is found. It is 
discussed here that this significant improvement may indicate either the better 
operating profits caused by M&A or may be the result of outlier values in 
EVA value of'sample Firms. The improvement in EVA may also be caused by 
the several adluttmerrts made in its calcu lation. 
2. The results of regression analysis depicts that for ROA, industry adjusted 
ROE, raw & industry adjusted cash flows/total assets', raw & industry 
adjusted 'cash flows/market value of assets' and EVA measure, the 
performance of M&A can be explained by the variation in the pie-merger 
performance of merged entities. Mergers and any of the merger characteristics 
do not seems to have a bearing on these performance measures of merged 
entities. 
3. The results of set of two-two subsamples created on the basis of merger 
characteristics indicate that more or less there is no significant difference in 
the pre and post-merger performance of these subsamples. Therefore the 
difference in the merger characteristics does not seem to lead to different 
performance ol'M&.A. 
4. The results of the subsamples created based on select industries indicate that 
results of M&A vary across industries. The results of Pharmaceutical, 
Refinery industry, Construction Building Material industry. Plastic & 
Packaging industry depicts the better performance of merged companies. In 
Automobile industry. Textile industry, construction & Equipment industry, 
Electric & Electronic Appliances industry mergers have not led to any 
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significant difference in performance. In case of chemical industry, results 
indicate that mergers have led to deterioration in performance. 
The improvement in EVA in the overall sample is also explained! by the results 
of select industries. the EVA has shown significant improvement only in 
Refinery industry and not in any other industry. Therefore, the suspicion 
raised in the overall sample toward the outlier FVA values in few sample firm, 
found to be true. It can be concluded that only the M&A in refinery industry 
are able to generate high EVA which is misleading/distorting the result of 
overall sample. 
5. The firms involved in multiple mergers have shown significant improvement 
in performance. This indicates that acquirer learn out of their merger & 
acquisition experience over time. 
Thus we can conclude that different results shown by different M&A cases are the 
manifestation of industry specific factors related phenomenon. 
Because the sample comprises of domestic firms involved in M&A from 16 acquirer 
industries and 67 pairs of sample firms are spread over a period of 1999 to 2007, the 
results of the study can be generalized in Indian contest. 
5.8 Recommendations 
The following are the recommendations based on the results of this study: 
l_ As depicted by the results of this study that all the mergers are not profitable. 
The firms should not assume that every M&A will result may into better 
performance as the growth is not synonymous of improvement in financial 
performs rice. 
2. The industry specific factors have a hearing on the firm performance; 
therefore the tirms tormrdating the growth strategy through M&A should 
study the specific environment pertaining to their industry. 
3. The firms should evaluate their prior M&A experience as such learning may 
be helpful in improving the performance of their future acquisitions. 
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5.9 Directions for future research 
1. In this stud,, for the evaluation of M&A performance in select industries 
sample sizes are very small for each industry as they are the subsamples 
created from the same overall sample. %%hich is not sho%%ing improvement in 
the results but %hen broken into subsample based on industries some 
subsamples ha%e sho%%n significant improvement. 	hile others not. This 
helped us to conclude that industr% specific factors have a bearing on M&A 
performance. I lo~%e\cr. in order to have a better understanding of this aspect 
large sample size should be used for each industry and this aspect should be 
further probed for more number of industries with larger sample sites. 
2. In this stud\ the mergers by the firm involved in multiple M&A have shown 
significant improvement. However, here also the sample size is very small. 
Therefore in order to understand the phenomenon of acquirer learning because 
of multiple merger experience large number of firm involved in multiple 
merger should be included into sample and this aspect of the work should be 
improved b\ future researches. 
3. In this studs '\e have used the profitability measures, cash flow measures and 
FVA for the performance measurement of M&A. There is one more 
performance measure Market Value Added (MVA) \\hich is not applied here 
and it helps to anal\ze the additional value assigned h\ the market over and 
above the book value of' firm. Future research \+ork can be directed towards 
the analysis of increase/decrease in MVA of the merged entities before and 
after the merger. 
4. This study has studied the performance of onl\ domestic M&A. The cross-
border mergers are not evaluated here and they should be examined in the 
future studies. 
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Annexure-I 
List of Sample Mergers and Acquisitions 
S. No. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
I0 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24  
Acquirer Company 
A I ('hampdan. Inds. Ltd. 
Aarti Industries Ltd. 
Aban Offshore Ltd. 
Ambuja Cements Ltd. 
Ambuja Cements Ltd. 
Asahi India Glass Ltd. 
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
Bilt Paper Holdings Ltd. 
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. 
Chambal Fertilisers & Chemicals Ltd 
Clariant Chemicals (India) Ltd. 
Coromandel International Ltd. 
Cosmo Films Ltd. 
Dr. ReddN'S Laboratories Ltd. 
Everead% Industries (India) Ltd. 
Forbes & Co. Ltd. 
Gateway Distriparks Ltd. 
Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. Ltd. 
Gitanjali Gems Ltd. 
(ilaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Gujarat Narmada Valle\ Fertilizers Co. 
Ltd. 
Henkel India Ltd. 
Himachal Futuristic Communications 
Ltd. 
Target Company 
('hampdan\ Industrie,, ltd. 
Alchemic Organics Ltd. 
Hitech Drilling Sere ices India Ltd. 
Ambuja Cement Rajasthan Ltd. 
Ambuja Cement Eastern I'td. 
Floatglass India Ltd. 
Kochi Refineries Ltd. 
Janpath Investments & Holdings Ltd. 
German Remedies Ltd. 
India Steamship Co. Ltd. 
Clariant (India) Ltd. And Vanavil Dyes & 
Chemicals Ltd. 
Godavari Fertilisers & Chemicals Ltd. 
Gujarat Propack Ltd. 
Cheminor Drugs Ltd. 
Po\\ercell Batter\ India Ltd. 
F A L Industries Ltd. 
Snowman Frozen Foods Ltd. 
G I S Ltd. 
Gemplus Jeweller India Ltd. 
Smithkline Beecham Pharmaceuticals 
(India) Ltd. 
Burroughs \Vellcome (India) L.td. 
Narmada Chematur Petrochemicals Ltd. 
Henkel Spic India Ltd. 
IITLLtd. 
S. No. Acquirer Company Target Company 
25 Hindalco Industries Ltd. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
26 Hyderabad Industries Ltd. Malabar Building Products Ltd. 
27 1 T C Ltd. I T C Bhadrachalarn Paperboards Ltd. 
28 I T C Ltd. I T C Hotels Lid. 
29 IT C Ltd. Wimco Ltd. 
30 I V R C L Ltd. Hindustan Dorr-Oliver L.td. 
31 Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. Bongaigaon Refinery & Petrochemicals 
Ltd. 
32 Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. Chennai Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
33 Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. I B P Co. Ltd. 
34 Ispat Industries Ltd. Ispat Metallics India Ltd. 
35 J S W Steel Lid. Jindal Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. 
36 Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. Mahindra I Iinoday Inds. Ltd. 
37 Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. Punjab'I'raetors Ltd. and Swaraj Engines 
Ltd. 
38 Matrix Laboratories Ltd. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd. and 
Vorin Laboratories Ltd. 
39 Megasoft Ltd. Visualsott Technologies Ltd. 
40 Mire Electronics Ltd. Onida Savak Ltd. 
41 N R B Bearings Ltd. S N I. Bearings ltd. 
42 Nirma Ltd. Saurashtra Chemicals Ltd. 
43 Novartis India Ltd. Ciba Ckd Biochem Ltd. 
44 Pfizer Ltd. Parke-Davis (India) Ltd. 
43 Philips Electronics India Ltd. Philips Glass India Ltd. and Punjab Anand 
Lamp Inds. ltd. 
46 Punjab Chemicals & Crop Protection Alpha Drug India Ltd. 
Ltd. 
47 Punjab Chemicals & Crop Protection I A & I C Chem Pvt. Ltd. 
Ltd. 
48 R SW M Ltd. Cheslind'rextiles Ltd. 
49 Raymond Ltd. Ring Plus Aqua ltd. 
50 Reliance Industries Ltd. Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd. 
S. No. Acquirer Company Target Company 
51 Reliance Industries Ltd. Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 
52 Salzer Electronics Ltd. Salzer Controls l.td. 
53 Siemens Ltd. Siemens V DO Automotive Ltd. 
54 Spente\ Industries ltd. emit Spinning Inds. Ltd. 
55 Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
56 Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. Ilindustan Zinc Ltd. 
57 Stmdaram-Clayton Ltd. T V S Motor Co. Ltd. 
58 Sundram Fasteners Ltd. F V S Autolec Ltd. 
59 Supreme Industries Ltd. Siltap Chemicals l.td. 
60 T V S Motor Co. Ltd. Lakshmi Auto Components Ltd. 
61 Tata Chemicals I.td. Hind Lever Chemicals Ltd. 
62 Tata Sons Ltd. C M C Ltd. 
63 Tata Steel Ltd. l ata S S L Ltd. 
64 Torrent Power Ltd. Torrent Power A E C Ltd. and Torrent 
Po~~ er S F C l.td. 
65 [flex I.td. F C L 'l'echnolooies & Products Ltd. and 
Flex Engineering Ltd. 
66 l'nited Spirits l.td. Shah\ Wallace & Co. Ltd. 
67 V I P Industries I.td. Blow Plast Ltd. 
